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Introduction

Now that globalization is in the air, it is discernible in various forms and assuming

varying contacts and ramifications. Globalization already affects national treatment and

practice. It raises a number of questions that cannot be readily and easily answered. It

may have to strengthen or weaken, in some respect or to some extent, the traditional

concept of national boundary or territoriality, within which only one supreme authority

exists without any external interference or interposition. Gradual and natural erosion of

t

sovereign authority of a state is superseded by that of a global, supranational, or regional

~

entity.

In particular, the globalization of finance has created a significant evolution of the

international financial system in recent years. Very rapid increases in telecommunication

and computer-based technologies have reduced the costs of borrowing and lending across

traditional national boundaries, and thereby led to a dramatic expansion of cross-border

financial flows entailed by the instantaneous transmission of information around the globe.

Notably, the global financial integration has eroded economic and regulatory barriers to

1

competition across the marketplace for financial services. The growing global financial

system is demonstrated to be far more efficient today than ever before in that it has

significantly facilitated cross-border trade in goods and services, and thus substantially

contributed to standards of living worldwide.

However, the world financial system has witnessed that the efficiency of the global

system has exposed and punished underlying economic weakness swiftly and decisively,

which has been accompanied by the effective transmission of financial disruptions as

shown in considerable worldwide economic turbulence over the last decade, and the risks

that internationally active banking and financial institutions have had to cope with have

become more complex and challenging. As evidenced in recent financial crisis episodes,

the world's financial regulators have been struggling with dealing with new and complex

financial instruments and techniques driven by the financial innovation over the preceding

decades. In particular, bank regulatory authorities have not succeeded in keeping pace

with the dynamics of evolving international financial system, such as improvements in risk

management in banking organizations, thereby failing to catch up with the market.

2

In the circumstances, the globalization of finance spurred by the information revolution

has called for the integrated international regulation of banking organizations. At the same

time, recent financial crises have raised a question of global governance as an agenda for

rethinking about the rules and norms that underpin the world order, because the current

global governance agenda emphasizes the universalization of understanding of global

governance based on the efficiency and effectiveness through one-size-fits-all formulas, in

which democratic accountability and participation is a secondary variable. Although

implementing internationally acceptable financial standards is important, but remains

problematic, because the national differences in financial systems and regulatory

frameworks that underpin existing practices complicate the process of identifying and

enforcing the standards. Despite strong pressures for the convergence of one-size-fits-all

standards throughout the global system, the current global governance agenda has given

little attention to the tension between harmonizing pressures of financial globalization led

by advanced financial centers and prevailing diversity of financial systems and to their

economic consequences. Prevailing variations in national financial practices continue to

3

complicate policy and regulatory cooperation through international institutions. Thus, the

continued failure of national regulatory authorities to collaborate effectively attenuates

prospects for the successful restructuring ofthe global financial regime through

international cooperation based on harmonization. Here persistent national differences in

financial market structures and institutions have significant implications for international

cooperative efforts at global financial governance.

In order to restructure global governance toward a just new world order in the

international finance, it needs to explore specific policy and regulatory options to national

and international policy makers in devising patterns of regional and international

cooperation. An important issue is how to enhance democracy, legitimacy, and

accountability in the global financial regime dominated by the leading industrial states.

Further, it needs to address what should be the appropriate national and international

responses to the growing needs for regional cooperation through regional institutional

coordination, as international regulatory cooperation continues to be difficult.

4
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While the private sector activities have increasingly dominated global financial

transactions, the wider public sector policy and regulatory objectives of financial

governance have become more difficult. Further, there is a recognition that in light of

ongoing global financial integration, emerging forms of governance and regulation involve

a shift in power and authority from public sector institutions, across international layers, to

forms of private sector and, increasingly, private interest governance and regulation. This

situation pertains in both developed and emerging market economies. In particular,

~

regulatory refonn efforts on the part of national regulatory authorities and institutional

institutions are important, but they are not sufficient for the effective governance of global

finance. Notably, the role and influence of private sector actors in the elaboration of public

policy with regard to financial regulation have been considerably enhanced at national,

regional, and international levels. While the private sector is crucial to the governance of

financial system at national, regional, and global levels, what should be the proper balance

between public authority and private interests? To that end, the role ofthe state is deemed

5
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to stand in need of reevaluation in an increasingly integrated global economy, as the private

sector involvement is essential to the effective governance of global finance.

In line with the analyses above, this study attempts to address that in search of a just

new world order in the global finance what should be the proper national, regional, and

international responses to the global financial integration. At first glance, it analyzes the

globalization of finance. The impact of globalization on state sovereignty is also

demonstrated. In this regard, this study seeks to reconceptualize the traditional notion of

state sovereignty. Here it highlights the increased interaction and interdependence

between states and nonstate actors in the global economy. Then, this study moves on to

the anatomy of the dynamics of global governance through government

networks-independent national regulatory agencies-among states in terms of

transgovernmentalism. In the context of an increasingly global economy, it acknowledges

the rise of trans governmental regulatory organizations in various areas and the

achievements of these government networks, but it attempts to point to problems with the

networks. With the investigation ofthe trans governmental theory in light of global

6
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governance, this study identifies the features oftransgovemmental financial regulatory

organizations.

Thereafter, the focus of this study shifts to the examination of international banking

regulation and supervision under the auspices of the Basel Committee on Banking

Supervision (Basel Committee). As noted, no other sector than banking has become more

global in its operations, and thus more difficult to monitor and supervise it. As such,

global convergence in banking has made greater strides than in any other financial sector.

However, some skepticism has run over the argument that global standards in banking have

been established by the international financial community's concerns about the safety and

soundness of the global financial system. Arguably, hegemony of Western powers began a

drive to move in terms of hegemonic stability more than their concerns about a global

banking crisis. In this context, this study attempts to assess the Basel Committee's bank

supervisory standards and capital adequacy rules, and thereby rethink whether global

convergence in banking regulation is desirable and inevitable. To that end, it seeks to

address the impetus for the creation ofthe Basel Committee, and explore driving forces

7

behind the internationalization of bank regulatory and supervisory standards. Following

the theoretical analysis of systemic risk, historical experiences of bank failures are

reviewed to answer the question about whether systemic risk has really played a key role in

the internationalization of bank regulatory and supervisory standards.

More importantly, this study attempts to explore the origins ofthe Basel Accord on

bank capital adequacy. To do so, it largely relies on current theories on the process of

negotiating the capital adequacy standards in the areas of political science and international

political economy. At this point, this study takes a position as a break against the force of

international market failure logic that has enjoyed an exceptionally positive reception

among economists, political scientists, and legal experts. Nonetheless, it does not intend to

freeze the international coordination and cooperation of banking regulation.

Given the understanding of the politics behind the creation of the Basel Accord, this

study evaluates the Basel Accord of 1988 and the new capital adequacy framework (Basel

II), and then moves beyond the assessment of the capital adequacy standards. In doing so,

it attempts to draw lessons from Basel toward a just world order in the global finance. In

8
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search of a new international financial order, this study analyzes the dilemmas of

international financial regulation. Then, the role of private regulation is examined. While

this study stresses the importance of the private sector in the governance of financial system

at national, regional, and international levels, it addresses what the proper balance should

be between the public authority and private interests for the appropriate pUblic-private

partnership. Given the difficulties of institutional collaboration at the international level,

this study emphasizes the importance of regional cooperation for global financial

~

governance. In this way, it seeks to contribute to an assessment of proper balance between
the market and regulatory discipline that would ensure that financial institutions have

sufficient opportunities to compete fairly and profitably in a global marketplace. Finally,

this study attempts to answer the question of what should be the appropriate national,

regional, and international responses to global financial integration, and thus provide a new

paradigm for the just world order in global finance.

9

I.

The Globalization of Finance

A. Introduction
Globalizationl has begun in various dimensions. Since the inception of the

globalization process in numerous aspects, all our global neighbors are increasingly seeing

the new issues and counter-effects that government and societies must confront. Amidst

the enormous challenges driven by the process, it is worth noting that globalization
propelled by information revolution2 and technology innovation has created the increasing

~

needs of cross-border relationships between countries, which extend across widely

c

dispersed locations, transcending territorial borders. The global financial system has been

evolving at ever-fast rates in the past decades. New technology has radically reduced the

cost of borrowing and lending across national borders, facilitating the development of new

I Globalization commonly refers to the erosion of geographical borders between states in the form of crossborder exchange of goods, services and information technology along with cultural transfers. See Roman
Terrill, What does 'Globalization' mean?, 9 TRNASNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217,218 (1999); Greenspan
describes globalization as "the interaction of national economic systems." See Alan Greenspan, Opening
Remarks presented at the symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, titled Global
Economic Integration: Opportunities and Challenges (August 24-26, 2000), at 1.
2 The information revolution has raised the significance of the "back office operations" supporting other
business activities, which were formerly considered as mere "plumbing," but now main operational process of
business organizations seeking more profits. See Jane K. Winn, Catalytic Impact of Information Technology
on the New International Financial Architecture, 34 INT'L L. 137, 146 (2000).
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instruments and drawing in new players. 3 Indeed, computer and telecommunication

technology has made it possible to use the integrated system and programmes for

conducting highly complex financial transactions and for the immediate and systemic

exploitation of the flood of available infonnation that may be of relevance for financial
operations. 4 The massive use ofthe Internet, therefore, has created not only a huge jump

in transaction volumes but also the utilization of highly complex financial innovations, such
as the whole range of ever more sophisticated derivative instruments5 which are used to
refine further the allocation of risk, and mostly traded in over the counter6 markets. 7 As a

result, electronic exchanges have been used around the globe for traditional stock-exchange

3 See Alan Greenspan, Testimony before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, US House of
Representatives (January 30, 1998), at 1.
4 Mario Giovanoli, Virtual Money and the Global Financial Market: Challenges for Lawyers, 1 Y.B. INT'L
FIN. & ECON. L. 3, 16 (1996).
5 A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is based on (derived from) other assets or variable.
Derivatives include options, swaps, and warrants. See generally Hal S. Scott & Philip A. Wellons,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, ANDREOULATION 921-998 (5 th ed. 1998).
6 Securities transactions are conducted through a telephone and computer network connecting dealers in
stocks and bonds rather than through an exchange. See id. at 800-801.
7 See Giovanoli, supra note 4.

11

business, and for futures 8 thanks to the specific programmes along with modem data-

processing techniques.

However, the growth of global networked information systems poses serious threats to

the soundness of financial markets, and thus destabilizes markets around the world because
financial information can be transmitted too quickly across borders. 9 It is argued that

"excessive computerization has also tended to deform the financial services industry into a

game driven by sheer lust for financial gain, without a broader sense of self-discipline or

concern for the overall welfare of the economy or society."l0 The worldwide prevalence of

greed among informed and sophisticated market participants of the money game creates a

serious threat to the healthy development of financial markets because unsophisticated

customers cannot access the accurate information rather than false rumors. As a

consequence, a good number of gullible investors in a scam investment scheme can

destabilize the safety of financial markets by rushing in and out of the market based on

Futures is an agreement to buy or sell a fixed quantity of a particular connnodity, currency, or security for
delivery at a fixed rate. Unlike an option, a future contract involves a defmite purchase or sale and not an
unlimited loss. See generally Scott & Wellons, supra note 5.
See Winn, supra note 2, at 137.
Toyoo Gyoten, Global Financial Markets: The Past, The Future, and Public Policy, in REGULATING
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: ISSUES AND POLICIES 18 (Franklin R. Edwards et al. eds., 1991).
8

:0
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misperceptions. ll Despite regulators' sustained efforts, serious violations in business

ethics by the swindlers in the market through sophisticated technologies have brought about

the exploitation of uninformed investors, and illegal actions such as securities fraud, which

have a great impact on the global financial stability.

Undoubtedly, the global integration of information technology has become the

challenges to the participants of the financial markets. On the one hand, financial services

providers need to survive increasing competition with competitors through the prudent

management ofthe risks entailed by acting on the opportunities offered by new

technologies. On the other hand, regulatory and supervisory authorities should keep pace

with the rapid financial innovation, and make endeavors in striking an appropriate balance

in the midst of rapidly changing market environment since the evolution of the financial

services industry driven by technological advances is not likely to stop. In short, the

financial markets need to operate more efficiently and prudently to the extent that same

degree of access is available to all of the participants of the market, and an appropriate

11

See W'mn, supra note 2, at 143.

13

balance between market and regulatory discipline ensures sufficient opportunities to both

financial services providers to compete prudently and their unsophisticated clients to take

advantage of advances in technology.

B. Financial Integration

Over the past decades, financial markets have tended to become more tightly linked

across national boundaries. A notable example of capital market linkages among the

countries is the introduction of Euro along with the advent of EMU (European Monetary

Union), which represents a significant change since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
system in 1971 and the movement to floating exchange rates in 1973. 12 The EMU has

eliminated exchange rate fluctuations among the eleven (11) participating countries, and

reduced dramatically interest spreads and the volatility of the spreads.13 The emergence of

12 See Horst Koeler, The Euro-An Emblem Success and Challenges ofEuropean Integration, Remarks on the
Occasion of the Informal Meeting of the ECOFIN Council (December 14, 2001), available at http://www.imf
orglextemaVnp/speeches120011l21401.htm (last visited January 10,2003). See also Bertold Wahlig,
European Monetary Law: The Transition to the Euro and the scope ofLex Monetae, in INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 121 (Mario Giovanoli ed., 2000).
I3 The participating countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain. All the European countries are expected to join the EMU by 2010 under

14
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. . . . .------------------------------------------~

a unified money market for liquidity with the rapid start of EMU has created a two-tiered

structure. The first tier includes the large banks in each domestic market, which compete

for the European Central Bank (ECB) funds at auction and trade liquidity among them,

effectively distributing liquidity throughout the euro area. These large banks operate as

hubs for distributing liquidity to a second-tier of smaller institutions in national markets.

I4

As for emerging market economies, a dramatic evidence of their linkage to global

financial markets was drawn during the Asian financial crisis, which was preceded by a

massive surge in gross private capital flows to emerging market countries and a deep

compression of spreads for emerging market borrowers.

I5

Notably, the five Asian crisis

countries (Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines) received $47.8

billion in foreign bank loans in 1996. This capital inflow turned into a $29.9 billion

the condition that all goes well and the monetary union is prosperous. See Robert Mundell, The Euro: How
Important?, 18 CATOJ. 441, 444 (Winter 1999).
14 See International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy
Issues 13 (September 2000).
15 See Michael Mussa, Factors Driving Global Economic Integration, paper presented for the symposium
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, titled Global Economic Integration: Opportunities
and Challenges (August 24-26,2000), at 34-38. The Chart 5 in Mussa's paper illustrates the fInancing
conditions for emerging markets between 1990 and 2000. According to Mussa, factors driving global
economic integration fall into three categories: technological developments, social and individual for the
benefIts of globalization, and public policy. Mussa stresses that these factors have acted individually and
interactively in driving integration.

15

outflow in 1997-a turnaround of almost $80 billion.

16

In this regard, one argues that these

changes represent "a shift in tastes of global investors either toward lower assessment ofthe

risks of investing in [Asian] emerging markets or toward greater acceptance of such
risks.,,1 7 Encouragingly, a recent annual data on net private capital flows to emerging
markets show that net inflows stabilized in 1999 after large falls during 1997-1998. 18

While with the financial globalization, international capital flows have increased

markedly in the 1990s, some observers emphasize the need to determine ifthere has been a

genuine increase in financial market integration because cross-border financial market
linkages do not necessarily imply high degree of financial integration. 19 It is worth noting

that according to the causes of the increase in financial market integration, the evaluation of

degree of financial integration may be variably different. In short, this is because the

Martin N. Baily et aI., The Coloro/Hot Money, 79 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 101.
See Mussa, supra note 15, at 34.
18 See IMF, supra note 14, at 44-45 ("The stabilization of net private capital flows reflects continuing growth
in foreign direct investment and a recovery in portfolio investment, which more than offset a continuing
cutback in bank lending"). According to the report, net capital inflows to five Asian crisis countries have been
broadly unchanged from 1998.
19 See Juan Ayuso & Roberto Blanco, Has financial market integration increased during the 1990s?, BIS
Conference Papers No.8 (March 2000), International Financial Markets and the Implications for Monetary
and Financial Stability, at 175-195. Ayuso and Blanco focus on stock markets and compute direct measures of
the changes in market integration in 1990s. They argue that the main driving factor behind the increase in
financial market linkages is the information globalization that affects fmancial prices rather than a higher
degree of market integration.
16
17

16
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welfare and policy implications ofthe apparent higher linkages depend on whether they are

the outcome of greater market integration-fewer barriers to free financial trade in the

context of financial services liberalization-or the globalization of information which still

entails barriers.20

Here, there is still a need to investigate the persuasive evidence of growing international

financial integration over the last decade. One adopts two indicators to support the
evidence. 21 The first indicator is the sharp expansion in the scale of both gross and net
capital flows between industrial countries, and between developed and emerging markets. 22

According to a balance-of-payments statistics, net inflows into emerging economies rose

from virtually zero in 1989 to reach $307 billion in 1996 before falling half that level
during 1997-1998. 23 Although the financial crisis has subdued the economic growth in

See id. at 192.
See William R. White, Evolving International Financial Markets: Some Implications for Central Banks,
BIS Working Papers No. 66 (April 1999) at 2.
22 For the features of net and gross flows of capital, see International Monetary Fund, International Capital
Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues (August 2001) at 6-7 ("Although net capital flows
provide useful insights about balance-of-payments fmancing and net funding requirements, they can
considerably understate the volume and volatility of international portfolio rebalancing. Gross flows more
closely reflect international transactions and are more relevant in terms of their impact on market prices and
volatility")
23 The Institute oflnternational Finance, Inc., Near-Term Prospects for Emerging Market Economies
(October 1998).
20

21

17
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emerging economies and private capital flows to these markets, net capital inflows are

expected to be about $160 billion in 2002, a significant increase from the $80.5 billion in

1999, and the $130 billion seen last year but well below the levels of the mid-1990s. 24

Nevertheless, gross capital inflows have risen sharply to about six times the level of net
flows on a global basis since the mid-1980s. 25 As such, the growing global financial

integration has occurred despite financial crises over the preceding decades.

In the meantime, it should be recognized that before strengthening the domestic

financial system the increase in the volume and volatility of international capital flows

driven by the capital account liberalization in light of financial liberalization has been a

driving factor behind the recent costly financial crises. 26 That is, the financial integration

as a process of the financial globalization has increased the potential risk of financial crisis.

However, some argue that financial globalization along with the international financial
24 See IMF, supra note 14, at 46. See also IIF, Integrated Approach Proposed/or a New Phase o/Crisis
Prevention and Crisis Management to Revive Emerging Market Capital Flows, IIF Press Release (April 9,
2002).

See IMF, supra note 22, at 7 ("The high level of gross flows relative to net flows suggests that countries
and regions that have small net capital flows can nevertheless experience substantial gross inflows and
outflows of capital") •
26
25

See Barry Eichengreen et aI., Liberalizing Capital Movements: Some Analytical Issues, IMF Economic
Issues No.17 (Feb. 1999) ("It is not fmancialliberalization that is at the root of the problem but rather weak
management in the fmancial sector and inadequate supervision and regulation, whose consequences are
magnified by liberalization.").

18

integration will eventually reduce the possibility of financial crisis since it is associated
with the increasing direct investment, which is not so risky as portfolio investment.27 By

contrast, one argues that recent financial crises have been caused mainly by the financial

market liberalization and deregulation rather than the global financial integration.

28

It is

worth noting that the period between 1945 and 1973 was seemingly calm and prosperous

since financial markets were operated by a stable system of pegged exchange rates under

the Bretton Woods system, widespread controls over capital flows, and strict restrictions on
banking activities. 29 Arguably, the relaxing ofthese financial regulations after 1974
brought about not only economic benefits but also potential risks of financial crisis. 3o

Another indicator of the increase in financial integration is the creation of new financial
markets and instruments to facilitate diverse transactions around the world. 3 ! As noted, the

27 Paul Krugman, Crises: The Price of Globalization, paper presented at the symposium sponsored by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, titled Global Economic Integration: Opportunities and Challenges
(Aug. 24-26, 2000) at 104. Krugman stresses although the process of globalization increased the risk of
financial crisis, the increase in trade as tradeoffs of the policies reducing the risk of financial crisis via costly
restrictions on capital flows may lead to a reduced likelihood of fmancial crisis in the long run because a
depreciation of the currency is likely to have net explanatory effects with increased trade.
28 Charles Goodhart, Commentary presented at the symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, titled Global Economic Integration: Opportunities and Challenges (Aug. 24-26, 2000) at 108.
29 /d. at 107.
30 Goodhart stresses that there is a need to restructure the framework for regulating banking and fmancial
sector s to restrict volatile short-term capital flows rather than as direct control. /d. at 110.
31 See White, supra note 21.

19

forces of technological innovation and globalization have driven remarkable changes in

financial services industry. The offshore markets--extemal markets located in a different

political jurisdiction and only linked by the currency used to denominate the financial

claims to the national market-have seen the rise of financial transactions in domestic

currencies to be conducted abroad although it is argued that the markets generated by the

providers' inducement on the users due to the financial regulatory discrepancies, and the
differences in the investors' perceptions of markets32 rather than the fair share of financial

innovation. 33

c. Financial Innovation
New financial instruments and financing techniques have rapidly developed and grown

in response to the desire of market participants over the last decades. The advent of asset

securitization, which links banking markets with capital markets has spread to meet the
Movements of money from the national markets to offshore banking centers have been motivated by four
factors: the profit incentive, financial privacy and secrecy, tax benefits (tax savings/avoidance), and protection
of assets from lawsuits and other liabilities. See B. Chad Bungard, Offshore Banking in the British
Dependencies, 9 TOURO INT'L L. REv. 141, 143-145 (2001).
33
Gunter Dufey & T. Chung, International Financial Markets: A Survey, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND
INVESTING 3-29 (R. Kuhn ed., 1990), cited in Scott & Wellons, supra note 4, at 7.
32

20

needs of financial market participants. This new method of financing helps the financial

institution, or corporation (originator) transform their illiquid financial assets into highly

liquid securities to improve their financial situation and liquidity. 34 This new technique

has been used to remodel all the assets such as home mortgages, credit card debt, student

loans, car loans and equipment leases into asset-backed securities. As a result, credit has

been expanded to consumers, and the liquidity (flexibility) for lenders and the modulation
for investors have been getting greater. 35

Likewise, derivative instruments have developed to meet the market participants' needs

to repackage credit risk into discrete bundles and thus increase the debt market liquidity

together with the improvement ofthe participants' balance sheets. According to the recent

data, at the end of 2000, over-the-counter derivatives markets amounted to $95 trillion in

34 Securitization refers to the process by means of which primary creditors (originators) transfer a diversified,
segregated illiquid income producing pool of assets (underlying assets) to a third party (special purpose
vehicle) to transform and restructure these underlying assts and sell them into tradable equity or debt
instruments. The means by which these transformation and restructuring are accomplished include pooling,
unbundling, repackaging and refmancing of existing financial assets into securities or instruments that can be
sold to and traded by investors in capital markets. See Tamar Frankel, SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED
FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES, Sec. 1.1, at 3 (1999). For example, a
special purpose vehicle (entity) purchases a pool of car loans from the creditor, using money it got by the sale
of securities that are collateralized by the loans. As a result, interest and principal payments on the car loans
used to pay interest and principal on the asset-backed notes.
See Diana B. Henriques, The Brick Stood Up Before. But Now?, The New York Times, Mar. 10, 2002, at
Section 3, Page 1, Column 1.
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notional principal, and daily aggregate global turnover rose to about $1.4 trillion. 36 As

recognized, financial derivatives have created considerable benefits by allowing investors

to unbundle and redistribute diverse risks-foreign exchange, interest rate, market and

default risks-, and thereby contributed to the improvement of market liquidity and

increase in the capacity of the financial system to bear the risk and intermediate capital. 37

However, there is a concern that heavy reliance on new and innovative financial techniques

and instruments can cause a serious turbulence resulting in financial panics and banking
crises 38

Although asset backed securitization can create several benefits in the financial market,

it also raises some potential risks, particularly to the banking system. Most importantly, a

financial institution may be in trouble when the originator could not achieve a true sale of

the assets, but recognize the incurred losses when the assets cease to perform

subsequently. 39 Also, potential risks arise when banks in pursuit of a favorable market

36
37

38

39

See IMF, supra note 22, at 30.
See IMF, supra note 14, at 79.
Id. at 83.
See Basel Committee on Banking on Supervision, Asset Transfers and Securitization (Sept. 1992), at 6.
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reception for the securitized assets may tend to sell off the highest quality assets despite

their retention of lower quality assets, and thereby increase the average risk in the
remaining portfolio. 4o Securitization may also raise systemic risks leading to the increase

in the fragility of the financial system in both national and international contexts as long as

it reduces the proportion of financial assets and liabilities held by banks in countries where
the variable minimum reserve requirement system control the central bank's operation. 41

Moreover, various securitization plans have been introduced to reduce the third world

debt,42 which arose by the loan of unprecedented sums of money from commercial banks in

industrial countries to developing countries of the third world in the 1970s due to the

increase in the reserves resulting from an influx of oil-generated deposits by the

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).43

As highlighted in the third

world debt crisis of the 1980s, arguably securitization plans may be inadequate measures of

ld.
Under the system, a country's central bank can control the domestic money supply by raising or lowering
the level of minimum reserves, which banks should maintain. The effectiveness is reduced with the decrease
in the overall level of assets and liabilities held by fmancial institutions. ld. at 7.
42 Mostly, these plans entail repackaging of debts into a negotiable instrument, such as bond, which creditor
banks may thereafter sell on the secondary markets to private investors. See Robert Plehn, Securitization of
!:ird World Debt, 23 INT'LLAW, 161, 162 (1989).
See Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing the Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 137 (1989).

40

41
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alleviating the debt problem so far as the plans cannot address the debt nation's major

problem of simply having too much external debt to service in the near or medium-term

future.

44

Similarly, derivatives activities can cause the build up of financial system fragilities and

adverse market dynamics in some cases as demonstrated in the recent events of near

collapse ofthe U.S. hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM),45 and the Enron
debac1e 46 in the mature financial markets. The turbulence of the near-failure ofLTCM in

It is argued what the debtor nations really need is for creators to forgive and write down a portion of the
debt until the situation stabilizes and only thereafter, should securitization of the debt be considered. See
David W. Leebron, First Things First: A comment on Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 173 (1989).
45 Between January and September 1998, LTCM, one of the largest U.S. hedge funds and most important
market-makers and providers ofliquidation in securities markets, lost almost 90 percent of its capital. By
August 1998, with less than $5 billion of equity capital, LTCM had earned a very highly valued counterparty
status and highly leveraged trading positions through assembling of a trading book that involved about 60,000
trades, including on-balance-sheet positions totaling $125 billion and off-balance-sheet positions including
about $1 trillion of notional OTC derivative positions. In September 1998, the Federal Reserve determined
that rapid liquidation of LTCM' s trading positions and related positions of other market participants might
raise a serious threat to already unsettled international financial markets. As a consequence, the Federal
Reserve facilitated a private sector recapitalization to prevent the collapse ofLTCM. See United States
General Accounting Office (GAO), Long-Term Capital Management: Regulators Need to Focus Greater
Attention on Systemic Risk, Doc. No. GAO/GGD-00-03 (Oct. 29,1998), at 1. See also IMF, supra note 14, at
85.
46 Enron was the main dealer, market-maker, and liquidity provider in major segments of the OTC energy
derivatives markets, and at end-September 2001, its overall derivatives trading liabilities stood at nearly $19
billion. However, its non-recurring charges amounted to $1.01 billion for the third quarter of2001, and net
income was reduced back to 1997 by $586 million, or 20%. The collapse resulting from the aggressive use of
accounting techniques to mask the Emon's excessive leverage and weak earning caused important volatility
in fmancial markets, and considerable losses for market participants, which may lead to the risk of systemic
consequences for financial markets. The plummeting of Emon's shares and credit rating in October 2001
~esulted in its filing for bankruptcy in two months. Arguably, the Enron case raised three capital market
ISsues: inadequate oversight of financial activities ofnonfmancial institutions, ineffective private market
diSCipline, disclosure, corporate governance and auditing, and misallocation of retirement savings. See IMF,
44
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late 1998 was preceded by the accumulation of a complex network of derivatives

counterparty exposures, encompassing a high degree ofleverage in the major markets

through late summer 1998, and the adverse shift in market sentiment following the Russian

crisis in mid-August 1998.

47

In short, the near-collapse raised concerns that heavy reliance

on innovative financial techniques and undue reliance on historical information got the
market participants into serious trouble. 48 As such the severity ofthe LTCM turbulence

posed the risk of systemic impact on the global financial system and real economic

activities.

Meanwhile, the collapse of Enron, interestingly a nonfinancial institution as an energy

trading and distribution corporation in late 2001 highlights uncertainties about the effective

Global Financial Stability Report (March 2002) at 41-42. See also,Iohn R. Emshwiller, Rebecca Smith &
Jonathan Weil, Enron Slashes Profits Since 1997 by 20%, WALL ST. 1., Nov. 9,2001, at A3; Enron
Corporation, Press Release, Enron Reports Recurring Third Quarter Earnings of $0.43 per Diluted Share;
Reports Non-Recurring Charges of$1.01 Billion After-Tax; Reaffinns Recurring Earnings Estimates of$1.80
for 2001 and $2.15 for 2002 and Expands Financial Reporting (Oct. 16,2001), available at http://www.enron.
com/corp/ pressroom/release/200l/ene/68-3QEarningsLtr.html (last visited January 15, 2003).
47 The Russian turmoil due to Russia's devaluation and unilateral debt restructuring sparked a broad-based
reassessment and repricing of risk and large scale deleveraging and portfolio rebalancing that cut across a
range of global financial markets. See IMP, supra note 14, at 85.
48 The Russian crisis deprived the LTCM of its engaging in highly leveraged bets on the historical interest
rate spread between riskier debt instruments and US Treasury bonds, and thereby drove investors' worldwide
flight of high risk investments to safety. See Steve Lipin, Matt Murray & Jacob M. Schleginger, Bailout
Blues: How a Big Hedge Fund Marketed its Expertise And Shrouded Its Risks, WALL ST. J., Sep. 25, 1998, at

AI.
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functioning of credit-risk transfer vehicles used to hedge or take on credit exposures

across markets and sectors. 50 Even though these financial instruments and markets, which

are usually driven by regulatory arbitrage offer some benefits to the market participants

including nontraditional players, the complexity of financial transactions and markets have
posed new challenges to the market. 51 As demonstrated in the Enron case, the vast use of

derivatives by way of credit risk transfers raised concerns over potential systemic riskS.

52

Moreover, the Enron case called for "much greater transparency and the increased

completeness in the accounting treatment of derivatives,,53 since it seemingly engaged in

manipulative accounting transactions to minimize financial-statement losses and volatility,
Notably, credit risk transfers can foster the efficiency and stability of credit markets overall the allocation
of capital with the growth of the markets by the separation of credit institution from credit risk bearing. Also,
they can reduce the concentration of credit risk in fmancial systems by helping nonfinancial corporations take
on the credit risks held by banks. Additionally, credit risk transfers create the diversification of fmancial
institutions' credit exposures across markets and sectors, and facilitate the trading of credit risk, and thus,
financial and nonfinancial institutions can flexibly manage their credit exposures. Moreover, liquid credit risk
transfer markets can enhance price discovery and provide price information. See Global Financial Stability
Report supra note 46, at 38-39.
50 Id. at 41.
51 Arguably, there are some concerns about these instruments and markets. First, they reduce transparency
regarding the institutional distribution of credit risk and its concentration. Second, they may create or magnify
channels, which help credit events-associated distress spread across institutions and markets. Third, these
instruments are not seemingly regulated as well as banks, and not necessarily have the experience required to
price properly and manage these risks. Finally, the mechanism of credit risk transfer augments the potential
for mispricing and misallocation of capital by adding the leveraged instruments to the total amount of credit.
Id. at 39.
52 Greenspan stresses that despite providing of greater flexibility to the financial system, due to the
complexity, the counterparties could get vulnerable to serious risk that "they do not currently recognize, and
hence these instruments potentially expose the overall system if mistakes are large." See Allan Greenspan,
Testimony Before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 27,2002) at 8.
3 See id.
49
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augment profits, and avoid adding debt to its balance sheet. 54 There were no requirements

to disclose information about its risks to counterparties, and the market prices or conditions,

and thus the derivatives activities have not been regulated in spite of the size of derivatives

market, complexity, and pivotal role in the energy derivatives markets under the 2000

Commodity Futures Act. 55

In these circumstances, same financial techniques used for the asset securitization were

arguably applied to "construct the elaborately camouflaged and boody trapped

partnerships" resulting in the Enron's collapse. 56 That is, non-consolidated special purpose

entities (vehicles) were used to hedge certain Enron investments in its manipulations.

However, it should be recognized that the problem in Enron case is not the securitization,

the process of creating asset-backed securities but the more Enronic uses of structured

54 As a consequence, the Enron's credit rating was damaged, and thus its credibility in energy trading
business was hurt. See Report of Investigation by the Special Investigation Committee of the Board of
Directors ofEnron Corporation 4,36,68, 78, 97 (Feb. 1,2002).
55 See Global Financial Stability Report, supra note 46, at 41. However, the U.S. Congressional Hearings
have affIrmed that certain energy derivatives activities do not fall into the categories that are exempted from
~ey regulatory provisions under the act.
6 See Henriques, supra note 35.
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finance. 57 Arguably, the Enron's abuse of special purpose vehicles posed fundamental

questions whether its Spy transactions transferred risks ofthe hedged assets owned by the
Enron to others 58 because ofthe SPVs' inability to perform their hedges resulting from the
simultaneous fall in Enron's asset and stock values. 59 In this sense, the Enron collapse has

not been caused directly by the new financial techniques and instruments. Rather, partly

ineffective private market discipline, disclosure, corporate governance, and inadequate
accounting rules should be blamed for the Enron case. 60

Consequently, financial regulatory and supervisory authorities should catch up with the

financial innovation and new instruments to improve robust financial system. Any

regulatory re-evaluation needs to take a long-term perspective so that market participants

can take advantage ofthe ever-lasting financial innovation in the age ofthe information

economy. Also, financial institutions need to strengthen their credit risk management
57 Id. (quoting law professor Ronald Gilson that "Enron gives a very useful tool a bad name for no reason.
Structured finance is used for a zillion different and worthwhile purposes. The problem is Enron used it to
~feate a structure that was genuinely not transparent, to hide things.").
Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron, and the Use and Abuse ofSpecial Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 7
(July 2002), available at http://ssm.com/abstracUd=306820 (last visited Dec. 19,2003); see also Henriques,
SUpra note 35 (quoting law firm partner David Eisenberg that "securitization is about transferring risk to
~9thers - and Enron only appeared to be doing that, when in reality they were retaining the risk themselves").
See Steven L. Schwarcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION
~ec. I: 1 (3 d ed. 2002); see also Schwarcz, supra note 58, at 7 n.41.
See Global Financial Stability Report, supra note 46, at 41.
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practices to foster their review of new financial instruments. Needless to say, the market

participants' attention to the lessons from the recent episodes, and adoption ofthe adequate

policies and controls will substantially prevent or minimize the risks of repeating similar

. the near future. 61
excess III

D. Financial Deregulation

As noted, the regulatory authorities are continuously getting behind the structural

changes in the financial services industry, and thereby cannot but react to immense

pressures by relaxing the financial regulations or implementing new regulations.

Despite regulators' sustained efforts, the increasing complexity of financial services

transactions involving the cross-institutional and cross-border activities has reduced the

effectiveness of financial regulation, and thus eroded statutory and physical barriers

between financial sectors and jurisdictions, which led to regulatory changes and

convergence of financial regulatory standards in response to the regulatory arbitrage.

Ri h
card Spillenkothen, Testimony Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
COmmittee on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate (Dec. 11,2002), at 6.
6)
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These structural trends have blurred traditional distinctions between banking and other

types of financial activities resulting in "one-stop" shopping for the customers of the

financial services industry, and a concentration of financial services in larger institutions

through merges and acquisitions. As such, there has been a remarkable convergence of

banking and financial sectors. The recent repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act (Section 20),

which prohibited banks from engaging in securities underwriting, under the Financial

Modernization Act of 1999 (the Gramme-Leach-Bliley Act) in the U.S.,62 and the
dismantling of Japan's statutory separation of banks, securities firms, and trust banks63 are

examples of the new regulatory approach to the structural trends. 64

Moreover, the international competition between national regulatory authorities based
on regulatory discrepancies 65 has intensified the pressure for deregulation of financial

Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.c. sec. 377 (repealed 1999); and Gramme-Leach-Bliley Act section 101(a).
In light of the financial "Big Bang," the Law Amending related laws for Financial System Reform
amended over 21 laws including the Securities and Exchange Law, Banking Law, and Insurance Law (Law
No. 107 of 1997). See Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, The Japanese Banking Crisis: Some Historical and Regulatory
Aspects, y.B. INT'LFIN. & ECON. L., 205, 217 (1999).
64 At the extreme, the regulatory trends are toward the German-style ''universal banking," in which banks are
allowed directly to underwrite securities and invest in equities of nonblank institutions. See Richard 1. Herring
& Robert E. Litan, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL REGULATION 10-11(1995).
65 Differences in regulatory constraints between national financial systems have driven the shift of fmancial
activities from one location to another than to accomplish their intended goals in some cases. See id. at 20.
Such cases demonstrate that the regulators need to anticipate to the providers' circumvention of the regulation
through the fmancial innovation, and thereby react by new regulation or deregulation. In particular,
62
63
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markets in the domestic arena. As a result, international pressures along with the
globalization of financial markets spurred the domestic financialliberalization. 66 Also, this

competitive deregulation and liberalization process have removed anti-competitive

regulatory restrictions, and brought the increased competition for the financial market
industry, which resulted in efficiency and lowered costs in the financial services sector. 67

That is, financial market participants have enjoyed net benefits from both lower prices for

financial services and the improvements in quality and access to new financial instruments
through deregulation and liberalization. 68

In the meantime, there are some concerns about the potential risks and other

shortcomings raised by financial deregulation. 69 In short, the issues fall into the broad

categories: the financial market volatility resulting from the large swings in financial

deregulation has played an important role in stimulating fmancial innovation while innovation has spurred
financial deregulation. In short, fmancial innovation and regulation are mutually reinforcing.
66 For example, Japan's financial liberalization in the early 1980s resulted from the United States' pressures
for Japan to make its financial services industry effective. See K. Osugi, Japan's Experience ofFinancial
Deregulation Since 1984 in an International Perspective (Basle: Bank for International Settlements, Jan.
1990), cited in OECD, Regulatory Reform in the Financial Services Industry: Where Have We Been? Where
Are We Going?, FIN. MKT. TRENDS, June 1997, at 36.
67 See OECD, supra note 57, at 53. While fmancial deregulation has created gains from efficient resource
allocation such as the improved capacity of consumers and private businesses to allocate their spending over
time thanks to increased capital mobility, it has also raised extensive changes in the financial and macro~;onOrnic environment. !d. at 59-63.
69 Id. at 56.
!d. at 63-75.
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market prices, debt build-ups and asset price bubbles preceded by the flexibility of

available financial instruments and the increased access to credit, banking sector problems,

and recent international debt problems due to international capital flows. However, it is

argued that the costs and risks of deregulation can be outweighed by its benefits if only

deregulation is appropriately implemented and entailed by necessary policy reforms
affecting financial incentives. 7o More importantly, the financial deregulation process

should be accompanied by proper reform efforts such as prudential supervision and

regulation of financial markets to ensure the financial stability. In this regard, the

regulatory competition can focus on the quality of regulation such as its ability to deliver

results in terms ofthe financial efficiency and stability rather than the regulatory laxity.7l

In sum, the financial deregulation and liberalization should not be inappropriately

implemented to bring about the laissez-faire activities or functions free of the prudential

regulation and supervision of financial markets in the wake of recent financial crises around

the globe.

70

7\

/d. at 75.
See Wendy Dobson & Pierre Jacquet, FINANCIAL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION IN THE WTO 112 (1998).
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E. The Convergence of Regulatory Standards

There have been some debates over whether the cross-national convergence of

regulatory policy is desirable by the pressure of globalization. Arguably, globalization

pushing the elimination of all barriers and differences72 among states and cultures has

brought sharing same values accompanied by the convergence 73 of economic and political
systems despite differences between countries with market economies. 74 In particular, the
financial globalization has caused policy convergence/ 5 that is, a general convergence of

policy goals, policy instruments, and policy style. Namely, in response to the financial

globalization, the international cooperation has produced the widespread adoption of

72 However, some argue that globalization is misunderstood as "the promotion of homogeneity across the
face of the earth ... as a bulldozer. ... [G]lobalization is a technological and telecommunications revolution, a
phenomenon of the information age, which will not necessarily erase all differences and barriers between
nations and cultures." See Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global Convergence" in
Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 321, 326-327 (2001).
73 As for the meaning of convergence, one defmes it as "the process of applying increasingly similar rules to
a given situation in different jurisdictions, and is closely related to the harmonization and approximation of
laws." See Andrew M. Whittaker, Tackling Systemic Risk on Markets: Barings and Beyond, in THE FUTURE
FOR THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET 259,261 (F. Oditah ed. 1996). Similarly, convergence is described as
"the process by which the rules, regulations, or political institutions governing economic activity in different
countries become more similar." See Henry Laurence, Spawning the SEC, 6 IND. J. GLOBALLEGALSTUD.647,
649 (1999).
74 See Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, CORNELL INT'L L. J. 429, 465-469 (1997)
(arguing that sharing the same values promotes "similar expectations and a common ground for
understanding" and thereby creating the closer relationship in human society).
75 Policy convergence is composed of different dimensions including policy goals, "a coming together of
intent to deal with common policy problems," policy instruments, "the institutional tools available to
administer policy, whether regulatory, administrative or judicial," and policy style, "a more diffuse notion
signifying the process by which policy responses are formulated." See C.J. Bennett, What is Policy
Convergence and What Causes it?, 21 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 215,219 (1991).
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similar regulatory technique and harmonized global standards by way of negotiated and

multinational agreements among different national regulatory authorities. 76
,-

While the convergence advocates note that the global convergence does not necessarily

imply the convergence of identical regulatory standards and structures among different

nations, they emphasize the convergence of basic values and fundamental systems to

promote the reliance on market forces, and thus attracting international businesses and
increasing economic bene:fits. 77 At this point, there is a growing cognizance of the need to

evaluate the international cooperative efforts at the harmonization and unification of

regulatory standards.

In this regard, one of the most controversial debates in the field of international

economic law concerns the desirability of international cooperation. By explaining the

relationship between internationalization and public choice, one of the proponents for

international cooperation advocates that "international cooperation is likely to be welfare-

One describes this convergence process as "negotiated convergence" because it is the byproduct of
extensive negotiation among different regulatory authorities and the usual compromises and trade-offs
inherent in bargaining. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The
~ase of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States, 20 MrcH. J. INT'L. L. 595, 597-598 (1999).
See Laurence, supra note 73, at 649-650; Seita, supra note 73, at 466-469.

76
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improving in the majority of contexts, though the exact nature of that cooperation must

vary from one subject to another.,,78 The defender identifies several reasons why

international cooperative efforts should be encouraged.

79 First, as the ability of national

authorities to regulate transnational activities is eroding, and noncooperarive strategies

become less successful, international cooperation will become more attractive. Second,

international cooperation is desirable and successful because of the increase in welfare

associated with the cooperation in trade liberalization under the WTO despite it's the value-

subtracting cooperation. Third, even if international cooperation can be welfare-reducing,

the argument for cooperation may be strengthened since the cooperation allowed nations to

consider a broader range of interests and thus producing a remarkable growth in trade and

welfare.

78

See Andrew T. Guzman, Public Choice and International Regulatory Competition, 90 GEO. L. J. 971, 972974 (2002). By contrast, Stephan and O'Hara's skepticism identifies about the potential hazards of
international cooperation resulting from the probability and the costs of welfare-reducing international
agreements through facilitating transfer payments and logrolling. See Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy
of Choice of Law, 90 GEO. L. J. 957, 960-961 (2002); Erin A. 0 'Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and the
~erennial Conflict of Law, 90 GEO. L. J. 941, 948-956 (2002).
See Guzman, supra note 78, at 978-979.
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To support the argument, the international cooperation advocates assert the

determination of the appropriate level of cooperation when it should be used.

8o

In

particular, it is worth noting that when the other levels of cooperation fail, supranational

standards and regulations should be alternatively taken into account because of their

potential to reduce the cost of transfers among nations, which makes it easier to reach an

agreement. 81

In contrast to the international cooperation advocates, some argue that international

cooperative efforts have faced a great degree of skepticism at the national level because the

efforts lack the political accountability of elected and appointed officials at national and

local levels. 82 That is, the domestic decisionmakers or bureaucrats face severe constraints

on their behavior as opposed to international lawmakers, and thereby bears some political

80 See Guzman, supra note 78, at 980-983 (providing several levels of cooperation that are available: fIrst, a
laissez-faire system as the lowest level of cooperation, second, a nation's setting of the terms of its
interactions with other nations through a unilateral selection of choice-of-law rules, third, an agreement on
choice-of-law rules without any comments on substantive rules, fourth, harmonization of substantive laws as
a higher level of cooperation, alternatively, supranational standards and regulations as the highest level of
cooperation)
81
.
. See Guzman, supra note 78, at 983 (taking as the best examples of this strategy, international trade and
mternational intellectual property under the WTO, and international banking regulation through the Basle
Accord).
82
See Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39
A. J. INT'L L. 743, 752 (1999) (arguing that this is because "[n]o mechanism exists for voters to pass
Judgment on the international lawmakers. At best, they can vote for the domestic governments that in turn
choose the drafters of international agreements.").

'!
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accountability for their choices. 83 Also, international cooperative efforts have brought

about skepticism because they lack the transparency of local lawmaking. 84 Due to the lack

of transparency, a substantial amount of economic rent-returns in excess of what is

necessary to keep a given resource from transferring to other occupation-have been

sought all over the world. As such, bureaucrats may foil the cooperative efforts unless they

have chances to engage in rent seeking, thereby decreasing transparency and engaging in

turf protection. 85 Furthermore, the pessimistic perspective on cooperative efforts classifies

into two categories the reasons why international cooperation may produce undesirable

outcomes:

First, negotiators may give excessive weight to the preferences of private groups with

unrepresentative preferences but especially low organizational costs .... Second, persons

with an interest in the institutions established or promoted by international cooperation may

83
84

Paul B. Stephan, Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. INT'LL. & Bus. 681,682,732 (1997)
See id. at 689 ("interest groups tend to have somewhat lower costs of expressing their preferences to
executives engaged in international lawmaking than in conveying their wishes to domestic legislators, and ...
~e general public has higher monitoring costs with respect to international lawmaking").
See id. at 706.
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seek the adoption of agreements that expand the competence, discretion, and authority of
those institutions at the expense of desirable regulatory outcomes. 86

More importantly, this pessimistic point of view on the cooperative efforts points out

the costs of cooperation and welfare-reducing agreements. S? The grounds for welfare-

reducing international cooperation fall into three categories:

First, [the negotiators] have powerful incentives to achieve some kind of agreement

regardless of substantive outcome. 88 Association with a concluded agreement brings

prestige opportunities to offer interpretation, and invitation to participate in subsequent

negotiations. Second, the legislatures ... face take-it-or-leave-it choices that limit their

power to shape what gets adopted. Thus they are [unlikely] to reject agreements that may

reduce overall welfare. 89 Third, the difficulty of reaching the sustained level of agreement

86

See Stephan, supra note 78, at 960-961.
In general, the costs incurred by a potentially undesirable agreement, discounted by the likelihood of the
structure producing such an agreement is greater than the benefits of a potentially desirable agreement,
~iscounted by the likelihood of a particular institutional structure achieving it. See id. at 960.
In response to this argument, Guzman advocates that this does not show an important ground to resist
international cooperation for three reasons. First, as long as a pro-agreement bias exists among the negotiators
as agents for the nations, the principals have a incentive to correct for this through a change in the negotiators.
~econd, there are many ways to "reach a deal" without imposing important commitments on a nation under
mternationallaw. Third, despite a bias toward some kind of agreement, the bias may be helpful rather than
harmful in light of the overall negotiating structure of international law, under which the consent of every
partiCipating nation is required for international agreements in accordance with the unanimity rule. See id. at

87

974-975
89
.
As for this argument, Guzman casts doubts for two reasons. First, the negotiators are controlled by the
executive, and thus the nation has a chance to shape the content of the agreement. Second, the legislature's
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necessary to pennit frequent updates of existing agreements pushes negotiators toward
delegations oflawmaking authority to international institutions.90

Even if international cooperative efforts have been remarkably increasing over the last

decades, there is still a concern that the international cooperation has pitfalls and should be

approached cautiously.91 As noted, the lack of transparency, the lack of political

accountability and the rent-seeking may impede convergence. 92 Here, it should be noted

that there is no trend to homogeneity in world economics as asserted by globalization

advocates the globalization thesis. Moreover, modernization and Westernization are not
converging trends, as the underlying premise of global convergence scholarship implies. 93

With respect to the convergence thesis, some argue that states still pursue diverse policy

choices. In this regard, one examines the hypothesis that the Keynsian welfare policies of

decision to accept a tale-it-or-leave-it offer does not imply that it is not likely to approve a welfare-reducing
agreement. See id. at 975-976.
90 Id. at 961. In contrast to this concern of entrenchment by international bureaucrats, Guzman claims that the
concern is a concern about the form of cooperation rather than its merit since many forms of cooperation can
ffoceed without formal institutions. See id. at 975.
Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J.
~rT'L L. Bus. 681 (1996-1997).
In addition, one indicates as one of the grounds the pretentious "we know better" tone of much of the
~30nvergence advocacy. See Branson, supra note 72, at 339.
John Gray, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL eAPITALISM 169-170 (1998), cited in Branson,
S~pra note 72, at 349. It is argued that for much of the world, modernization and Westernization have become
dIverging trends or, indeed, anathema to one another.
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West European states will be eroded by the international financial integration and

concludes that notwithstanding the increased exertion of capital integration over the past

two decades, "powerful pressures for convergence in economic policies,,,94 such

convergence has not happened, and that "the evidence on fiscal policy conflicts sharply

with the convergence thesis. ,,95 The other argues that "the international outcome [of the

financial integration] is solidly rooted in domestic policy dilemmas and distributional

debates," and that "[financial] markets remained distinctively national.,,96

Nevertheless, global convergence fueled by the process of globalization has grown

significantly in international economic affairs. As a matter of fact, international efforts at

regulatory cooperation have resulted in global convergence of regulatory standards.

Notably, global convergence of financial regulatory standards propelled by the

globalization of finance has recently attracted a considerable attention around the globe. In

particular, it deserves noting that global convergence in banking regulation has made

94

See Geoffrey Garrett, Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy, 49 INT'L

~RG. 657, 657 (1995)

See idat 659.
Andrew C. Sobel, Domestic Choices, INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 19,143 (1994), cited in Laurence, supra
note 73 at 652-653.
96
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greater strides than in any other financial sector law and regulation. In this regard, most

regulators and academics seem to believe that global convergence ofthe Basel Committee's

bank supervisory standards and capital adequacy principles is desirable and more would be

better. However, there is a strong need to examine this global, one-size-fits-all-standards

setting process and thus to enhance the more prudential bank supervisory and regulatory

framework in the wake of recent financial crises.
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II.

The State in the Global Era

A. The Status of the State Under International Law and in a Globalizing
World
After the World War II, the realization that global problems need international

regulatory regimes to cope with cross-border and inter-state activities has driven the

creation of international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) that have

international administrative jurisdictions ensuing contravention of the territorial

sovereignties of states. Globalization has also played a key role in eroding states'

geographical borders thanks to the rapid economic integration, and the growth of

regionalism. The birth of European Union despite member states' national differences

shows that the reciprocal benefit derived from the correlative restriction on another state's

power makes the loss of one's power acceptable, and the state's boundaries insignificant.

As mentioned, globalization has played an important role in reshaping the world order

since the end of the Cold War. Dramatically, remarkable innovative changes in the linked

technologies of computing and communication as a result of the information revolution, so
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called the third industrial revolution, are influencing the nature of the state institutions, and

increasing the role of non-state actors. 97

The process of globalization has transformed the traditional view of intemationallaw

for the state sovereignty that is associated with exclusive territorial jurisdiction since the

Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, ending the Thirty Years War. 98 This Westphalian

It deserves noting Joseph Nye's remark in the context of information revolution, although the focus is on
the importance of soft power of the American foreign policy. According to Nye, "we can get some idea of
where we are heading by looking back at the past. In the first industrial revolution, around the tum of the
nineteenth century, the application of steam to mills and transportation had a powerful effect on the economy,
society and government .... The second industrial revolution, around the tum of the twentieth century,
introduced electricity, synthetics, and internal combustion engine and brought similar economic and social
changes. The historical analogies help us understand some of the forces that will shape world politics in the
twenty-first century. Economies and information networks have changed more rapidly than governments
have, with their scale having grown much faster than that of sovereignty and authority. [T]he building blocks
of world politics are being transformed by the new technology, and our politics will have to adjust
accordingly. If we focus solely on the hard power of nation-states, we will miss the new reality and fail to
advance our interests and our values." See Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's
only Superpower can't go it alone 43-44 (2002).
th
98 Since the 17 century, the modem state has been the dominant entity in domestic and international affairs
both in terms of power and regulatory authority. See John Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing
Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139, 174 (1993); Kalevi Holsti, Peace and War: Armed
Conflict and International Order 1648-1989 25 (1998) (noting that [t]he Peace of Westphalia organized
Europe on the principle of particularism. It represented a diplomatic arrangement-an order created by states,
for states-and replaced most of the legal vestiges of hierarchy, at the pinnacle of which were the Pope and
the Holy Roman Empire."); Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb. 1997, at 50 (arguing
that the Westphalia thesis is not universally endorsed); Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State:
Culture, Social Identity and Institutional Rationality in International Relations 88 (1999) (pointing out that
"[I]t was not until the middle of the nineteenth century, when a new set of constitutional value has emerged to
justify the authority of [a] sovereign state, the fundamental institutions of multilateralism and contractual
international law took off."); see also Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the
Westphalian Myth, 55 Int'l Org. 250, 268 (2001) (remarking that "the prevalence of the Westphalian Myth ...
is the result of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians adopting a certain standard account of 1648,
influenced by ideas that can be traced to anti-Habsburg propaganda of the Thirty Year' War.").
Historically, the modem state system has its origin in the medieval European feudalism. One conceives
the state as the outcome of chance and history in that the state developed by defeating all other contesting
fonns of authority. See Bart Driessen, A Concept of Nation in International Law 33 (1992). Since the
Westphalia pact in 1648, the concept of state sovereignty has established the territorial state as governing
system for a specific territory with a stable population and a functioning government, and the capacity to
97
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sovereignty has been subject to critical scrutiny due to the rapid globalization in the world

economy, the growth of regionalism around the globe, and the advent of international
.

regulatory regImes.

99

In recent years, the impact of globalization on the dominance and autonomy of the state

has increasingly been the subject of heated debate cutting across various disciplines.

Globalization has played a significant role in eroding states' geographical boundaries

thanks to the rapid economic integration, and the growth of regionalism. Dramatically,

innovative changes in the linked technologies of computing and communication are

influencing the nature of state institutions, and enhancing the role of nonstate actors. In

this regard, some observers stress a need for relocation of authority, both to the

international level for problems for which the state is too small to operate effectively, and
engage in foreign relations despite the persistence of ethnic and religious identities as reaffirmed in Article 1
of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and duties of States regarding four requirements for de
facto status as a state. A defined territory is one characteristic of statehood, whereas an attachment to lands
mayor may not be a feature of nationhood. Here, a state can be defined as a territory built by conquest in
which one culture, one set of ideas and laws have been enforced over diverse nations. By contrast, a nation
may be defined as a self-identifying people who share a common history, a common culture, language and a
homeland, but not necessarily installed on a given territory. See Suzan D. Balz, Essay: A Country within a
~ountry: Rewarding Borders on the post-Colonial Sovereign State, 2 Mich. J. Race & L. 537, 541 n.13 (1997).
See Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of
Global Regulatory Governance, 6 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 425, 426 (1999) (arguing that "[t]he notion of a
single unified system of internal sovereignty has become increasingly problematic in a global political
economy surrounded by islands of sovereignty, rather than by a single, central decisionmaking authority").
Jayasuriya claims that the development of this "complex sovereignty" reflects the transformation and
reconstitution of the notion of the state sovereignty in the face of globalization in the world economy. !d.
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to the sub-state level, for tasks for which it is too big. loO Others acknowledge the gradual
ending of the primacy of the state. lOl This is due to "the alleged loss of functions to

international institutions, to pressure to develop power to regional movements demanding

autonomy or secession, and to the difficulty of effectively controlling large multinational

enterprises, the flows of international finance and of information and ideas.,,102

The new medievalists proclaiming the end of the state emphasizes the role of non-state
actors with multiple allegiances and a global network l03 while liberal internationalists

adhere to the primacy of the state, but recognize a need for international rules and

institutions, constituted by a legally binding treaty, with expanding powers of governance

to solve governmental problems. 104 The adherents of new medievalism conceive the

development of a complex and varied world order with multiple layers and actors that is
100

See Paul Kennedy, PREPARING THE TWENTy-FIRST CENTURY 131 (1993).
101 See Ali. Khan, The Extinction of Nation-States: A World without Borders 193 (1996); see also Jan A.
Scholte, Global Capitalism and the State, 73 INT'L AFFAIRS 427,444-45(1997) (noting the states' loss of
sovereign authority in the face of independent regulatory activities by business association; arguing that the
end of state sovereignty does not mean the end of the state; recognizing the more powerful states have
r1etained important influence in contemporary global finance).
02
See Peter Ma1anczuk, Globalization and the Future Role of Sovereign State, in INTERNATIONAL
~~ONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE 46-47 (Friedl Weiss et al. eds., 1998).
See Jessica T. Mathews, supra note 98 (describing a shift away from the state-up, down, and
~~~eways-to supra-state, sub-state, and above all, nonstate actors).
See Michael Zuern, From Independence to Globalization, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELA TrONS 235 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2000). The liberal internationalism requires a centralized ru1emaking authority, a hierarchy of organizations, and universal membership: the United Nations is one of the
standard or classical model of international institutions.
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more akin to the order of medieval times. !Os In this sense, this view is construed as a back-

to-the-future model of the twenty-first century. 106

Another view of chaos paradigm specifically addresses the decline of the state as an

institution. 107 This view highlights the sharp rise in tribal, ethnic and religious conflict, the

rapid increase in the activities of international criminal mafia organizations, the

proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, the increase of international

terrorism, the problem of massive refugee flows and the appearance of acts of genocide and

ethnic cleansing. l08 This is an anarchic and chaotic world characterized by the breakdown

of governmental authority, the dismemberment and fragmentation of states and the

appearance of failed states: Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Afghanistan, and

Yugoslavia. 109

For a summary of this view, see Samuel Huntington, The Clash o/Civilizations and the Remaking 0/
World Order 35 (1996).
106 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183.
Slaughter pointed out two central weak points of the new medievalism: fIrst, private power does not take the
place of state power; second, "the power shift is not a zero-sum game [because] [a] gain in power by nons tate
actors does not necessarily translate into a loss of power for the state." See id. at 184.
107
See Huntington, supra note 105.
108 See Zhigniew Brzezinski, OUT OF CONTROL (1993); see also Daniel Moynihan PANDAEMONIUM:
~rHNIClTY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, cited in Huntington, supra note 105, at 35 ..
See generally G.B. Helman et aI., Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POLICY 21(1992); for the analysis
of failed states and illegal regimes, see also Oscar Schachter, The Erosion 0/ State Authority and its
105
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At the other extreme, advocates of the realism in international relations stress the

primacy of the states as the central actors in world affairs, that is the primary units of

analysis in social science terms, and the states' activities in a single-minded pursuit of
political and military security in accordance with their own self-interest. 110 This realism's

narrow focus on power and military might have encountered challenges from other schools

of international relations theory since the collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold

War. As the most dominant theory of these schools, the regime theory shares a number of

Implications for equitable Development, in International Economic Law with a Human Face 40-42 (F.W eiss
et al. eds., 1998) at 40-42.
Ito The perspectives of realists Hans Morganthau and George Kennan builds on the experience of World War
II, the Cold War, and the alleged utopianism of Wilsonian internationalism in the interwar years. See Claude
E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization 150-152
(2001). Mogenthau argues that the science of international politics does not lie at the interstices of realism
and utopianism, but in the realm of realism alone. Its dual purposes are "to detect and understand the forces
that determine political relations among nations, and to comprehend the ways in which those forces act upon
each other and upon international political relations and institutions." See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 18 (6th ed. 1985). For the relationship between realism
and utopianism, see E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939 (2 nd ed. 1946). The realists consider
the international relations anarchic and often compare to a state of war, specifically "a competition of units in
the kind of state of nature that knows no restraints other than those which the changing necessities of the
game and the shallow conveniences of the players impose." See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony:
Cooperations and Discord in the World Political Economy 7 (1984). Kenneth Waltz shifted the focus in
realist theory, particularly the powerful redefinition and refinement of realism. According to Waltz's
neorealist reformation of realist international theory based on the economic theory of the firm, the anarchical
nature of the international system-its lack of a central authority with effective sanctioning powers--gives
states a powerful survival motive. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory ofInternationa1 Politics (1979) preface; for
the analysis of the Watz's theory; see also Anne-Marie Burley, International Law and International Relations
Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 American 1. ofInt'l L. 205, 208-218 (1993). The advocates of the realist
tradition of international economy continue to stress the primacy of the state as the central actor. In this
context, one points out, in some cases, globalization has brought about the expansion of government authority
and government spending rather than diminishing the state authority. See Robert Gilpin, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1975).
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assumptions with realism, but regime theorists often modify them substantially. Although

like realists, the regime theorists view the state as the primary actor in the international

affairs, they acknowledge that "internal economic, social, and political pressures buffet

governments before they reach a unified national position."lll

In recent years, the proponents of transgovernmentalism recognize that the information

revolution and globalization are changing world politics, and entailing selutory effects on

the evolution of international law, but they believe that the state is resilient and will remain

the centerpiece of the international system, thereby continuing to exercise its power in a
disaggregated, more flexible fashion. IIZ That is, the transgovernmentalism notes the

frequent interaction among decentralized government agencies-global networks-all over

the world rather than formal negotiation. This point of view argues that "[r]egular

interaction with foreign colleagues offers new channels for spreading democratic

III

For the distinction between the realism and regime theory, see Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade,
Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization, 152-153 (2001). See generally
mtemational Regimes (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
. See Slaughter, supra note 106 at 184. Slaughter asserts that "[d]isaggregating the state permits the
disaggregation of sovereignty as well, ensuring that specific state institutions derive strength and status from
participation in transgovemmental order." [d. at 196.
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accountability, governmental integrity, and the rule of law."I13 The advocate claims that

transgovernmental networks represent "a blueprint for the international architecture of the
21 51 century." 11 4

Although it is beyond the scope of this study, exploring the relationship of the state and

nation due to the increase in the nation and state conflicts is noteworthy while traditional

international law doctrine is still based on the presumption of fictional nation-states. With

the demise of Communism across Eastern and Central Europe that has propelled us into the

post-Cold War era, international community has confronted the ever-increasing claims to

autonomy and outright independence by minority nations that are seeking a greater

recognition of their cultural and political identities within their existing states in the name
of self-determination or national liberation. 115 Arguably, since current international law

113 See id. at 186. Slaughter asserts that transgovernmenta1ism is more effective and potentially more
accountable than any other alternatives since it leaves the control of government agencies in the hands of
national citizens rather than supranational bureaucracies answerable to no one in the liberal internationalism.
~laughter also argues that although new medievalism attracts states' rights enthusiasts and superanationalists,
lit could easily reflect the worst of both worlds. Id.
14
.
liS See ld. at 197.
See Ved P. Nanda, Revisiting Self-Determination as an International Law Concept: A Major Challenge in
the post-Cold War Era, 3 Ilsa. J. Int'l & Compo L. 443, 444 (1997); see also Ravi Mahalingam, The
Compatibility of the Principle of Nonintervention with the Right of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 UCLA J.
Int'! L. 223, 225 (1993). For the concept of self-determination, see generally Eric Kolodner, The Future of
the Right to Self-Determination, 10 Conn. J. Int'! L. 153, 155 (1994).
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still excessively based on the presumption of fictional nation-states has not evolved

sufficiently to handle this postmodern global disorder ofthe tumult of ethnicity as

witnessed in the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia, the paradigm of international

legal discourse needs to be adapted to real nature of states and nations. I 16

Arguably, a nation cannot be defined in international law while sticking to the positive,

while ignoring the concept of morality in international society. I 17 One focuses on the

issues of self-determination and rights of nations in international law to solve problems

between states and nations. I 18 The past centuries saw the problem of the moral justification

of the state-centric conception while the state system could not prevent hundreds of wars.

It can arguably be assumed that the order or authoritative association between states has

little moral value in itself. In short, state borders are not borders of morality, and thus the

state system cannot be adapted to be harmonious with the nations system. I 19 In this regard,

1i6
1i7

See Bart Driessen, A Concept of Nation in International Law 5 (1992)
lis See id. at 4.
1i9 Id. at chapter 5.
Id. at 34.
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it is asserted that the real moral collectivity is not the state but the nation, which should be
. d und
. 11 aw. 120
recognIze
er 'mternatlOna

The decolonization in 1950s has fonned numerous new states that housed different

peoples with different cultural backgrounds between their borders. Since new sates'

borders were often drawn arbitrarily, based on previous wars fought by the colonial powers,

and on compromises reached between them, yet unmatured democracies were also

anticipated to accommodate several peoples in their territory, to protect minorities against

the majority and to build one nation out of several ones, and thus the post-Colonization era

has witnessed a side effect of failed states. 121

Although it is difficult to attempt a definite nonnative assessment of so complicated and

many-sided phenomenon as that discussed above, the state will be unlikely to disappear in

120

Id. at chapter 4.
See Ruud Lubbers & Jolanda Koorevaar, Nation state and democracy in the globalizing world, Paper
presented at a Tilburg University seminar (Nov. 26, 1998), at 3; see also Suzan D. Balz, A Country within a
Country: Redrawing Borders on the Post-Colonial Sovereign State, 2 Mich. J. Race & L. 537, 561-563 (1997)
(arguing that territory is no longer necessarily the characteristic of political entity in the international arena,
and therefore stateless nations should be recognized as subjects of international law. The best way to achieve
this is to make room in international law for minority nations that are self-defining in accordance with their
own criteria to be recognized as political entities within the concept of the sovereign state, co-exist in
arrangements with states, and further serve as members of international organizations. In order for
ColOnialism to be ended, a room in international law for non-Western concepts should be made, and stateless
nations should be recognized, they should be heard, and they should be allowed to contribute to its shape.
This will strengthen the state, whose legitimacy and continued survival hinge on its representation of the
peoples.).
I2l
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the foreseeable future. The key issue is not the continuous existence of the sovereign state,

but how its centrality and functions are being modified. As the past decades have

witnessed, all the states on the globe are struggling to solve the problems that are beyond

their control within their national boundaries-financial flow, drug trade, AIDS, terrorism,

and so forth-. In these circumstances, the state actors and institutions need to adapt. As

such, they modify the meaning of sovereign authority, control, and the role of private

actors.122 In short, while the state's powers are not what they once were, the state remains

sovereign.123

B. The Emergence of Global Civil Society: Implications for the State

The changing role of the state is often associated with the increased participation of

global civil society in domestic and international affairs. Notably, the state has been

122

See Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 56 (2002)
See id. at 74. Observers remark that "[I]fthe state remains at the center of governance in the world, what
has changed? In a word everything. Never have so many different nonstate actors competed for the authority
and influence that once belonged to the state alone." See Gordon Smith et aI., Altered States: Globalization,
Sovereignty and Governance 10 (2000).
123
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increasingly challenged by the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs ).124

The information revolution has enabled NGOs to engage in the large scale-activity across

national borders because NGOs are particularly effective in penetrating states without

regard to borders. 125 As a result, NGOs operating transnationally have much greater
opportunities to organize and propagate their views in response to new demands. 126 The

prospect of a civil society is attractive to liberals, who envisage it as enabling and

empowering independent self-organized groups to participate politically and to counter the
abuses of state power. 127 One notes that "the revitalization of civil society was portrayed,

124 Thanks to the information revolution, the number ofNGOs increased from 6,000 to approximately 26,000
during the 1990s alone. See The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Ann FIorini ed. 2000).
It deserves noting the importance of in particular NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International,
the International Red Cross, Greenpeace, the World Economic Forum, Doctors without Borders, and
Transparency International. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) playa key role in an increasingly global
economy. At the end of2001, the gross product of all foreign affiliates ofMNEs was estimated at $3.5 trillion,
or roughly one tenth of the world's domestic product. About two thirds of world trade is conducted by MNEs,
and about a third takes place within MNEs. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness 4-5,
U.N. Doc. UNCTADIWIRl2002 (2002). Gross Product is defined as the total value of all goods and services
produced by MNEs.
125 See Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics 91(2004).
126 In this regard, new perspectives on governance highlight the potential role of civil society. Nye notes the
need for a diffusion of governance activities in several directions at the same time instead of centralization or
decentralization when there is imbalance between the state's problem-solving capacity and the problems of
life. See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 45. Nye illustrates the possible diffusion of
activities away from central governments-vertically to other levels of government and horizontally to market
~~d private nonrnarket actors. See id. at 45-46.
See John Clark, Democratizing Development: The Role o/Voluntary Organizations (1991); see also
Andrew Hurrell et aI., Globalization and Inequality, 24 Int'l Studies 447,467 (1995) ("the idea of 'civil
society' has long been considered in liberal thought as something defmed in contradiction to the state and as
valuable precisely as a means of checking the power of states. Confirming this view in the evidence ofNGOs
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at least by conservatives, as a solution to the social and political side of public well-being,

one that could make the state politically obsolete, just as global markets made the state

economically obsolete.,,128

Many NGOs assert to act as a global conscience representing broad public interests
I

beyond the domain of states, or interests that states are used to ignoring. 129 In this way, a

large number ofNGOs have played a key role in the official institutions concerned with the

creation of international law and legal policy, and in pressing for the implementation and
enforcement oflaw. 130 NGOs' work ranges over their broad interestsYI Some note that

which have given voice to the weak and vulnerable and to those who are deemed to be non-members of a
particular state or political community, or who fall between the cracks of the state system ... ").
128 See Peter Evans, The Eclipse of the State?: Reflections on Stateness in an Era ofGlobalizations, WORLD
POLITICS, Vol. 50, No.1 (Oct. 1997), at 78-79. Evans points out that the political triumph of the stateless
Anglo-American world order was a crucial driving force behind the charisma of civil society. Id. at 78.
129 See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 60. Thanks to the expansive use of the
Internet, NGOs are able to share information with state institutions, thereby pressing governments directly, or
indirectly by mobilizing their publics through focusing the attention of the media and governments on their
preferred issues. In this way, they create a new type of transnational political coalitions, such as a coalition to
ban land mines brought together NGOs, celebrities, and politicians in many countries. Meanwhile, there is a
need to rethink about NGOs' use of the Internet to plan the disruption of the WTO summit in 1999 that
r3~came known as the battle of Seattle. See Nye, Soft Power, supra note 125, at 90-92.
See Oscar Schachter, The Erosion of State Authority and its Implications for Equitable Development,
supra note 109, at 36. For a recent survey ofNGOs, see Thomas G.Weiss et aI., NGOs, the UN and Global
~?vernance (1996).
Multinational enterprises are also the target ofNGO activities. In short, as the technology of the cheap
communications enable NGOs to conduct campaigns to name and shame transnational companies that pay
low wages to laborers in poor countries. Such campaigns sometimes work since they are credibly able to
threaten to deprive the corporations of the soft power of their valuable brand names. See Nye, Soft Power,
SUpra note 125, at 93. Indeed, multinational enterprises (MNEs) playa key role in an increasingly global
economy. At the end of 2001, the gross product of all foreign affiliates of MNEs was estimated at $3.5 trillion,
Or roughly one tenth ofthe world's domestic product. About two thirds of world trade is conducted by MNEs,
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"[NGOs] breed new ideas; advocate, protest, and mobilize public support; do legal,

scientific, technical, and policy analysis; provide services; shape, implement, and monitor

national and international commitments; and change institutions and norms.,,132

Needless to say that NGOs have played a critical role in supporting human rights,

thereby improving the status of women and environmental regulation. Despite their

dedication to higher aims, their efforts are widely viewed as a desirable addition to
international political and legal structures. 133 Their power in mobilizing public opinion

and bringing pressure on government is construed as participatory democracy. 134 The

information revolution and global communication networks have contributed to the growth

and effectiveness of the NGOs on the international stage. As a result, NGOs are able to

challenge states or compete with them in important areas. In this regard, governments

and about a third takes place within MNEs. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness 4-5,
U.N. Doc. UNCTADIWIRJ2002 (2002). Gross Product is defined as the total value of all goods and services
P3~oduced by MNEs.
133 See Mathews, supra note 98, at 53.
134 See Schachter, supra note 109, at 35.
[d. at 37.
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have to consider NGOs as both allies and adversaries because of their ability to attract

followers.

135

However, NGOs are barely recognized under international law, and their juridicial

status and rights are still governed by national law constituted by the state authority. Under

the special circumstances, they are granted privileges and immunities similar to the public
bodies. 136 A provision of the U.N. Charter (Article 71) provides a basis for granting

consultative status in the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to both

international and national NGOs with regard to economic and social issues. The text of

this provision is commonly viewed as a compromise among those who advocate NGO

participation in the United Nations' work and those who oppose such participation. 137 A

reading of Article 71 of the U.N. Charter may cause some doubts as to any entitlement of

nongovernmental organizations in the context of a legal subject. 138 Nevertheless, the

135
136

See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 90.
See Schachter, at 37 ..
See Rainer Lagoni, Article 7J, in The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary (Bruno Simma et al.
eds., 1994).
138 Arti
.
c1e 71 provides: "The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation
With nongovernmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such
arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national
organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned." For the analysis of the
137

56

provision created the unprecedented formal relationship between interest groups and an

intergovernmental body (ECOSOC).

Since the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro held in

1992, a lot of members ofNGOs served on government delegations, and they penetrated

deeply into official decision-making in international authorities with independent

regulatory powers. 139 The Rio Declaration itself does not mention nongovernmental

organizations. However, Agenda 21 underlines that such organizations possess "well-

established and diverse experience, expertise and capacity infields which will be of

particular importance to the implementation and review of environmentally sound and

socially responsible sustainable development"(Section 27.3). It is therefore concluded that

the role of such organizations is to be strengthened. Apart from promoting the fullest

possible communication and co-operation between international organizations, national and

local governments and NGOs, one specific method of enlarging the role ofNGOs is "to

role ofNGOs, see Stephan Hobe, Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of
~~ngovernmental Organizations, 5 INDIANA 1. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191(1997).
See Mathews, supra note 98, at 55.
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ensure the right of nongovernmental organizations to protect the public interest through

legal action"(Section 27.13).

Moreover, it is important to note NGOs and states' collaborating ad hoc in large-scale

humanitarian relief operations that involve both military and civilian forces. 140 Also, it is

noteworthy that whereas NGOs as observers of the World Bank have done, they may also

file amicus curiae briefs in WTO dispute-settlement cases depending on the transparency of

their own membership and finances. 141 Another group ofNGOs engage directly in

development activities under contractual agreements with governments or international

agencies such as the World Bank. 142 More importantly, there is an increasing role of

NGOs to play in a hybrid network of organizations that combine governmental,

intergovernmental, and nongovernmental representatives, such as the World Commission

on Dam or Kofi Annan's Global Compact, the International Telecommunications Union,

140
141

See id. at 62-63.
See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 167.
In that way, international financial institutions have also more engaged in states' domestic affairs.
Beyond their engagement in domestic economic and social decisionmaking, under the new policies,the World
B~ the International Monetary Fund, and other international fmancial institutions are forced to be allied
With bUSiness, NGOs, and civil society if they are to accomplish broad changes in target countries. In the
pro~e~s, they have exposed themselves to the same needs they are asking their clients: broader public
PartiCIpation and greater openness in decision-making. See Mathews, Power Shift, supra note 98, at 60.
142
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and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature to enhance global

governance.

143

Since a number of groups within civil society are the direct or indirect product of state

action, and cannot be understood outside their relationship to states, the politics of

transnational civil society mainly concerns the way of certain groups' emergence, and their

legitimacy by governments, institutions, or other groupS.144 NGOs' environmental and

development activities which are not operated for profit are also influenced by scientific

and technical community oflike-minded experts acting through their associations or

consulting companies. A benefit of these epistemic communities, in addition to their

specialized competence, is their avoidance of defects of centralization, and the hierarchies'
characteristic of both state and international public bodies. 145 One observer notes that

epistemic communities bring up knowledge and consensus providing basis for effective

143
144

See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 167; see also Mathews, supra note 98, at 62.
Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods, Globalization and Inequality, 24 MILLENNIUM 447, 467-468(1995).
See Peter. Haas, Do Regimes matter?: Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control, 43
INT'L ORG. 377 (1989).
145
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cooperation through framing issues of ozone depletion or global climate changes.

146

Although the cross-border transmission of knowledge and ideas is often viewed as the

diffusion of knowledge through epistemic communities, this neglects the issue of whose

scientific knowledge becomes critical through what channels, and with what relationship to

states and state power. 147 Arguably, there is a need to examine the links between

influential epistemic communities, particular institutions and particular groups within

society are often unexamined

In the meantime, there are increasing concerns over the rise in transnational criminal

organizations' illegal activities of drug-traffic, money laundering, terror, and so on. In

particular, international terrorist groups have become the center of attention around the

globe in the aftermath of 9/11 tragedy. As for the empowering terrorist groups in an

uncritical way, there are two further problems. First, these transnational terrorist

organizations are not necessarily representative, nor politically accountable. Second, the

146

Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International policy Coordination, 46 Int'l Org.

~~Winter 1992).

See Karen Litfm, Framing Science: Precautionary Discourse and the Ozone Treaties, 24 MILLENNIUM
251(1995).
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probability of demonstration for better and for worse. In this regard, the same standards of

transparency should be applied to NGOs themselves as the increased transparency, that is

curtailing secrecy of procedures is required for international institutions to be held
accountable. 153 Furthermore, NGOs do not hesitate to use their soft-power resources in

calling to storm the barricades evidenced in Seattle and Doha if the lack of political

accountability and legitimacy came to a head.

Despite problems of empowering NGOs, they have worked their way into the core of

international negotiations and the operations of international institutions bringing new

priorities and demands for procedures that give a voice to groups outside govemments.

154

Fostering civil society does not necessarily require the demise ofthe state. That is to say,

it is not a zero-sum relation between robustness of the state and the vibrancy of civil

society. 155 Thus, the relationship of the state to civil society is more productively viewed

in the context of mutual empowerment or synergy.156 Likewise, by assisting to solve

153
154
155
156

See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 166-167.
See Mathews, supra note 98, at 56.
See Evans, supra note 128, at 79.
See 1°d . at 80
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See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 166-167.
See Mathews, supra note 98, at 56.
See Evans, supra note 128, at 79.
See id. at 80
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problems governments cannot cope with, private sectors, NGOs, and international

institutions may find themselves actually strengthening the state system.

C.

IS7

The Reconceptnalization of State Sovereignty

The traditional conceptions of sovereignty have been problematic due to the changing

nature of sovereignty. Finding a workable definition of sovereignty has been an everlasting

challenge for academics. As a result, the notion of sovereignty is meant by different

."

definitions. ISS Moreover, the concept of sovereignty has been attacked as obsolete,IS9 a
.•.
.~

dead duck l60 or extinct,161 but has not been abandoned.

157 One observer argues that "NGOs are no more successful now in driving outcomes than they were in the
past. The most powerful of these organizations originated and are headquartered in Europe or the United
States--territories that have driven international policies for at least the last fifty years. To the extent that
these NGOs have been able to prevail in domestic processes of interest intermediation in the most powerful
states, they have long been able to influence international negotiations and outcomes. When NGOs have not
prevailed in powerful countries, they have sometimes tried to effect change by going around the their
Powerful home states, prevailing instead upon weaker states to support their positions in international
negotiations. Such strategy, however, has not reversed their fortunes in the powerful states where they were
unable to prevail initially. The net result has been a series of recent treaties that have been limited
effectiveness due to lack of support from powerful states-the Kyoto Protocol, the Antipersonnel Landmines
Convention, and the Rome Statute, to name a few." See Richard H. Steinberg, Who is Sovereign?, 40 Stan. J.
Int'l L. 329 335 (2004).
158
'
Stephen Krasner conceptualizes four different dimensions of sovereignty-international legal sovereignty,
Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty. According to Krasner, in
particular Westphalian sovereignty refers to the exclusion of foreign actors from domestic decision-making,
and interdependence sovereignty refers to a state's control over the cross-border movement of goods, services,
capital, labor, and information. See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 9-25 (1999).
Krasner's study was initiated to respond to observers who assert that the state sovereignty was once exclusive
and absolute, but has been eroded by transportation and communication advances, globalism in general, and
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The term "sovereignty" has had a long history of the concept in philosophical and

historical lexicons as the word's meaning changes with each passing era. The

conceptualization of sovereignty varies with the context and objectives of the use ofthe

word among legal scholars, political theorists, and policymakers. As remarked earlier, the

concept of sovereignty has been defined as absolute control of territorial state since the I i

h

century, first in Europe and then elsewhere. As the term "territorial state" denotes a

governing system for a specific territory with a stable population and a functional

government, the rise of the territorial state was entailed by the notion that the state was

sovereign. 162 Hence, the sovereignty of all social groupings regardless of ethnic and

religious identities within a state's borders was legally subordinated to the sovereignty of

the state. This was the situation at the earliest stages in the development of the concept of

sovereignty. Thereafter, sovereignty has become a widely accepted notion as the ultimate

authority to make policy within a state's boundaries. Therefore, sovereignty is perceived
the rise ofNGOs. Notably, Krasner remarks that sovereignty was never absolute and always frail as a legal
fs;mciple. See id.
See Hans J. Morgenthau, The Intellectual and Political Functions of a Theory of International Relations, in
~e Role of Theory in International Relations 116 (Horace V. Harrison ed., 1964).
161 See J.P. Nettle The State as a Conceptual Variable, 20 World Politics 560 (1968).
162 See Ali Khan, The Extinction of Nation-States 193 (1996).
See Thomas G. Weiss et aI., The United Nations and Changing World Politics 4-9 (1997).
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as an authority to enhance the power of peoples constituting the government that represent

the state.

As a legal concept, the doctrine of sovereignty and the legal fiction of the sovereign

equality of states is the independence of states. In the doctrine of international law , state

sovereignty itself denotes not only the power of an independent state, but the ultimate

authority of the state, which is absolute within its territory and equal in its relations with

other sovereigns. That is to say, the state is granted the right freely to exercise its power

within its territory, and the right to exclude from its territory the exercise of power by any

other state without any voluntary invitation to do so. Accordingly, the sovereign'S will is

the only legally relevant one, and thus the power of sovereigns and their political authority

must be respected, that is no outside rules and institutions are held to be superior to the

state.

The eclipse of established empires after World War I and the creation of international

institutions following World War II posed challenges to the traditional notions of state

Sovereignty as absolute territorial control over all people in a state. Moreover, the

65

breakdown of the communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe which led to the end

of the Cold War has propelled the emergence of a new world order. The traditional and

ideological conflict in politics has encountered a new stage of the world politics and global

cooperation. In particular, the economic integration in the European Community163

leading to the prominence of the European Union 164 has become an inspiration for the

regional cooperation movement aiming at the growth of domestic economy. It is very

crucial to note what the transformation of Europe means in the context of the state

sovereignty in that the transformation makes states' boundaries insignificant. The

European integration toward Europe as unity and Europe as community raised a question

163 The European Community (hereinafter Ee) is opposed to the European Union (hereinafter EU), from a
legal point of view, the European Communities in that the European Communities and their Member States
are members of the WTO. That is because the area of trade is governed by the three Community treaties: the
Treaty establishing the European Community (Ee), formerly the European Economic Community (EEe); the
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSe); and the Treaty establishing the
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). These treaties were amended but not replaced by the
Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty). The tree supranational European Commnuties make up
the fIrst of so-called three pillars on which the EU, which does not have legal personality, is founded. The
two othr pillars-foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs-are intergovernmental EC as
opposed to European Communities. See Sydney J. Key, Financial Services in Uruguay Round and the WTO,
?roup of Thirty Occasional Papers 54 (1997) at 53 n.2.
64 Thanks to the success of the 1992 initiative, followed by the Masastricht Treaty and plans for further
integration in the near future, the European Union has come into being. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,
1992, O.J.C. 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, also
known as the Maastricht Treaty, offIcially adopted the name "European Union" for the former "European
Communities." The European Coal and Steel Community, which was born during the devastation wrought by
Bitler has come a long way to breed the prominence of the EU. As of May 1,2004, the European Union has
grown to an organization with 25 member states and 450 million people from 6 member sates in 1951. For the
detail, see http://www.europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm.
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whether the reciprocal benefit derived from correlative restriction on the sovereignty of a

state renders the surrender of the sovereignty of another state, because the EU has to

become as much a union of citizens as it is of states. In other words, there was a concern

over the loss of sovereignty by the EU member states because the EU accession required

significant changes in the 10ca11egis1ation and direct infringement on the domestic control

oftax and other matters, although it was permanent, and did not include a right of

secession. 165

However, the EU member states do not conceive the growing power of the EU and its

ru1emaking commissions as a loss of sovereignty, although public suspicion of the sudden

prominence of the EU became painfully obvious during national ratification of the

Maastricht Treaty.166 Likewise, the EU member states were expected to surrender more

sovereignty to the EU, but even the smaller states of Europe consider the EU's progress and
165

See Jenik Radon, Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, not a Concept, 40 Stan. J. Int'l L. 195, 199-202
(2004).
166
Notably, a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark, British parliamentary support was
questionable, and even in traditionally pro-EC France a referendum passed by the narrowest of margins. See
e.g., Half-Maastricht, Economist, Sept. 26,1992, at 15; The Danes say No, Economist, June 6,1992; See also
David Arter, The Politics of European Integration in the Twentieth Century 212-216 (1993). Public suspicion
of the creation of the EU arose due to the concern over the legitimacy ofEU institutions themselves in terms
of the democratic deficit, and the threat the EU posed to the independence and survival of the member states.
For the democratic deficit, see Peter Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and Administrative Character of
Supranationalism: The Example of The European Community, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 628 (1999).
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growth as an exercise of expansion of their sovereignty. 167 Accordingly, each EU member

state still enjoys its dignity as a sovereign in intemationallaw. Hence, the prominence of

the EU casts some hints on defining a contemporary concept of state sovereignty In the

expectation of new geographic and functional entities' birth.

With the acceptance ofthe Charter ofthe United Nations (UN), none of the original

fifty-one member states raised the issue of UN membership as a threat to the sovereignty,

but perceived it as a confirmation of their sovereignty. 168 However, competing

conceptualizations of sovereignty arise even in the Charter of the United Nations.

According to the Article 2 (7) of the Charter, "Nothing in the present Charter shall

authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the

domestic jurisdiction of any State.,,169 By contrast, the UN Member States, in virtue of

their acceptance of the UN Charter, have agreed to the ensuing restrictions on their

167

Estonia and the other Baltic States became the EU members to protect their sovereignty because they
considered joining the Euro Zone as a means to increase sovereignty. See Askel Kirch et aI., Changes in EUS~nsciousness in Estonia 1995-2000: Discussion and Public Union (IES Proceedings 2002).
See Radon, supra note 165, at 201 (remarking "the creation of the United Nations also sanctified the
f~ncept of state sovereignty, as only recognized states could be members of this new global club").
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
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sovereignty according to the Article 2 (1) of the Charter.

l7O

The coexistence of human

rights provisions in the UN Charter since 1945 has made the issue of conceptualization of

sovereignty complicated. In particular, the NATO intervention of in Kosovo was the

subject of hot debate among international legal experts, with asserting illegality because it

was not explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council, and others claiming its legality

under the evolving body of international humanitarian law. 171 The issue lies at the center

of the justification of states' interference in the affairs of other sates. One arguably

attributes such interferences to governments' understanding of the unavailability of no

other alternatives to them, and fundamental threats to their security derived from conditions

once thought to be within a state's exclusive domestic jurisdiction. 172

170

U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (embedding the principle of self-determination in the mission of the UN). One
observer argues that "[r]ecent attemps in the international legal literature to declare incompatible with state
sovereignty, and therefore illegal, the binding decisions of the UN Security Council authorizing enforcement
measures under Chapter VII, are flawed and simply false.". See Jost Delbruck, Prospects for a "World
(International) Law?": Legal Developments in a Changing International System, 9 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud.
401,428 (2002). Delbruck continues asserting that "the concept of sovereignty with which the UN actions are
supposed to be incompatible is an extraneous notion revived from pre-World War I times, not the concept on
~~ich the UN are based on according to the article 2 (1) of the Charter." See id. at 428 n.78.
See Adam Roberts, "The So-called 'Right' of Humanitarian Intervention", Yearbook ofInternational
N~nitarian Law, summer 2001.
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 Stan. J. Int'l L. 283,
284-285 (2004).
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According to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

(ICISS),173 participating in international organizations, such as the UN itself, ensues the

participating states' acceptance of the fellow member states to intervene in their domestic
affairs in case of their failure in their primary responsibility to protect their citizens. 174 In

December 2001, the ICISS issued a significant report, "The Responsibility to Protect," as a

call for updating the UN Charter to incorporate a new conceptualization of sovereignty. 175

The ICISS insists that "there is a necessary re-characterization involved: from sovereignty
as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties. 176

That is, whereas internally, a government has an obligation to respect the dignity and

fundamental rights of its citizens, externally, it has an obligation to respect other states'

sovereignty.

173

In September 1999, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan issued a challenge to all the UN member states
on the humanitarian area at the opening of the General Assembly to "reach consensus-not only on the
Principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights must be checked, wherever they take place,
but also on ways of deciding what action is necessary, and when, and by whom." In response to this
challenge, a distinguished global group of diplomats, politicians, scholars, and nongovernmental activists
~~tab1ished the International Commission on Intervention and state Sovereignty. See id. at 286-287.
175 Id. at 286.
ICIS, The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
~~OOl). See also Slaughter, supra note 172, at 287 & n. 12.
See ICIS, supra note 175, at para. 2.14.
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As a matter of fact, states have difficulty governing effectively as long as they are left

alone and they leave oth er states a Ione.

177

It is arguably because governments' ability to

accomplish their objectives through individual action has been impeded by international
political and economic interdependence. 178 Conversely, "[ s]tates can only govern

effectively by actively cooperating with other states and by collectively reserving the power

to intervene in other states' affairs.,,179 Here, a modem notion of sovereignty formed by

the paradigms of cooperation and compliance with the international legal order needs to be

reconceptualized.

In the words of Chayes and Chayes , "the new sovereignty" is the right and the capacity

to participate in the international organizations of all types that authorize their members

cooperating with one another, to attain the objectives that could once be achieved by
governments themselves. 180 According to Chayes and Chayes, the international system

177

See Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International
Regulatory Agreements 27 (1995) (arguing that "[I]t is that for all but a few self-isolated nations, sovereignty
no longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently, in their perceived self-interest, but in
~embership in reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of international life.").
See Robert o. Keohane, Sovereignty, Interdependence, and International Institutions, in Ideas and Ideals:
~~says on Politics in Honor of Stanley Hoffmann 91,92 (Linda B. Miller et al. eds.,1993).
180 See Slaughter, supra note 172, at 285.
See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 177, at 4.
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itself has moved beyond interdependence, and it has become a "tightly woven fabric of

international agreements, organizations and institutions that shape [states'] relations with

one another and penetrate deeply into their internal economics and politics.,,181 In this

regard, one argues that state sovereignty does not mean the autonomy of the state any more

as long as the background features of international system are connection rather than
separation, interaction rather than isolation, and institutions rather than free space. 182 In

this sense, the new sovereignty is conceived as status, membership, "connection to the rest

of the world and the political ability to be an actor within it.,,183

181 See id. at 26. For the relationship of globalization to interdependence, see Wolfgang Reinicke, Global
Public Policy: Governing without Government 52-74 (1998).
182
See Slaughter, supra note 172, at 286.
183
See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 177, at 26. However, Slaughter paradoxically remarks that "the
measure of a stae' s capacity to act as an independent unit within the international system-the condition that
"sovereignty" purports both to grant and describe-depends on the breadth and depth of its links to other
states." See Slaughter, supra note 172, at 286. Despite a need for the reconceptualization of the traditional
notion of sovereignty, there is a variance in the extent to which states exercise their sovereignty. In this
regard, some observer argues that "all states are legally sovereign, but they vary in the extent to which they
are behaviorally sovereign." See Steinberg, supra note 157, at 329 (distinguishing legal from behavioral
sovereignty: legal sovereignty confers each state the legal competence to participate in the international
system on an equal footing with other states, conclude treatise on the basis of consent, exclude other states
from interfering in its internal affairs; behavioral sovereignty is an evaluation of the extent to which states
indeed exercise the authority granted by legal sovereignty). This variance arises because the state's capacity
to exercise both domestic and international dimensions oflegal sovereignty is contingent. See id. at 333.
Furthermore, states are entitled to a right to exclude other states, nonstate actors, and international
organizations from interference in their internal affairs in international system under international law, but
few states are able to do so in fact. As noted, the IMF's conditionality arrangements imposed on loans and
other measures to help developing countries prevent financial disaster drive the target countries' domestic
policy and institutional changes. See Lawrence L.c. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening
International Banking Supervision, 39 Va. 1. Int'l L. 1. 1,36-39 (1998) (noting that the Basel Committee's
bank regulatory and supervisory standards have been enforced in emerging economies through considerably
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As noted above, state sovereignty is deemed to be an evolutionary rather than a static

concept because both the international system and state-society relations have been

transformed by globalization and interdependence. As such, sovereignty encounters the

transformation and evolution in its nature. Consequently, state sovereignty is redefined by

its responsibility to protect its nationals as well as its capacity to participate in international

regImes.

more coercive means. Under the conditionality, the IMF has insisted on compliance with the Basel Accord
and the Core Principles as a condition of aid.}. In contrast to the sovereign equality of states, powerful states
actually have a dominant voice in the decision-making processes, thereby driving international rules and
consequences of in these settings. See Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Dec. 27, 1945, art. XIL, section 5,
60 Stat 1401, 1418-1419,2 U.N.T.S. 39, 86-88 (In the IMF, votes are weighted to reflect some measure of
underlying power). In this sense, international environmental changes have strengthened in particular the
behavioral sovereignty of powerful states.
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III. Skepticism on Governing the Global Economy Through Government
Networks

A. Restructuring Global Governance

The ongoing economic integration in the world economy raises significant questions

concerning the structure of global governance
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systems intended to safeguard markets

where globalization entails the erosion of national boundaries. Some observers argue that

international institutions threaten state sovereignty.185 The other advocates that traditional

184 As David Kennedy mentions in a particularly informative discussion, governance "has emerged as a
distinctive motto for international public order, consciously distinguished from 'government' and consciously
identified with the group of phenomena that are thought to define the late twentieth-century international
condition: globalization, interdependence, the demise of sovereignty, the apparent futility of further United
Nations institution building, and the emergence of international civil society. These writers identify
governance as a new, distinct phenomenon: either a defining characteristic of the new world order or a
prescriptive for resolving its pragmatic challenge, or both. 'Governance' in this literature, as opposed to
'govenunent' is the complex of more or less formalized bundles ofmles, roles, and relationships that define
the social practices of the state and non-state actors interacting in various issue areas, rather than formal
interstate organizations[.]" See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and
International Governance, 2 UTAH L.REV. 545, 548 nA (1997).
185 See e.g., Susan George, The Problem isn't Beef, Bananas, Cultural Diversity or the Patenting of Life. The
Problem is the WTO, The Guardian (London), November 24, 1999 (claiming that "[w]ithout the WTO has
created an international court of "justice" that is making law and establishing case law in which existing
national laws are all "barriers" to trade, and is sweeping aside all environmental, social or public health
considerations."); see also Patrick Buchanan, The Great Betrayal (1998) (arguing that "the World Trade
Organization exercises a supranational authority in conflict with our forefathers' vision of an American
forever sovereign and independent"). Kal Raustialla classifies the conventional sovereignty-based critiques of
international institutions into three categorizes; first, sovereign power is absolute power and thus reallocations
of power represents a zero-sum game; second, reallocations of sovereignty, especially reallocations of
Upwards to international institutions are presumptively bad, and the retention of sovereignty is presumptively
good; third, sovereignty is nearly synonymous with the notion of democracy. This premise claims that power
allocations to international institutions not simply erode sovereignty but harm democracy, because democratic
processes work better the closer the people are to the government. As a result, international organizations are
perceived as unaccountable and distant, thereby creating or strengthening the democratic deficits. See Kal
Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 61. Int'! Econ. L. 841, 853
(2003).
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notions of state sovereignty are being eroded by globalization itself rather than international

institutions. ls6 Further, one claims that international institutions at least under some

conditions actually enhance sovereignty.IS7 The sovereignty question at international

institutions is related to the level of political support and concerns over democracy.ISS

In particular, the third premise represents American notions of sovereignty adopting the pre-War concept
of sovereignty. The invocation of patriotism arisen from the association of sovereignty in the u.s. with the
domestic democratic process, complete with checks and balances and political accountability is hard to be
reconciled with the global interdependence other states have embraced in their efforts to accomplish
sovereignty. Accordingly, the U.S. entrance in to the International Criminal Court (ICC) like the accession
into the WTO was met with opposition and suspicion. The U.S. sovereigntists argues that the U.S. acceptance
of the ICC would allow politically motivated prosecutors of Americans by nonaccountable actors without
granting Americans their constitutional rights. In this context, Jenik Radon highlights that "[ w]ithin the
United States, the word "sovereignty" has found a separate and independent footing almost adrift from its
historical origins. In effect, it has become an emotion flag. In contrast to the growing trend of interdependence
between nations and ready acceptance of negotiated limits on sovereignty, American notions of sovereignty
adopt the pre-War concept of sovereignty that reconciles both absolute control and popular sovereignty in its
singular brand of democracy." See Radon, Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, not a Concept, supra note 165, at
202-206; John R. Bolton, The United States and the International Criminal Courtfrom America's Perspective,
64 Law & Contemp. Prob. 167, 173 (2001) (remarking several U.S. objections to the ICC); see also John H.
Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay
Round Results, 36 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 157, 160 (1997) (arguing that "[w]hen [sovereignty is] viewed as a
question of allocation of power, however, the debate only begins with the "sovereignty objection; it must
continue with an analysis demonstrating why it is better or worse for such a power shift to occur in certain
circumstances .... [T]his is rarely done, but ought to be done if the argument is to be persuasive.").
186
See Andrew Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 Harv. Int'l L. J. 303, 348 (2004). For the
sovereignty question at the WTO, Guzman asserts that "[it] can be viewed through the lens of contract.
Domestic legal systems allow individuals to make binding agreements. These contracts limit the future
actions of each party, but we do not criticize them as infringements on individual autonomy. In fact, we view
them as tools to further individual autonomy, because they allow individuals to advance their interests more
effectively than would be possible in a world without binding contracts. International agreements can be
viewed as contracts among sovereign states. Like domestic contracts, they restrict (or seek to restrict) future
behavior, but like contracts, they should be viewed as serving rather than undermining the interests of states."
See id. at 346.
187 See Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, supra note 185, at
843.
188 See e.g., John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movesesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 511
(2000). In response to the concern over democratic deficit, Raustiala point out that contemporary critiques of
global governance often embrace the retention of state sovereignty in that sovereignty protects democratic
processes from external influence. Further, he argues that the expansion of governance beyond the state
strengthens sovereignty and democracy. See Raustiala, supra note 185, at 854-855. The major reactions
responding to the conventional sovereignty-based critique of international organizations can be fallen into
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Sovereignty issues emerge due to the institution's success in limiting the policy options of

national governments and its impact on the state behavior despite no enforcement

mechanism within the institution. 189

three categories. See generally Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Democracy, Accountability, and
Global Governance, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (June 27, 2001), cited in Raustialla,
supra note 185, at 855, n.52. According to Keohane and Nye, the fIrst reaction is to withdraw; to suggest that
reliance should be curtailed as shown in the U.S. rejection of the ICC. The second reaction is to continue to
employ international organizations but to strive to reform them through institutional design to enhance the
accountability and legitimacy of international institutions and networks. See Nye, The Paradox of American
Power, supra note 97, at 165. This reaction is embedded in the current practice of subsidiarity, that is all
political issues to the lowest possible level for resolution in the EU as a response to the critique of democratic
defIcit in global governance in European context. See Peter L. Lindseth, democratic Legitimacy and the
Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 Colum. L. Rev.
628 (1999). The third reaction is realist: to dismiss the whole problem as a misguided category because
"world politics are is inherently undemocratic and there is little point in lamenting the obvious." See Keohane
& Nye, Democracy, Accountability, and Global Governance, at 2. This reaction is closely associated with
realist theory in international relations theory under which international institutions do not act in world
politics directly, and states would never agree to institutions that diminish their sovereignty unless it is their
interests to do so. See id.
As a conceptual alternative, Raustiala presents the sovereignty-strengthening claim that views
international institutions as a positive force for sovereignty. There are two varied ideas about this claim. The
fIrst variant is that states declared sovereignty as autonomy in the past due to the dramatic change of the
nature of sovereignty and international relations, but international institutions are the tools through which
sovereignty is reasserted thanks to the increased interdependence in world affairs. The second variant based
on public choice theory asserts that international organizations can enhance sovereignty for two related but
distinct reasons stressing the centrality of rent-seeking by individuals and private actors. Raustiala points out
that "[I]nternational institutions may help to circumvent domestic rent-seeking interests which have captured
the state, or international institutions may be used as tools to preserve the sovereign power, and associated
rents, of government offIcials whose regulatory powers are challenged by globalization." See Raustialla,
Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in international Economic Law, supra note 185, at 856-857. For the detail,
see
id. at 857-874 •
189
For example, borrowing countries are required to accept the more forceful conditions, so called
conditionality on the loan agreement imposed by the IMF. In short, due to the imbalance of power between
the IMF and the client countries, the countries are put on strict targets. As a result, the countries' congress
should pass pertinent laws in order to meet IMF requirements and targets by a specifIc date. As for the
conditionality, one argues that "conditions that might weaken the economy in the short run, whatever their
merits in the long, run the risk of exacerbating the downturn and thus making it more diffIcult for the country
to repay the short-term IMF loans[,]" although at a minimum, every loan agreement specifIes basic conditions
d~signed to increase the likelihood that they will be paid. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its
~lsContents 43-44 (2002). Stiglitz notes several reasons for the failure of conditionality. See id. at 46-48.
lIrther, Stiglitz argues that the conditionality has little to do with the welfare ofless developed country
peoples and more to do with the concerns of powerful states. Id. at 18.
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Moreover, the increasing interdependence among states has posed formidable

challenges for the predominating post-War mechanism of international cooperation, so

called liberal internationalism based on multilateral treaties, mainly creating international

institutions. In this context, some critics assert that the traditional statist foundation of

liberal internationalism has increasingly been waning due to globalization and the growth
of nonstate actors. 190 As a leading alternative to liberal internationalism, the new

medievalists assert that information revolution has driven the power shift from hierarchies

to networks in the structure of organization with the eclipse of the state, whereas liberal

<'

1.
"

internationalists still view international rules and institutions as crucial mechanisms to

solve governmental problems. 191 In response to the debate, one observer argues that

trans governmental networks can be substituting for sovereign or unitary state interaction in

several regulatory fields due to the demise of regulator's power to implement national
190
191

See ~athews, supra note 98, at 50-52.
See Id. at 52 (arguing that "[b]usiness, citizens' organizations, ethnic groups, and crime cartels have all
readily adopted the network model [while] [g]overnments ... are quintessential hierarchies, wedded to an
organizational form from incompatible with all that the new technologies make possible."). Some argue that
the future is one of new-medievalism, meaning a return to the overlapping sovereignties of that era. See
generally Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, 49 Int'l Org. 595, 624
(1995)("[G]overnment per se will essentially become privatized, losing much of its public character. The
world will be a neo-feudal one, [w]ith overlapping and democratically unaccountable private regimes ... ").
The term originated in a classic work of international relations by Hedley Bull. See Hedley Bull, The
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics 264-281 (1977).
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regulations within those boundaries both because of their citizens' flight for regulatory
laxity, and financial flows are too great and sudden for one regulator to control. l92 In

contrast, the liberal internationalist response to concerns about the erosion of state

regulatory power is to build a larger international apparatus, such as the United Nations

system-the paradigmatic example of liberal internationalism- constituted by a legally

binding treaty, with expanding powers of governance to deal with governmental

problems. 193 However, these attempts to reconstruct global governance have encountered

the limits and strains of liberal internationalism.

194

192 See Slaughter, supra note 106, at 189-192. Slaughter argues that "[a] new world order is emerging, which
less fanfare but more substance than either the liberal internationalist or new medievalist vision." See id. at
184. According to Slaughter, "[g]lobal governance, [from the transgovernmentalist perspective], is not a
matter of regulating states the way states regulate their citizens, but rather of addressing the issues and
resolving the problems that result from citizens going global-from crime to commerce to civic engagement."
See Slaughter, A New World Order 16 (2004).
193 See Zuern, supra note 104, at 241. Slaughter notes that "[g]lobalization thus leads to internationalization,
or the transfer of regulatory authority from the national level to an international institution ... Liberals are
likely to support expanding the power of international institutions to guard against the global dismantling of
the regulatory state." See Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 106, at 192-193. Although
Slaughter acknowledge the importance of international rules and institutions described by liberal
internationalism for the creation and maintenance of international order, she argues that "they apply to part
only, and arguably a diminishing part, of the rules and institutions that are generated outside anyone national
legal system but that directly regulate individuals and groups in both their domestic and foreign interactions.
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, in The Role of
Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law 178 (Michael Byers ed.,
2000).
194 See Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas
ofNeo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. Int'l 1. & Bus. 1014, 1019-1020 (1996-97). For detail, see id. at 1022-1035.
While liberal internationalism is still robust, it faces increasing challenges. Recently, the formidable
challenges have been posed to unaccountable and undemocratic international bureaucrats. The slow pace,
formal procedures, and high bargaining costs of multilateral organizations may impede the negotiation of new
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A notable response is the decline of liberal internationalism, and the disaggregation of

the state into its component legislative, executive, administrative and judicial parts, and the

positing of a complex of transnational connections between these component parts in
different states. 195 This perspective asserts that contemporary international cooperation is

being undertaken among discrete and specialized agencies of governments to coordinate

their policies and enhance the enforcement oflaws, in a fashion which, by comparison to
formal inter-state cooperation is fast, flexible and effective. 196 That is, these constituent

institutions are all networking with their foreign counterparts, thereby sharing information,

ideas, resources, and policies. This new paradigm of peer-to-peer cooperation adopts the

adaptable and decentralized network model instead of traditional international institutions
and treaties for their enforcement. 197 However, as discussed later, some critics

treaties and institutions. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Governmental
Networks and the Future ofInternational Law, 43 Va. J. Int'l L. 1, 17 (2002).
195 See Slaughter, supra note 106, at 184, 188-189. One observer argues that "there has been a shift from
"government" to "governance," as the central political institutions of the state have found it increasingly
difficult to resolve social conflicts or to reconcile the diversity of social interests '" Internationally, the
~rrangements for allocating competence between states have also tended to break down, evidenced by the
~creased salience and frequency of inter-jurisdictional conflicts." See Picciotto, supra note 194, at 1018-1019.
6 See id.
197
For the term "transgovernmental networks," see Raustiala, supra note 194, at 4 ("They are
"transgovernmental" because they involve specialized domestic officials directly interacting with each other,
often with minimal supervision by foreign ministries. They are "networks" because this cooperation is based
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acknowledge the significance of networks, but hold them accountable for their role in

reducing transparency and impeding political accountability.198 Others fear that networks

may reinforce the dominance of the major economic powers, particularly inequalities

between advanced industrial countries and less developed economy because of networks'
club-like feature. 199 Nonetheless, trans governmental networks are on the rapid rise, and
their growth is visible in regulatory cooperation. 2oo

In these circumstances, the complex issue of how to govern the global economy comes

:C
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into question. That is to say, how states can regulate properly the global economy. Even

on loosely-structured, peer-to-peer ties developed through frequent interaction rather than formal
negotiation. ")
198 See generally Robert Howse, Regulatory Cooperation and the Problem of Democracy, in
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION 469 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000).
199 See Stephen Toope, Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law, in The Role of Law in
International Politics, supra note 193, at 96-97 ("Networks, like regimes and regardless of their membership,
are sites of power, and potentially of exclusion and inequality."); see also David Kennedy, When Renewal
Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 335,412 (2000) (questioning whether
exploring the "disaggregation of the state and the empowerment of diverse actors in an international civil
society without asking who will win and who will lose by such an arrangement" is prudent).
200 See generally Paul B. Stephan, Regulatory Cooperation and Competition: The Search for Virtue, supra
note 198, at 202; see also Kalypso Nicolsidis, Regulatory Cooperation and Managed Mutual recognition:
Elements of a Strategic Model, supra note 198, at 571 (rernarking that "[r]egulatory cooperation deservers
analytical attention both in own right and a forerunner for the effect of interdependence on other policy areas
and international governance in general."). One observer identifies three chief factors behind the recent rise
of networks: technological innovation, the expansion of domestic rerulation, and the rise of globalization. See
Raustialla, supra note 194, at 11-16. Moreover, Slaughter lauds that trans governmental networks are "the
optimal form of organization for the Information Age." See Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy
Through Government Networks, supra note 193, at 204. Needless to say, since Robert Keohane and Joseph
Nye first observed its emergence, transgovernmentalism has rapidly become the most widespread and
distinctive system of global governance. See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Transgovernmental
~elations and International Organizations, 27 World Pol. 39 (1974) (wondering "whether the common
mterests of central bankers in a stable currency system have been implemented as fully by trangovernmental
Contracts as they might have been."). Id. at 51.
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if the answer is through international cooperation, there are still some concerns over

governing the global economy through government networks.

B. The Rise of Transgovernmental Financial Regulatory Organizations

The growing economic interdependence has urged economic regulators to work with

their counterparts abroad. Furthermore, burgeoning financial disturbances of the past few
~t'·

decades have called for international cooperation among domestic financial regulatory

agencIes. As a result, networks of finance ministers and central bankers have played a

central role in responding to domestic and regional financial turbulences. As the finance

ministers, the G8 that is as much a network of finance ministers as of heads of state is

taking key decisions on how to respond to calls for debt relief for the most highly indebted
countries. 20l In response to the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in

1998, the finance ministers and central bank governors hold separate news conferences to

201 Since 1994 Russia has been included in the annual summit of the G7, now meeting as G8 thanks to Boris
Yeltsin's efforts to join it as evidence that Russian was now part of the West. See Slaughter, A New World
Order, supra note 192, at 2,37. The G7 was set up in Tokyo in May 1996 to strengthen the effective
coordination of international economic policy. It consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom and the United States. See R. Fraser & Long, The World Financial System 199 (1993).
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announce policy.202 In order to help prevent future financial crises, the creation of a

network of G20 was led by the Indian finance minister and consists of the finance ministers
of twenty industrialized and underdeveloped states. 203 Notably, the Financial Stability

Forum as a networked network comprising three organizations, and other domestic and

international authorities was established in 1999 to provide a coherent strategy to achieve

and to maintain financial stability. 204 The key characteristic of government networks in

Recent meetings of G7/G 10 fmance ministers and central bankers are significant in that the practical
agenda of the regulatory fora is decided in these monthly and annual meetings. Its framework is set out by G7
financial ministers, whereas the actual technical deliberation of financial regulation is conducted by the
technocrats of domestic regulators. See Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, Regional Financial Institutionalization and the
Creation ofa Zone of Law: The Content of Financial StabilitylRegulation in East Asia, 35 Int'l Law. 1627,
1636 (2001). The GlO comprises Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Long, The World Financial System, supra note 201, at 31.
203 The G20 was created by created by the G7 on September 25, 1999 in Washington D.C. The extension of
the membership attributes to the increase in the role of the emerging economies' in banking and financial
service markets. See George Alexander Walker, International Banking Regulation: Law, Policy and Practice
152 (2001). Walker asserts that"[t]he importance of the G20 adds political credibility and authority arguably
to an otherwise politically deficient process. A democratic or political deficit or gap must necessarily exist in
the area of international policy construction .... The desire [to be involved in all immediate decision-taking
bodies or agencies] must clearly be to make them as inclusive and credible but at the same time as
operationally efficient and effective as possible."). See id. at.152. For the relative inclusiveness of the G20,
Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin remarked that "[w]hat makes [the G20] unique is the fact that it
brings together a cross-section of national economies at different stages of economic maturity, thereby
providing the diversity needed to address the wide range of human needs." See Notes for an address by
Honorable Paul Martin to Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs, London, U.K., January 24,2001, on
Department of Finance Canada. However, the G20 has certainly not replaced the G8 nor ever been invited to
meet and consult with the G8 on a regular basis. See Salughter, A New World Order, supra note 192, at 144
("How inclusive specific networks can be will ultimately depend in part on their particular functions.").
204 The Financial Stability Forum was led by the finance ministers and central bankers of the G7 industrial
countries in February 1999 preceded by a report on international occupation and coordination in the area of
financial market supervision and surveillance by the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The Forum
consists of six representatives from the Basel Committee, the International Organization of Securities
COmmissioners (IOSCO), and the International Association ofInsurance Supervisors along with senior
representatives from domestic authorities responsible for fmancial stability in significant international finance
centers. Also, the Forum comprises traditional international institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank,
and the OECD. See Financial Stability Forum website, at http://www.fsforum.org.
202
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particular, in financial sector is the cross-border interaction of government agencies with

similar functions and encountering similar problems. The result of this identifying feature

has led to the establishment of trans governmental financial regulatory organizations?05 In

order to understand how these organizations exemplify international financial regulatory

cooperation, it is necessary to explore how they actually work in the sense of the increasing

economic interdependence and achieving financial stability.

1. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) prompted by two large

international bank failures in 1974 was established by a simple agreement among the
twelve central bank governors of the GlO countries, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. 206 Its

founding mandate was a press communique from the central bank governors issued through

205 Slaughter divides government networks into three broad categories: harmonization networks, enforcement
networks, and information networks. According to Slaughter, transgovernmental financial regulatory
organizations are generally considered as information networks in that they exchange information, and further
actively collect and distill information about how their members do business. The standard product of this
~istillation is a code of best practice. For detail, see Slaughter, A New World Order, supra note 192, at 50- 64.
06 See Walker, supra note 203, at 17-81. The Basel Committee was established in 1975 by the Group ofTen,
which were the ten member countries of the IMF plus Luxembourg and Switzerland.
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the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).207 As an oldest and most active committee

under the BIS,208 the Basel Committee seeks to create common standards of banking
supervision. 209 The Basel Committee has no formal constitution or by-law, and operates
without its own staff or facilities. 2JO The charter membership of the BIS and the Basel

Committee overlaps, but the BIS does not formally participate in the Basel Committee.

Nevertheless, a small staff of the BIS-four professional supervisors on temporary

See Joseph Norton, Trends in International Bank Supervision and the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision, 48 Consumer Fin. L.Q. 415, 415 n.1 (1994).
208 The BIS was formally created on January 30, 1930 at the Hague Convention of 1930 with the main
purpose of processing settlements of international payments associated with Germany's reparations as part of
the 1929 Young Plan. Convention respecting the Bank for International Settlements, Jan. 20, 1930, 104
L.N.T.S. 441 (Hague Convention of 1930), available at http://www.bis.orgiabouticonvention.htm#P21_2653
(last visited Sept. 30, 2004). As a commercial bank, the BIS holds deposits for other central banks, engages
in capital market activities, and provides lending facilities to its central bank members. As an international
institution with legal personality, the BIS seeks to promote international monetary cooperation by hosting
meetings among central bank experts, conducting statistical research, and publishing some of its results
periodically. See Mario Giovanoli, The role of the BIS in Monetary Cooperation and its Tasks Relating to the
ECD, in Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks 1,39 (1994) (comparing the BIS with other fmancial
institutions). For the profile of the BIS, see Carl Felsenfeld et aI., The Role of the Bank for International
Settlements in Shaping the World Financial System, 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 945, 954-977 (2004). For
more information about the BIS, see Bank for International Settlements, About BIS, available at http://www.
bis.orgiaboutlindex.htm (last visited August 25, 2004).
209 In response to two large international bank crises, such as the Herstatt, and the Franklin National's Failure
in 1974, the Basel Committee's aim was to strengthen collaboration among domestic authorities in their
~upervision of international banking. See C. J. Thompson, The Basle Concordat: International Collaboration
In Banking Supervision, in 1Current legal issues Affecting Central Banks 331, 333 (Robert C. Effrose ed.,
1992). While the bank failure in 1974 was a driving force behind the creation of the Basel Committee, other
factors arguably contributed to the legitimacy and solidity ofthe Basel Committee. Two key events were the
collapse of the fixed international exchange system established by the Bretton Woods agreement in 1945,
which caused much more speculative investment and a general movement of funds in the currency markets,
and the need for international banks to absorb and invest these funds. See Ethan B. Kapstein, Governing the
Global Economy: International Finance and the State 30, 58 (1994). This issue will be discussed in detail in
~~~ of systemic risk in the next chapter.
See Joseph Norton, Devising International Bank Supervisory Standards 177 (1995)
207
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secondment from member institutions, and a member of the Basel Committee--serve as the

Basel Committee's secretariat, and the Committee meets four times per year in Base1.

211

The Basel Committee is not a public organization in that it operates informally and by

consensus. 212 The Committee operates secretly and seeks to maintain a low profile.

213

Further, membership is strictly limited to the world's most highly industrialized countries
and will be unlikely extended. 214 In 1988, capital adequacy requirements for all banks

were adopted by the central bankers of the world's major financial powers under their

supervision. Its members follow their own rules. Decisions are made by consensus and

are not formally binding; however, members do implement these decisions within their own

systems. The Basel Committee's authority is often cited as an argument for taking

domestic action.

211 See Charles Freeland, The Work of the Basle Committee, in 2 Current Legal Issues affecting Central
Banks 231-232 (Robert C. Effros ed., 1994).
212 See United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committee, International Banking:
Strengthening the Framework for Supervising International Banks (Mar. 1994), at 37. The Committee's
operations are characterized by an emphasis of close personal contacts, insistence, and an interactive and
decentralized method of ensuring compliance. The Committee operates through a rotating chair and makes
recommendations based on consensus. See Huib J. Muller, Address to the 5th International Conference of
Bank Supervisors (May 16, 1988), cited in Tony Porter, States, Markets, and regimes in Global Finance 66
(1993). The Committee seeks these contacts within its membership and pursued to develop others with
~utside banking regulators. See General Accounting Office, International Banking, at 64-67.
3 A former chairman Huib J. Muller noted that"[w]e don't like publicity. We prefer, I might say, our
~dden secret world of the supervisory continent." See Norton, Supervisory Standards, supra note 210, at 177.
4 See id.
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The Basel Committee's stated objectives are too broad. The Committee describes itself

as a "forum for ongoing cooperation among member countries on banking supervisory

matters" that aims to "strengthen international cooperation, improve the overall quality of

banking supervision worldwide, and ensure that no foreign banking establishment escapes

supervision." ,215 In practice, the Committee publishes some of its recommendations

ranging from short documents to technical, mathematical regulations used to provide

guidance for the implementation of the promulgations. After a comment period, the

Committee reconsiders and reissues a final version of its work, which the Central Bank

Governors are then supposed to implement within their own national systems. Even if the

Committee's formal authority has arisen exclusively from the support of the central bankers,

its recommendations have been implemented by both member and nonmember countries.

216

As one observer argues, "[t]he Basel Committee's recommendation-making process

exemplifies the distinctive nature oftransgovemmenatl regulatory cooperation.,,217 One of

the recommendations, the Committee's 1988 Capital Accord exemplifies the Basel
215

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Annexure C (1995), para. 3.

~16 Nonmember banking states' adoption of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord is a good example.
17

See Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, supra note 193, at 182.
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Committee's infonnal procedure, and demonstrates the Committee's expansive

understanding of consensus.218

The Accord, setting minimum capitalization standards for

international banks regulated by the member countries, provides an instructive example to

understand how the Committee operates as a transgovemmental network. After several

meetings, the Basel Committee announced that agreement on a proposal had been reached.
'"

1, ..

There was a six month comment period, during which the Committee received comments

on its draft agreement from private bankers and other interested parties. The final version

of the Accord was released on July 15, 1988, after which the central bankers of member

banks implemented the agreed standards. Following frequent amendments of the Accord

since its promulgation; the Basel Committee recently released the document, "International

Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, a Revised Framework"

(widely known as Basel II) on June 26, 2004?19

218
219

For the detail, see Kapstein, supra note 209, at 103-128.
The Bank for International Settlement, Implementation of Basel I: Practical Considerations, available at
http://www.bis.orglbcbsl09.htm (last visited on August 1, 2004). Unlike most treaties or other legal
agreements the Basel Capital Accord is intended to evolve over time.
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As the BIS notes, the Basel Committee does not possess any formal supranational

supervisory authority, and its conclusions do not, and were never intended to have legal

force. 22o The use of more informal language or no legalese is not unusual in products of

Committee agreements.

It is a significant task to the Basel Committee itself and members to insure the

compliance with agreements due to their informality and lack of authority. In this regard,

the Basel Committee members view the agreements binding even if they do not resort to

the legal status oftreaty.221 In fact, the Basel Committee's attempts to reach consensus

among domestic regulatory authorities are part of a broader harmonization process that

relies on national implementation of internationally agreed upon standards for insuring that

over time and under the pressure of market forces and the desire of national regulators to

give their institutions a competitive edge, harmonization objectives are met. 222 Given the

absence of an independent mechanism for monitoring non-compliance, the job belongs to
220

Bank for International Settlement, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, available at http://www.

~\s.org!bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm (describing the structure of the Basel Committee) (last visited Oct. 1. 2004)
See Charles Freeland, The work of the Basle Committee, in 2 Current Legal Issues Affecting Central
~~ 233 (Robert C. Effros ed., 1994).

See Cynthia Liechtenstein" Bank for International Settlements: Committee on Banking Regulation and
Supervisory Practices, Consultative Paper on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards, 30 I.L.M. 967, 969 (1991).
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the Committee themselves and their staff, with pressure from their colleagues223 . In this

regard, specific meetings review the implementation and consistency of the agreements.

Originally signed by the G 10 countries, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, the 1988 Accord
has been implemented by over one hundred countries. 224 In this context, one observer

arguably attributes the result to the effectiveness of the Committee's informal
~-

enforcement

225

despite suspicions that the resulting deceleration in bank lending intensified

the recession of the early 1990s in the United States, and other industrialized countries. 226

Arguably, the implementation of the Accord by national governments illustrates the degree

of autonomy and influence over domestic governments that the Basel Committee has
achieved. 227

Here, the effectiveness of the Committee's distinctive system needs to be examined.

One claims that the key factor of success is seemingly the Committee's facilitation of close

223.
224 See Untted

.

States General Accountmg Office, supra note 45, at 36.
See Patricia Jackson, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Capital Requirements and Bank
~ehavior: The Impact of the Basle Accord, Working Paper, No.1 (Apr. 1999) (reviewing capital adequacy
hterature)
225
.
See Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, supra note ,at 183 ("In
fact, the adoption of the capital adequacy standards has been so effective that governments did not withdraw
~eir support of the Accord ... ).
227 See generally Robert Litan, Nightmare in Basle, The International Economy, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 7.
See Slaughter, supra note 193, at 183.
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personal contacts among the central bankers. 228 In this regard, the Committee itself

acknowledges the significance of its role, declaring "the development of close personal

contacts between supervisors in different countries has greatly helped in the handling and

resolution of problems affecting individual banks ... [t]his is an important, though

necessarily unpublicized element in the Committee's regular work.,,229 The Committee's

efforts are still underway to pursue to organize and facilitate networking among the rest of

the world's central bankers and other financial regulators. Among them, the Committee

supported the establishment of the Offshore Supervisors Group, the South East Asia, New

Zealand and Australia Forum of Banking Supervisors, and the Caribbean Banking

Supervisors Group. As discussed below, the Basel Committee has also established links

with other financial sector regulators through groupS.230

Over time the Basel Committee has played a key role in international financial

regulation on the ground that it has effectively promulgated binding international standards

228
229

S

'd

eel.

Bank for International Settlements, Compendium of Document produced by the Basle Committee on

~~nking Supervision (Apr. 1995), at 14.

See Walker, supra note 203, at 60-68.
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despite the expense of implementing such standards and burden for member states.

231

The

Committee's competency in developing more theoretical principles of banking supervision

has led to its adoption of consolidated supervision derived from the Basel Concordat in

1975, which expands the regulatory responsibilities of committee member governors

beyond their borders as a matter of their first principle.

National securities commissioners

and insurance regulators have followed the Basle Committee's example. Moreover, the

Committee has issued the Core Principles comprising twenty-five area of banking

supervision in 1995.

Needless to say the global community view the Basel Committee as a crucial player in

international banking arena. However, the Committee is a government network with a

variation of traditional international organization. As a result, the Committee has

necessarily been accompanied by its strength and its weakness.

231

See Slaughter, Governing the Global economy Through Government Networks, supra note 193, at 184.
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2. The International Organization of Securities

The International Organization of Securities Commissioners (lOSCO) is a global

network of securities regulators.

232

The IOSCO consists of over 150 representatives

from ordinary members comprising national securities commissions or self-regulatory

organizations such as stock exchanges from countries with no official government

regulatory agency; associate members comprising provincial or regional securities

regulators when the national regulator is already a member; and affiliate members

comprising international or regional organizations charged with the regulation or

development of capital or other organizations recommended by the Executive
Committee. 233 Although the Basel Committee has limited its membership to the major

industrialized countries, the IOSCO follows a more inclusive policy of seeking to
attract the regulators of developing and emerging market economies. 234 In some

232 The IOSCO is a private organization originated in the Inter-American Association of Securities
Commission and Similar Agencies in 198, when the Associations' members passed bylaws transforming it
from a regional group to a global association of securities regulators. See Paul Guy, Regulatory
Harmonization to Achieve Effective International Competition, in Regulating International Financial Markets:
Issues and Policies 291 (F.R. Edwards et al. eds., 1992).
233 For a list ofIOSCO members, see http://www.iosco.orglindex4.htrnl.
234 The IOSCO's membership covers eighty-five percent of the world's capital markets. See IOSCO, IOSCO
Annual Report 1994, at 26-32.
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instances, he rosco may even offer membership to non-governmental regulators such
as private stock exchanges. 235 The rosco is not a formal international institution

because it has no formal charter or founding treaty. It was formed through
incorporation by a private bill of the Quebec national Assembly.236 The organization's

stated principles are "improving cooperation, and coordinating and harmonizing

securities and futures regulations on the internationallevel.

237

Its primary purpose is to

solve problems affecting international securities markets by creating a consensus for the

enactment of nationallegislation?38 That is, in a similar manner to the Basel
Committee, the rosco seeks to achieve regulatory harmonization through consensus.

Unlike the Basel Committee, however, and perhaps in recognition of its inability to
achieve consensus on specific issues, the rosco defines harmonization broadly. This
reflected in the comments of some rosco members who acknowledge that, whatever

the merits of harmonization, "value should be attached to the possibility of giving
235

See IOSCO Annual Report, at 4.
See an Act Respecting the International Organization of Securities Commissioners, Ch. 143, 1987 S.Q.
2437 (Can.) (incorporated under a private act as non-profit corporation). It has created and funded a
permanent secretariat in Montreal.
237
See Guy, supra note 232, at 295.
238 See Geofferey Underhill, Keeping Governments Out of Politics: Transnational Securities Market,
Regulatory Cooperation, and Political Legitimacy, 21 REv. INT'L STUD 251 (1995).

236
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issuers and investors a choice between quite different rules and regulations.,,239

Similarly, IOSCO officials have recognized that "harmonization does not necessarily

mean that regulation must be identical.,,24o Rather, it ensures that the organization has

adopted a cautious consensus-based approach. The IOSCO monitors whether its

members have employed and implemented its standards through methods of self-

reporting. Although its principle and rules are not legally binding, the organization

often seeks to ensure compliance through moral suasion applied to nonconforming

re gulators .z41

The IOSCO has notably contributed to the development of information-sharing and

enforcement agreements. All reciprocal information-sharing Memoranda of

Understanding (MOUs) were initially issued by the IOSCO in 1986 as a Resolution on
Reciprocal Assistance,242 and has been signed by forty agencies. 243 The Organization

See Guy, supra note 232, at 299-301 (quoting German Stock Exchange Federation Executive Vice
resident Ruedieger von Rosen who emphasized this point).
40 S
24\
ee 1'd • at 297.
See David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial
~igulatory Organizations, 33 TEXAS INT'L L. 1. 281, 295 (1998).
243 IOSCO Annual Report 1990.
See Michael D. Mann & Lise A. Lustgarten, Internationalization ofInsider Trading Enforcement: A
Guide to Regulation and Cooperation, 7 PLVCorp 798 (1993).
239
P2
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has also issued widely used Principles for Memoranda of Understanding as basic

guidelines to create enforcement MOUs for securities law violations.

244

In 1989, the

IOSCO employed a set of principles for the negotiation and implementation of

information-sharing MOUs, which was led by its resolution proposal for members to
enter into such MOUs. 245 Along with a combination of some factors, this groundwork

has been a driving force behind a whole network of bilateral MOUs that regulate insider
trading and information exchange. 246 Its members have also entered into information-

sharing agreements on their own initiative.

However, the IOSCO has not achieved the regulatory success of the Basel

Committee in implementing global standards for securities regulators. Its efforts to

develop and implement minimum capital requirements for securities firms failed in

1992 after opposition arose from the U.S. securities regulators against the capital

adequacy formulas that were developed by the Basel Committee and endorsed by

244 See generally Michael Mann et aI., The Establishment of International Mechanisms for Enforcing
Provisional Orders and Final Judgments Arising From Securities Law Violations, 55 Law & Contemporary
Problems
303 (1992) •
245
See id.
246
See Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, supra note 193, at 189193.
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European securities regulators. The IOSeO, subsequently, abandoned its efforts to

reach a compromise on the issue. Additionally, many resolutions passed by the

loseo are not implemented at the domestic arena. These failures highlight that

government networks are lacking in the ability to exercise any coercive power over

their members, and have less degree of independence from their national legislature. 247

3. The International Association of Insurance Supervisors

The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), created in 1994 as an

Illinois nonprofit corporation, is the leading transgovernmental regulatory organization for

state agencies that supervise and regulate the insurance industry.248 The IAIS consists of

two membership classes: (1) the charter members, who include the insurance regulators

from sixty-seven countries and seventeen U.S. states, joined the organization by the
completion of its first annual meeting on June 16, 1994. 249 ; (2) the second class consists of

new members, which can be admitted to the organization so long as they are an insurance

---------------------247
248

249

See Slaughter, supra note 193, at 185.
See IAIS, 1994 Annual Report.
See IAIS By-Laws, app. A.
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industry supervisor or agency, or an association of the public regulatory bodies with

jurisdiction over insurance in a country.250 Whereas one ofthe objectives of the Basel

Committee and the IOSCO is the establishment ofunifonn standards through the work of

the organization, the IAIS currently acts only as a forum for the exchange ofinfonnation

and experiences by insurance supervisors around the world. As such, the organization's
"I:

goals include engendering awareness of common interests, and encouraging wide

international personal and official contacts. The IAIS's eight-page long governing

document is a set of bylaws that do not impose legal obligations on members or the
countries or members that they represent. 251 In a similar manner to the Basel Committee

and the IOSCO, the IAIS maintains only a tiny centralized bureaucracy, and has

subcontracted the role of its general secretariat to the American National Association of

Insurance Commissioners.

Yet the IAIS has the power to promote minimum standards or multinational regulations.

However, it has approved the Recommendation Concerning Mutual Assistance,

250
25)

S .
ee Id. pt. 2, paras. 4-5.
See WS Annual Report, at 2.
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Cooperation, and Sharing of Information which has been signed by fifty-one members. 252

In spite of its brevity-one-halfpage in length-it has been applauded by some insurance

regulators.

253

The IAIS seems to be viewed as a talking shop rather than a genuine government

network on the ground that it does not appear to exercise any kind of power that could be

described as governmental. 254 Its value depends on providing regular channels for

communication and cross-fertilization among national regulators often striving to regulate

the same entities across national lines, or simply encountering the same problems within

their national jurisdictions. Despite the IAIS's struggling to develop standards,255 one

argues that "the IAIS is likely to evolve in ways that will give it more influence over its

252

See IAIS, Recommendation Concerning Mutual Assistance, Cooperation, and Sharing oflnformation,

~eprinted in IAIS Newsletter (Summer 1995), at 5.
53 The US insurance regulator David Walsh claims that '[the IAIS] is a very good vehicle for regulators to
get to know one another and develop the kind of relationship where you just pick up the phone and say,
;;Yhat's going on here?" , See IAIS News 1, Summer 1995, at 1.
255 See Slaughter, supra note 193, at 186.
Id. ("Within a spectrum of government networks, the Basel Committee would fall at one end and the IAIS
at the other.").
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member and eventually power .... it at least provides insurance regulators around the world

with the possibility of being a 'node' in a more important network."ZS6

4. Common Features
The transgoevrnmental financial regulatory organizations have much in common in the

way of their organizing themselves and the manner of their seeking to achieve their

objectives.z s7 The membership of these organizations is composed of state regulatory

agencies, not states. Their establishment is generally ad hoc, and they tend to have only

minimal structural components such as founding treaties, by-laws, and staff. The founding

documents that establish organizations emphasize the flexibility in structure and encourage

new members who are willing to adopt their principles. The internal operations and

deliberations of these organizations are normally not open to the public.

Consensus among the members is a key factor behind the agreements phrased in no

legalese, which are reached by these organizations. Significantly, the lack of legal force in

256
257

Id
•

See Zaring, supra note 241, at 301-304.
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the agreements reached is insisted by the member states' regulators of these

organizations.258 In this regard, the resolution, MOUs, or communiques reached by these
organizations are not viewed as treaties by the member of the organizations. 259 As a result,

the implementation on the domestic level occurs without any domestic legislation and

ratification. 260 As an additional feature, the absence of formal mechanisms to monitor

compliance with standards is in need of creating a formal peer view process to access

compliance, thereby achieving ever greater consistency.

The characteristics of their apparent ad hoc formation and self-proclaimed lack of legal

force do not prevent the members of these organizations from regarding them as generally

effective in performing their self-appointed functions?61 The regulatory agreements

reached are considered pledges of good faith that are self-enforcing, in the sense that one

258 Interview with Paul Leder, Deputy Director, Office of International Affairs (Jan. 19,1996), quoted in
~aring, supra note 241, at 303.
9 As for the Basel Committee's extra-legal status, one observer remarks the Basel Accord as a "gentlemen's
agreement among central banks." See Hal Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord,
39 St. Louis U. LJ. 885, 885 (1995). In contrast, another notes that the Committee's pronouncements, which
~re generally enforced in twelve member states, have assumed normative standards and may be viewed as
~ern~tional soft law. See Norton, Supervisory standards, supra note 210, at 261-262.
WIth respect to this quasi-legality, one observer notes that "although [these organization] promulgations
lack formal international legal authority when implemented at the domestic level, they gain at least local
legitimacy. In this way the promulgations are legal more in a multinational, rather than an informational,
~~lnse." See Zaring, supra note 241, at 304.
See Slaughter, supra note 193, at 189.
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state's ability to enforce its national law by implementing the agreement depends on other

state's enforcement on the domestic level in the same manner?62 For this, one emphasizes

that the strong interconnection between these organizations has led to the creation of an
interlocking web of financial regulators. 263

It is worth noting the observation that the nationalization of international law produces

the effectiveness ofthese organizations. 264 According to one observer, the purpose of

these organizations is not to exercise power in the international system but to help domestic

regulators protect the interests of their citizens, or enhance the enforcement of national laws

by working together across states' borders or promUlgating common solutions to problems
existing in their boundaries. 265

Although the Basel Committee, the IOSCO, and the IAIS have different features, they

possess a number of commonalities in the way in which they are organized, and in the

See id.
263 See Zaring, supra note 241, at 304. The degree of international regulatory cooperation in fmancial sector
is intensifying through the Basel Committee, IOSCO, IAIS, and the Financial Stability Forum. See George
Walker, A New International Architecture and the Financial Stability Forum, Studies in International Finance
and Economic Law, No. 24 (1999).
264
See Slaughter, supra note 193, at 189.
265 See id. ("The result is an international rule-making process that directly engages national officials and
national promulgation and enforcement mechanisms, without formal translation and implementation
mechanisms from the international to the national.").
262
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manner in which they seek to achieve their objectives. All are not traditional international

organizations per se, and therefore have no legal personality. They are informally formed,

containing flexible internal organization and decentralized bureaucracies. These

organizations often operate in secrecy and informality, but they manage to attain influence

through a kind of decentralized enforcement of their agreements that utilizes their links

with various international, regional and national financial regulators. Featuring tiny central

bureaucracies and small annual budgets, the organizations rely on their members to enforce

any regulations issued by the groups and to monitor the compliance of other members.

Their regulations have no legal force, but at least in the case of the Basel Committee, have

enjoyed full compliance.

c.

Assessing Government Networks

1. The Advantages of Government Networks

The adherents oftransgovernmetalism argue that trans governmental networks provide a

new vision of global governance at the most general level: horizontal rather than vertical,
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decentralized rather than centralized, and comprised of national government agencies rather
than supranational bureaucrats. 266 They believe that the networks build trust and create

relationships among their participants, thereby establishing incentives to create a good
reputation and avoid a bad one. 267 That is, such peer-to-peer cooperation among the

world's agencies is arguably self-enforcing since each agency is in a better position to

implement its domestic mandate as a product of the network due to the predominance of
common interests over the incentives to violate obligations. 268 In this way, the networks

arguably offer technical assistance and training to underdeveloped country members,
assistance resulting in replication of regulatory models from developed countries. 269 In the

process, the networks arguably take advantage of soft power, that is persuasion and

attraction rather than hard power of compulsion and coercion in that supranational entities

need to use everything from expertise to endearments: information, persuasion,

socialization when they have no actual means to enforce the obligations due to their formal

See Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, supra note 193, at 193.
See Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, supra note 172, at 290.
See, The Real New World Order, supra note 106, at 217.
269 See Raustiala, The Architecture ofIntemational Cooperation, supra note 193, at 7. (noting that networks
promote regulatory export from stronger to weaker states, and that this transfer of rules, and practices
promotes policy convergence among states).
266
267
268
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legal authority over its national counterparts. 270 Further, the transgovemrnentalists assert

that the networks' reliance on various fonns of soft power leads to the hard impact of soft

Iaw.

271

The proponents claim that the networks are potentially both more effective and

accountable than traditional international organizations whereas the liberal internationalism

is cumbersome, inflexible, and incapable of dealing with new challenges on the global

agenda in that it is based on the juridicial equality and the time consuming fonnality of
traditional international organizations. 272 They advocate that the networks are adaptable to

the technology of the Infonnation Age. The networks arguably strengthen states' power

270 See Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, supra note 172, at 291. According to
Nye, soft power flows from the ability to convince others that others want what you want. It is exercised
through setting agendas and holding up examples that other nations seek to flow. "It co-opts people rather
than coerces them." By contrast, hard power is command power that can be used to induce others to change
their position. It works through both carrots and sticks, rewards and threats. See Nye, The Paradox of
American Power, supra note 97, at 8-9.
271 See Slaughter, A New World Order, supra note 192, at 178-181. Traditional international lawmaking has
come in the form of hard law: treaties and other international agreements. By contrast, soft law provided in
the form of international guidance and nonlegal instruments is emerging as an equally powerful form of
regulation. See id. at 179.
272 See id.; see also Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 106, at 183; see also Raustiala, The
Architecture ofInternational Cooperation, supra note 194, at 24. In response, critics who criticize the
networks for being mere talking shops explain that "[t]he enormous increase in transnational activities as a
result of globalization highlights the legislative void at the international level. The activities described ...
respond, sometimes unconventionally, to the need to fill this gap. Traditional means of treaty making are too
cumbersome for the tasks at hand and too time consuming. There may also not be the need for full agreement
in all the details that a treaty requires, but simpler and more expeditious means to provide guidance may be
sufficient." See Andre Rigo, Law Harmonization Resulting from the Policies of International Financial
Institutions: The Case of the World Bank, Speech delivered at a conference on Globalization and the
Evolution of Legal Systems, University of Ottawa (October 2000).
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and provide state actors to interact with other state or any kind of nonstate actors at the

domestic, regional and internationallevels. 273 Most importantly, transgovemmentalism is

arguably all about bringing the state back in as a significant international actor in the real

new world order, which offers a governance alternative to both traditional international

organizations and new medievalist networks of nonstate, regional, local, and supranational

actors. 274

2. The Problems with Government Networks

Yet the transgovemmentalism is unquestionably controversial. The networks are

encountering sharp criticisms from many different perspectives. The sharpest charge

See Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, supra note 193, at 193,
204.
274 Slaughter asserts that another major advantage of the networks is associated with the ways in which they
can be used to strengthen individual state institutions. See id. For a proposal for the model of world order,
Slaughter summarizes in several terms: ''The State is not the only actor in the international system, but it is a
still the most important actor; The state is not disappearing into its component institutions, which are
increasingly interacting principally with their foreign counterparts across borders; These institutions still
represent distinct national or state interests, even as they also recognize common professional identities and
substantive experience as judges, regulators, ministers, and legislators; Different states have evolved and will
continue to evolve mechanisms for reaggregating the interests of their distinct institutions when necessary. In
many circumstances, therefore states will still interact with one another as unitary actors in more traditional
ways; Government networks exist alongside and sometimes within more traditional international
organizations." See Slaughter, A New World Order, supra note 192, at 18.
273
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against the networks is their lack of accountability 275in that they are networks of the

world's technocrats. As noted, the adherents of trans governmentalism advocate that

separate, functionally distinct disaggeregated networks are models for the next generations

of international institutions which are more likely to look like the Basel Committee or,
more formally the OECD 276 than traditional international organizations. 277 In response,

some critics charge the proponents' oversimplification of its actual and potential impact

resulting in the emphasis of only one artificial stratum out of a complex set of layers. 278

275 The term accountability is illustrated as "A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A's
(past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual
misconduct." See Andreas Schedler, Conceptualizing Accountability, in the Self-Restraining State: Power,
and Accountability in New Democracies 17 (Andreas Shedler et al. eds., 1999). Some observers note that
"[t]he concept of accountability implies that the actors being held accountable have obligations to act in ways
that are consistent with accepted standards of behavior and that they will be sanctioned for failures to do so."
See Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, American
Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No.1 (Feb. 2005), aU.
276 Although the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is characterized as one
of the international governmental organizations in the international system, it has played a critical role in
shaping the architecture of global governance despite its feature of "low-profile institution." See James
Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and development, 21 Mich. 1. Int'l L. 769, 772-773 (2000). As the successor to the
organization to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the OECD was initially established to
strengthen the economies of it's member states, and thereafter expanded its mission to identify common
issues and coordinate national and worldwide policies. See id. at 773. Because the OECD offers a closed
setting for its member states through the closed-door meetings, this feature of restricted membership and
transparency makes difference from conventional international organizations. As a result, the OECD
provides a "restricted forum on virtually unrestricted topics." Id. at 77 6-777.
in
See Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 106, at 196. Slaughter asserts that "[w]all street
looks to the Basle Committee rather that the World Bank." See id. at 185.
278 See Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaiden: International Lawyers and Globalization, 3 Eur. 1.
Int'l L. 435, 441 (1996). With respect to a question of the nature of the global agenda in a globalized world,
Alston observes that the formulation of the trans governmental policy agenda focuses on issues that are
essentially spillovers from the domestic policy agendas of the industrialized world, leaving out global poverty,
malnutrition, human rights, refugees, the persecution of minority groups, and disease. See id. at 439.
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Further, in the context that who sets and implements the global agenda, one claims that the

trans governmental theory disregards the multiple points of interaction between decision-

makers which takes place within a variety of public, private and trans governmental fora. 279

In this context, there is still a need to examine the transgovernmentalist's argument that

regulation by small, unaccountable, self-selected, non-transparent elite groups (which are,
more often than not, wholly US-centeredi 80 is preferable to classical international

regulation through horizontally enforced treaties and traditional international institutions.

In response to an argument about networks among national and international bureaucrats,

some critics charges that the networks adopt Platonic Guardianship as a mode of

transnational governance, an open move toward technocratic elitism.281 Others note "a

See id. ("Multilateral organizations cannot be simply sifted out of the picture like lumps in flour. To
suggest that the real action lies in the Basle rather than Washington in the case of banking, or with
transnational litigation strategies in national courts rather than with the UN Human Rights Committee in the
case of human rights, is to oversimplify the complex, essential and continuing interaction among different
levels or fora that continues to characterize international relations in these areas.").
280 See Alston, supra note 278, at 443 (1996) ("If [Slaughter'S analysis] is correct ... , [I]t implies the
marginalization of governments as such and their replacement by special interest groups, which might
sometimes include the relevant government bureaucrats. It suggests a defInitive move away from arenas of
relative transparency into the back rooms, the emergence of what she terms a 'real new world order' in which
those with power consolidate it and make the decisions which will continue to determine the fate of the
excluded, and the bypassing of the national political arenas to which the United States and other proponents
ffthe importance of healthy democratic institutions attach so much importance.').
81 See Antonio Perez, Who Killed Sovereignty? Or: Changing Norms Concerning Sovereignty, 14 Wis.lnt'l
1. J. 463, 476 (1996). A good example ofthe alleged global technocracy is the Basel Committee's creation
and enforcement of capital adequacy accords among its members. Whereas other members' regulators played
279

107

chronic lack of legitimacy plagues direct international contacts at the sub-state level among

national officials and administrators.,,282 Critics also argue that problems with the

undemocratic, unaccountable nature of regulation by transgovemmental bureaucrats arise

from the proponents' hasty dismissal on the basis that forms of international regulation in

contrast to traditional international law sources are nonbinding, that such

transgovemmental regulation has been pre-approved by legislative processes at the

domestic level, or that transgovemmental bureaucrats need only make their activities
transparent via the websites. 283

In contrast to proponents' arguments,284 transgovemmentalists' interests in

transnational regulation arise because, or to the extent that these networks are not mere

a key role in employing the Basel Accords to protect their autonomy in the face of international competition,
the Japanese represented a 'hands-tying strategy' that allowed "the Japanese bureaucrats ... to collude with
bureaucrats from other countries in order to obtain more discretionary authority." See Jonathan Macey, The
'Demand' for International Regulatory Cooperation: A Public Choice Perspective, in Transatlantic Regulatory
Cooperation, supra note 198, at 159-160.
282 See Picciotto, supra note 194 , at 1047.
283 See Jose E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory, 12 Eur. J.
Int'l L. 183, 229 (2001) Alvarez claims that liberal internationalism is normatively superior because
"democratic legitimacy often requires turning to treaty formally ratified by domestic legislative processes."
See id. at 228; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose? Holding Government Networks
Accountable, in Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation 521 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000).
284 Slaughter remarks that "many governmental networks remain primarily talking shops, dedicated to the
sharing of information .... But in giving and receiving this information, even in ways that may significantly
affect their thinking, government officials are not exercising power in the traditional ways which polities fmd

108

talking shops but sites of power of effective norm-making among relevant policy-

makers.

285

In this sense, transgovernmental networks may not be considered soft for the

purposes of accountability nor hard vehicles for more effective and integrated modes of

cooperation than are usually possible under traditional intemationallaw sources. 286

Other critics assert that the networks may be even less accountable than some states in

that the form of accountability provided by the diversity of membership is not assured

because power differentials within the network may distort negotiated solutions, and there

is no guarantee that all relevant interests will actually have a voice within the network.

287

Still critics accuse the networks of assuming and exaggerating to make the accountability
it necessary to hold them accountable." See Slaughter, Governing Through Government Networks, supra
note 193, at 195.
285 See Alvarez, supra note 283, at 229; see also Stephen Toope, supra note 199, at 96-97 ("Networks, like
regimes, and regardless of their membership, are sites of power, and potentially of exclusion and inequality. ").
286 See id. ("If transnational networks such as the Basle Committee come to exercise real power, those
affected are bound to notice eventually and to begin to ask questions about accountability strikingly similar to
those that are now being asked of those international organizations whose regulatory effect are becoming too
prominent to ignore. Nor can the accountability issues raised by transnational networks be deflected by
pointing to the domestic legitimacy of executive agency power. Whatever authority US citizens might have
delegated to their own central bank, it is not clear that such delegation was meant to extend to other central
bankers' powers to regulate US banks."). It is also unclear how the Basle process has been pre-approved by
citizens of states whose central bankers are among those represented on the Basle Committee. See id. at 229
n.219.
287 See Toope, supra note 199, at 97. Moreover, the clubby feature of networks may widen inequalities
between North and South. See David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, supra
note 199 (questioning whether exploring the "disaggregation of the state and the empowerment of diverse
actors in an international civil society without asking who will win and who will lose by such an
arrangement" is prudent); see also Steinberg, supra note 157, at 336 (arguing that "actors from the most
powerful states dominate interactions within their network ... In this way, policymaking by transgovernmental
actors merely replicate the capacity of powerful states to coerce weaker states into accepting particular
international rules or norms.").
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benefits of infonnation available via the Internet. 288 Even though those who have become

accustomed to the exercise of power without transparency will not struggle to cede to the

general public relevant information, it is unclear that Internet access will serve all relevant
constituencies. 289 Further, this Internet access to information without the incorporation of

other procedures for outside input into decision-making processes leads to meeting process
concerns. 290 As critics remark, "[w ]ithout knowing what questions to ask-what

information among the mass that may be available is relevant-and without the ability to

influence what these networks do, Internet access may not seriously ameliorate

accountability concerns.,,291

In addition, it deserves noting that the proponent borrows and incorporates the tools and

sources of traditional international law to solve the accountability dilemmas. As traced by

one observer, the proposals help to accountability concerns at the expense of claims that

288

See Alvarez, supra note 283, at 229.
See id. Alvarez claims that "[t]o the extent the accountability objection relates to fear of 'neocolonialism' or US dominion via technocratic rule, Internet access may only aggravate these concerns given
the wide gap between rich and poor (nations as well as between individuals) with respect to access to the web
itself." See id. at 228-229.
290 See id. at 230.
291 See id.
289
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trans governmental networks are distinctive tools of international law-making that remain

outside of and are superior to the coercive structure of international law. 292 In this context,

trangovernmentalists are not ready to declare that trans governmental regulation is more

flexible, expeditious, more capable of deploying technical expertise, more compliant with

domestic implementation and forms of deep cooperation than is the ordinary treaty as they
acknowledge. 293

A relevant concern is lack of transparency resulting from the informality and

flexibility of networks. The proponents argue that "[g]overnment networks are necessarily

informal because separate government institutions have no formal standing in the

international system under internationallaw.,,294 That is, these organizations do not exist
from the lens of the law, and thereby they cannot establish organizations that do. 295 As a

292 See Alvarez, supra note 283, at 230. Proposals include bringing network decisions before legislative
oversight committees or having them approved by legislative processes, nestling the networks or their work
products within international organizations, having the network norms or codes enforced by private investors
or by international organizations such as the IMF, and the World Bank, or expanding the representation of
countries within these networks. See Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose, supra note 283, at 528-535.
293 See Alvarez, supra note 283, at 230 ("Treaty regimes vary, coming in all shapes and styles of discourse,
covering a multitude of subjects '" Some such agreements come in forms that are not clearly distinguishable
from liberals' transnational networks to the extent that they establish mere mechanisms for the application of
technical expertise ... , while others anticipate ... domestic implementation and very deep cooperation
indeed.")
294
See Slaughter, A New World Order, supra note 192, at 152.
295 See id.
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consequence, these institutions can exist both within and alongside the formal sector of
international organizations comprised of states interacting as unitary actors. 296 Ironically,

this claim contradicts the trans governmental theory that the networks are the most
distinctive vehicles ofintemationallaw-making in the disaggeregated world order. 297 As

such the networks control more significant resources and values, it is natural that demands

for transparency and more direct participation increase. Increased transparency is essential

if the networks are to be held accountable.

A final response to the trans governmental theory is that its claim of the 'nationalization

of international law' that take place through the action of trans governmental regulatoy

networks is based on a false dichotomy between the issues of traditional international law

coping with the global commons and inter-State relations, versus the issues, such as crime,

monopoly, securities fraud, pollution, tax evasion coped with by transgovrernmental

296 Slaughter highlights that the reinvention, or the reconceptualization of existing international organizations
are necessary for the coexistence of the networks and traditional international organizations. Id.
297
cf Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 106, at 196.
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networks. 298 As one proponent argues, if the networks coexist and interact with traditional

international agreements, and thereby cooperate on the administration of anti-trust policy,

securities regulation, environmental policy, criminal law enforcement and banking and

insurance supervision, much of this activities originate in the shadow of an intricate web of

obligations ensuing from obligations assumed under treaties and traditional international
institutions. 299 Even though the subject matter of treaties and traditional international

institutions, accompanied by the often soft products of both has been in its proliferation no
less than trans governmental networks in the global age. 300 As one argues, it is not easy to

understand why "accurate description requires reordering the priorities of international law

such that non-treaty sources oflaw demand more attention.,,301

The proponents' attempt to nationalize international law is arguably missing a more

significant point about the nature of norm-setting itself. It is very important to note that
298 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order, in
Democratic Governance and International Law 217 (Gregory H. Fox et al. eds., 2000).
299 See Alvarez, supra note 283, at 212. ("While it is true that the Basle Committee itself operates in an
regulatory area not traditional regarded as 'international', without benefit of treaty or intergovernmental
organization, and through the medium of non-binding recommendations, its success is very much dependent
on other treaty regimes and the work of more traditional forms of international organization, including the
Bretton Woods institutions .... neither its subject matter nor its style of regulation really distinguishes the
Basle Committee from a wide number of traditional treaty regimes and institutions.").
300 See id.
301 See id.
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contemporary international law cannot be distinguished in terms of subject matter, from

domestic policy.302 Nevertheless, one oversimplifies how international norms are
nationalized under the classic sources ofintemationallaw. 303 The suggested dichotomy

that whereas the traditional international law is coercive and top-down, transgovemmental

regulation is soft and bottom-up fails to describe accurately either approach to norm-

making or the complex interplay between the twO.

304

Indeed, there are many treaties that

are viewed as promotional, and contain purposefully ambiguous commitments. 305 Other

treaties even with more definitive textual commitments are hard to classify as coercive due

to the lack of enforcement provisions or ambiguities within the enforcement schemes

provided.

In contrast to the proponent's interpretation, the UN Convention on the Law of

See id. at212-2B.
See Slaughter, Government Networks, supra note 298, at 217 ("Traditional international law requires
States to implement the international obligations they incur through national law where necessary, either
through legislation or regulation. Thus, for instance, if States agree to a twelve-mile territorial sea, they must
change the domestic legislation concerning the interdiction of vessels in territorial waters accordingly.
However, the subject of such legislation would be internationaL .. Bilateral and plurilateral regulatory
cooperation does not seek to create obligations between nations and enforceable at international law. Rather,
the agreements reached are pledges of good faith that are essentially self-enforcing, in the sense that each
nation will be better able to enforce its national law by implementing the agreement reached if all other
nations do likewise. The binding or coercive dimension oflaw emerges only at the national law.").
304 See id.
305 These commitments are not different from Slaughter's pledge of good faith. Like the soft products of
trans governmental networks, they also become self-enforcing only when domestic laws enable reciprocal
enforcement to be exercised or when other forms of interpretation provide them the concreteness that they
were originally in need of. See id. Many ILO conventions and recommendations are good examples.
302
303
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the Sea does not explicitly require changes in national law or regulations concerning the

breadth of the territorial sea. 306 As most treaties do, the agreement reached among member

states leaves states considerable direction as to how to attain compliance with its terms. 307

D. Concluding Remarks

The trans governmental theory is overly optimistic with respect to the prospects of the

networks as an effective governance alternative in the international system and under

international law. The transgovernmentalists do not look to the empowerment of

traditional international organizations as the way for governance. Rather, they do to the

evolving practice of formal and informal trans governmental regulatory networks as the

most realistic hope for governing the global economy. Indeed, the direct transnational

interaction between the diffuse states' agencies of the world's regulators has remarkably

proliferated in the global era. The trans governmental theory based on the disaggregation

of state sovereignty stresses the active participation of the world's independent government

306
307

See id. at 213-214.
Id. at 214.
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agencies rather than supra international regimes, which reflects regulators' compliance with

broad regulatory standards constituting international soft law instead of direct enforcement.

In this context, transgovemmentalism highlights nationalization of international law toward

the regulatory harmonization. However, this claim is still controversial even though

transgovemmental regulatory organizations are on the rise in the international system. In

order for all the undeveloped and industrialized countries to benefit from the

transgovemmental regulatory governance, various types of realistic measures should be

taken to reduce inequalities between North and South. Otherwise, global standards as

international soft law will not be apparently welcome to developing and transitional

countries.

Furthermore, this process is still a host of hot debate due to concerns over the lack of

accountability in the networks. The deficiencies of traditional forms of cooperation

through regional organizations can be assessed against the scope and the goals of their

constitutional documents, but the impact of informal arrangements is far more difficult to

evaluate. As there is no formal acknowledgement of the role of the networks,
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accountability still remains a concern. If transparency over the impact of such processes is

not present, the networks may reinforce the traditional undemocratic features of
international law by consolidating the state's position over the individual. 308 In this
perspective process, the benefits of greater plurality will disappear. 309 Consequently, an

"all-or-nothing" perspective for the analysis of desirable forum of global governance

ignores exploring each component of it, as it is at present in the international system. In

this sense, emphasis should be put on the cooperation between all the state and non-state

actors in the international system and under international law.

It deserves noting some

observer's remark that "[g]lobal governance will come not at the expense of the state but

rather as an expression of the interests that the state embodies. As the source of order and

basis of governance, the state will remain in the future as effective, and will be essential, as

it has ever been.,,310

See Richard A. Barnes, Book Review: Democratic Governance and International Law, 8 Ind. J. Global
Legal Stud. 281, 284 (2000).
309 See id.
310 See Martin Wolf, Will the Nation-State survive Globalization?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 190.
308
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IV.

Second Thoughts on the Inevitability and Desirability of Global
Convergence in Banking Regulation: The Case for the Basel Bank
Supervisory Standards and Capital Adequacy Rules

While the prudential supervision and regulation3 !! of banking and financial markets

were not preceding the globalization of finance, the bank supervision and regulation
remained the province of national regulatory authorities until the mid-1970s. 3 !2 As a result,

some historical incidents such as bank failures and financial disruptions over the past

decades, which are illustrated below, have drawn a considerable attention to the need for

the global regulation of banking markets. The internationalization of bank regulatory

standards has been essentially reactive in nature. Since no other sector than banking has

become more global in its operations, and thus more difficult to monitor and supervise it,

national regulatory authorities have adjusted domestic regulations to keep abreast of global
3ll There are two approaches to distinguish regulation and supervision in terms of function and content.
Under the distinction based on function, regulation refers to 'the body of legal rules, regulations or
administrative requirements established by financial authorities or fmancial market participants to limit or
control the risks assumed by financial institutions." Supervision refers to "the associated or complimentary
process of monitoring or reviewing compliance by fmancial institutions with specific regulatory provisions or
general standards of prudent or proper behavior in any particular market." By contrast, a distinction based on
content or degree of control is drawn between "particular systems having regard to the degree of control or
statutory direction imposed as against the level of discretion left to be exercised by the authorities concerned."
See Walker, supra note 203, at 1 n.l. Walker argues that neither the Bank for International Settlements emS)
nor the Basel Committee has ever defmed the terms. See Id. at 17 n.1. This study follows the more complete
distinction based on function rather than content as long as both approaches impose some degree of control
which implies a compliance or review function.
312 Moreover, bank supervision has been traditionally "subject to no direct legal direction or, until recently
relied upon the exercise of often uncontrolled administrative direction." See id. at 2.
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bank regulatory standards. As such, global convergence in banking has made greater

strides than in any other financial sector.

However, some skepticism has run over the argument that global standards in banking

have been established by the international financial community's concerns about the safety

and soundness of the global financial system. Arguably, hegemony of Western powers

began a drive to move in terms of hegemonic stability more than their concerns about a

global banking crisis. In this context, this chapter attempts to assess the Basel

Committee's bank supervisory standards and capital adequacy rules, and thereby rethink

whether global convergence in banking regulation is desirable and inevitable. To that end,

it examines how bank supervisory and regulatory standards have been internationalized

toward global convergence in banking regulation. In this regard, this study attempts to

address driving forces behind the creation of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

and its establishment of uniform international banking standards. In doing so, it addresses

the question of whether systemic risk in banking has really played a key role in the

establishment of international bank regulatory and supervisory standards. In this context,

119

this study analyzes a comprehensive view of systemic risk in the banking sector.

Moreover, historical experiences of bank failures in terms of systemic risk are

demonstrated.

More importantly, this study attempts to explore the origins of the Basel Accord on

bank capital adequacy. To do so, it largely relies on current theories on the process of

negotiating the capital adequacy standards in the areas of political science and international

political economy. At this point, this study takes a position as a break against the force of

international market failure logic that has enjoyed an exceptionally positive reception

among economists, political scientists, and legal experts. Nonetheless, it does not intend to

freeze the international coordination and cooperation of banking regulation. Given the

understanding of the politics behind the establishment of the Basel Accord, this study

evaluates the Basel Accord of 1988 and the new capital adequacy framework (Basel II),

and then moves beyond the assessment of the capital adequacy standards. In doing so, it

attempts to draw lessons from Basel toward a just world order in the global finance.
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A. The Internationalization of Bank Regulatory Standards

1. The Historical and Theoretical Background

Although international finance has a long history of involvement with foreign trade,

shipping, and investments, the international financial markets expanded remarkably after

the post-world War period of construction and recovery?13 In particular, the substantial

expansion of bank overseas operation played a significant role in the growth of
international financial markets. The creation of Eurodollar314 accounts pioneered by

British banking has increased the amounts of liquidity to finance multinational business,

and expanded the deposits and lending operations for many clients including corporations

3\3 It is worth noting that European financial institutions have already conducted overseas activities for
centuries. Italian banks dominated international fmance during the Middle Ages and Renaissance. With the
establishments of colonial empires, British and Dutch banking have become conspicuously international by
their worldwide presence. During the 19 th century, London took the strong position as the center of
international finance until after the World War II. Although U.S. banking began to flow abroad earlier in the
th
20 century, especially during the World War I, the big involvement began after World War II. In last
generation, U.S. multinational banking system has been rapidly created as resulting from greater affluence,
thriving trade and commerce, foreign investment, and increasing use of multinational channels for tax
avoidance, enhanced profits, and flight of capital to escape regulation. See William A. Lovett, BANKING AND
FINANCIALINSTlTUTIONS LAW (3 d ed. 1992) at 215,217-218: David S. Kidwell, Richard L. Peterson & David
W. Blackwell, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, AND MONEY 449-450 (5 th ed. 1993).
314 The term Eurodollar was initially used to refer to the lending of U.S. dollars out of London by the foreign
branches of U.S. banks mainly located in U.K. The Eurodollar market is the foreign location of the banks that
distinguishes Eurodollars from ordinary dollar deposits in U.S. banks. In this sense, the Eurodollar market is
an offshore market in contrast to domestic onshore markets. See Franklin R. Root, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INVESTMENT 502 (7th ed. 1994). Walker, supra note 203, at 19 n.3. The role of the dollar as a preferred
reserve currency with less inflation than most countries to gather increasing amounts of liquidity to fmance
multinational business had been influential between the later 1940's-late 1960's. See Lovett, supra note 313,
at 218.
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and even governments, drawn from around the world.

315

In particular, the post-World War

II brought up the big involvement of the U.S. banking to service the needs of American

corporations expanding their business and activities into worldwide.

316

Moreover, U.K.

banking regulation and tax policy fostered the retention of earnings abroad by foreign

clients, especially American corporations in London.

317

That is because U.S. restrictions

on leakage of capital in the 1960's, with its interest equalization tax to be imposed on the

purchase of foreign bonds by U.S. investors stimulated the early development of the

Eurobond markets. 318 In addition, oil-rich exporters placed a large volume of their liquid

earnings into Eurocurrency deposits with the demise of OPEC and the "petrodollar"

recycling of 1974_75. 319 In all this rapid expansion of overseas banking activities, more

corporations and governments placed liquidity deposits in multinational banks to maximize

.
d
. 320
earnmgs an tax evasIOn.

See Lovett, Banking and Financial Institutions Law, supra note 313, at 218.
!d. at 217-218; see also William A. Lovett, WORLD TRADE RlVALRY: TRADE EQUITY AND COMPETING
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES (1987) at 39 (noting that ... "U.S. industrial, financial, and naval dominance was much
like Britain's leadership after the Napoleon Wars").
317 !d.
318
See Walker, supra note 203, at 2l.
319
See Lovett, supra note 313, at 218.
320 See id. at 219.
315

316
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However, the internationalization of financial markets has entailed the complexity of

financial markets and thereby posing new levels of financial risks. To begin, the

breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system between 1971 and 1973 put

an end to the period of substantial growth and stability of international financial markets. 321

The collapse of Bretton Woods system forced all of the participants in international

321 The international monetary system, known as the Bretton Woods system has existed for 25 years since the
Agreement was signed at a conference attended by 44 countries in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July
1944. The objective of the conference was to create a fixed exchange rate system to replace the formerly
existed foreign exchange market under the international gold standard. The delegates to the conference
including John M. Keynes from the U.K. and Harry D. White from the U.S were sure that only an
unprecedented degree of international monetary cooperation could anticipate a repetition of the Global
Depression in the 1930s. The result of their negotiations was the establishment of the International Monetary
Fund (lMF), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (now known as World Bank).
The IMF was created as a mutual lending institution (facilitating short- and medium-term loans) for member
countries, with potential to create multinational liquidity over the long run. The IMF's mandate was to assist
in stabilizing currency relationships, as described in terms of gold-dollar exchange standard. The International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Word Bank) was designed to complete the IMF's role as a means
for long-term lending above and beyond the support provided by private investors, international banks,
traditional export finance, and the IMF.
Under the circumstances, the Bretton Woods international monetary system was sustained by two
institutions: the IMF, and the central reserve role of the U.S. dollar due to the emergence of the U.S. as the
prime reserve nation, with the dollar increasingly taking over the function of gold as an international reserve
asset during the 1950s. Notably, the U.S. dollar was the only currency for convertible into gold at a fixed
price of $35 per ounce for official monetary purposes in that all IMF nations were required to maintain stable
par values of their currencies defmed in terms of gold or the 1944 U.S. dollar under the Bretton Woods
system. This international monetary system had both benefits, and drawbacks that brought about the
replacement with a regime of floating exchange rates. Arguably, the poor performance of the Bretton Woods
system in the 1960s attributes mainly to three interconnected causes: (1) the problem of international liquidity
formation centered on the dollar, (2) delays in balance of payments adjustments, and (3) dis equilibrating
short-term capital movements. In response to widespread concern over the adequacy of international liquidity,
agreement was reached in the late 1960s on facilities to create a new international reserve asset, the special
drawing right (SDRs) which was first activated in the beginning of the 1970s. More significantly, in the early
1970s, serious complexity of dollar devaluation, currency realignment, and major commodity price inflation
inspired the international monetary crisis of 1971, which forced the U.S. to suspend the gold convertibility of
the dollar on August 15 and thereby brought the closure of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in
March 1973. As a consequence, the floating exchange rate system has been accepted as the basis for valuing
currencies. The basic difference from the Bretton Woods system is the floatation of the U.S. dollar against
other key currencies. See Lovett, World Trade Rivalry, supra note 316, at 37-49; see also Root, supra note
314, at 456-485.
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financial markets to expose to new levels of currency and interest rate risk. 322 Most of the

financial institutions had never experiences in managing currency risk before and thereby

suffered a considerable amount of losses either in direct trading foreign currency or by

failing to hedge against foreign currency exposures. The losses are attributable to the

provision of forward cover by banks for existing clients and reckless trading to cover
existing losses. 323 In short, the elimination of fixed exchange rate parity with gold led the

privatization, which created the pressure to release the restraints on cross-border capital

movements, and the further deregulation in financial markets. 324 The privatization of

financial risk in the post-Bretton Woods age intensified the pressure on governments to

liberalize their national restriction on transborder capital flows so that financial

322 See Walker, supra note 203, at 25. Currency risk is associated with currency value changes and exchange
controls. Since many world currencies do not have well-established foreign currency markets, international
loans cannot always be hedged to reduce the risk if the currency in which the loan is made loses the values
against the dollar during the course of the loan. The exchange risk may occur due to difficulties in
convertibility into dollars for repayment. Some form of exchange control may be established by a country in
case of its large balance-of-payments deficit and its inability to make current payments of its sizable
international loans. Interest risk concerns the risk of fluctuations in a bond's price or reinvestment caused by
changes in market interest rates. The volatile interest rate environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s
caused the failure of many savings and loans association industry (S&Ls) because of the faster increase in
interest rates of their payment on deposits (liabilities) than the decline in yields of earnings on their mortgage
loans (assets). See Kidwell, Peterson & Blackwell, supra note 313, at 124-126, 344,467.
323 See E. P. Davis, DEBT, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND SYSTEMIC RISK (1992) at 154, cited in Walker, supra
note 203, at 26.
324 See Kern Alexander, The Need ForEfficient International Financial Regulation and the Role of a Global
Supervisor, in REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 273-274
(Eilis Ferran et al. eds., 2001).
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organizations could spread their risks to foreign assts and transactions. As a consequence,

the remarkable increase in short-term cross-border portfolio investment has posed systemic

risk due to the volatility of cross-border capital flows in many capital-importing

countries. 325 In these circumstances, the stability of financial markets has become a

serious concern in the era of volatility since historical bank failures and financial

disruptions. Unquestionably, national regulatory authorities began to recognize the

necessity to promote sound banking systems through the efficient management of systemic

risks in domestic markets.

Meanwhile, the extraordinarily large budget and trade deficit since 1981 transformed

the United States from the world's largest creditor in 1980 to the world's largest debtor in

1988. 326 As the U.S. suffered from the increasing trade deficit, Japan emerged as an

significant creditor country thanks to the growing strength of the yen, and the nation's

Id. at 274.
See Kidwell et aI., supra note 313, at 332 (noting the purely fmancial impact of this phenomenon
that "[f]irst, since corporate capital spending actually rose as the budget and trade deficits mushroomed, the
United States had to borrow money from foreigners on a scale never imagined, [which] caused the world's
most sophisticated financial system become even larger, more efficient, more innovative[;] .... [second,] [a]s
the national debt zoomed past $2 trillion, a truly global bond market (for U.S. Treasury securities) of immense
size and liquidity came into being[;] [t]hird, foreigners accumulated massive holdings of U.S. dollars, which
they either invested in dollar-dominated financial assets or repatriated to the United States as direct
investment").
325

326

125

burgeoning foreign reserves. 327 Notably, Japanese banks and securities firms became a

driving force in international financial markets as a result of the liquidity provided by the

huge foreign currency accumulations along with a high national savings rate and a slowing
domestic economic growth. 328 That is, the relatively lower Japanese interest rates than

those of other industrial nations enabled the financial firms to bid aggressively for
multinational financing business, and dominate in financial commodity markets. 329

In these circumstances, the prosperity enjoyed by industrialized globe during the 1980s

promoted the internationalization?30 Meanwhile, a major industrial countries' argument

about their competitive disadvantages due to the discrepancies in the bank capital adequacy

regulations posed the pressure to establish a set of common regulatory standards,

eliminating disparities, creating a level playing field in international finance. Furthermore,

the Third World debt-overload crisis of 1982-84, and financial disruptions over the past two

327

See Scott & Wellons, supra note 5, at 491.
The ten largest banks in the world were Japanese by the mid-1980s. They held almost 40% of international
bank assets. See id.
329 See Kidwell et aI., supra note 313, at 333.
330 See id (noting that international capital flows were propelled by the need for companies expanding their
multinational operations to fund expansion in efficient capital markets, and the explosive growth in valuation
and trading volume in stock markets around world during the 1980s as investors pursued diversification
objectives, and corporations pursued low-cost fmancing).
328
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decades around the glove have called an attention to the need for global regulation of

financial markets. The major underlying factors of the internationalization of bank

regulatory standards will be demonstrated below.

2. The Impetus for the Internationalization of Bank Regulatory
Standards: Systemic Risk
Notably, the internationalization of regulatory standards in banking has made greater

strides than in any other financial sectors. The greater headway with which international

standards converged in banking law lies in the concerns over the uniqueness in the financial

services industry such as worldwide spillover problems in financial markets, and fears

about entailing political, economic and social disruption as shown in financial crises over
the decades since the collapse of Bretton Woods system. 331 Historically, it was not until

the banking collapses due to the privatization of financial risks in the 1970s that

international community has paid attention to the need for the global banking supervision

331

See Patricia A. McCoy, Musings an the Seeming Inevitability a/Global Convergence in Banking Law, 7
J. 433, 436 (2001).

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE L.

127

and regulation.

332

In short, the major banking collapse at U.K., West Germany, and the

U.S.A. in the post-Bretton Woods era has led national regulatory authorities to improve the

supervision of financial institutions, and promote safe and sound financial systems through
the taking of the increased risk of systemic financial destabilization. 333

As a matter of fact, the increased cross-border linkages among the financial markets

have brought a remarkable expansion in financial activities and efficiency to capital

markets around the globe. However, the increasing complexity in financial activities of

financial institutions has caused systemic and other financial risks at the same time.

Especially, systemic risk is critical issues in the bank regulation because of the capital

structure and mutual interdependence ofbanks.

334

That is to say, banks are special due to

the characteristics of bank funds comprised of debt in the form of demand deposits, and

banks' short-term borrowing and long-term lending resulting in a fundamental mismatch in

332
333
334

See Kern Alexander, supra note 324, at 276.
[d. at 274.
See McCoy, supra note 331, at 442.
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the maturities of their assets and liabilities. 335 Upon borrowing, a bank invests in riskier

and safer assets, that is, a bank has an incentive to take on excessive risks in making loans

or investments, or to operate with insufficient capital, because accepting those risks may

greatly reward the bank's owners and managers, while the possible adverse consequences

may be borne by depositors, other lenders, and government guarantees and bailouts such as

deposit insurance. 336

Moreover, banks' choice of industry in which they undertake riskier investments

determines the correlation of their portfolio returns. When banks prefer to lend to similar

industries in equilibrium, systemic risk occurs as an endogenous consequence. 337 Namely,

the severe deterioration in bank balance sheets may lead to bank panics in case of multiple

335 Id. Traditionally, banking business involves borrowing short and lending long, that is, taking deposits
which can be withdrawn on demand or certificates of deposit that can be withdrawn in a matter of months,
and making loans that will be repaid over periods of years. As such, the assets of a bank have typically longer
duration than its liabilities.
336 Here is a crucial issue of "moral hazard," meaning that loss may arise from a person's character, habits,
and circumstances, a sin of omission. In short, all but the largest depositors tend to indifferent to the safety
and soundness of their banks because the government guarantees their deposits, and their funds are not really
at risk. Major sources of moral hazard in banking are leverage and deposit insurance. Some notes the moral
hazard arising from government guarantees as a justification for bank regulation. See Stephen C. Cecchetti,
The Future of Financial Intermediation and Regulation: An Overview, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Vol. 5 No.8 (May 1999) at 3-4.
337 See Viral A. Acharya, A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation 2 (January 9,
2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm'?/abstract=236401 (last visited Jan. 10,2003).
Acharya notes that in practice, joint failure risk of banks may be determined by a more complicated pattern of
inter-bank loans, derivatives, and other transactions. See id. at 2 n.2.
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and simultaneous failures of banking institutions. In this context, systemic risk arises
arguably from a high interconnection of returns on the asset side of their balance sheets. 338

In addition, the linkages of banks to one another through the payments system and inter-

banking lending may cause a ripple effect throughout the banking system. 339 Since deposit

contract is not explicitly subject to bank characteristics, the depositor losses due to bank
failures are not internalized by the bankowners. 34o As such, bank failures and panics are

considered to involve huge externalities. That is, individual bank failures produce harmful
effects on other bankS. 341 The aggregate investment may be reduced due to a decrease in

the aggregate supply of deposits. As a result, a recessionary spillover (a negative

See id. at 5-11.
See McCoy, supra note 331, at 443.
340
See Acharya, supra note 337, at 2.
341 Acharya notes two conflicting effects of individual bank failures on other banks. According to Acharya, in
contrast to a negative externality, surviving banks have a strategic benefit (a positive externality) from other
bank's failure because of an increase in scale or an expansion caused by the migration of depositors from the
failed banks to the surviving banks, or due to a reduction of operation cost resulting from acquisition of the
failed bank's lending facilities. Meanwhile, if the negative externality effect is greater than the positive
externality effect, banking institutions recognize it optimal to increase the probability of surviving together,
and hence failing together by choosing asset portfolios with greater correlation of returns. This phenomenon
would arise where (i) the decrease in aggregate investment is substantial on a bank's failure, for example,
banks are large; or (ii) depositors of the failed bank's depositors do not migrate to the surviving banks, for
example, banks are essential; or (iii) other banks cannot benefit from the acquisition of the failed banks'
business facilities, for example, banks are unique, or such acquisitions are prohibited by anti-trust regulations.
This preference occurs as a joint outcome of the limited liability of the banks' equityholders and the nature of
the externalities. Acharya calls this equilibrium characterization behavior of systemic risk as "systemic riskshifting." In this context, bank regulator attempts to reduce systemic and individual risk-shifting incentives of
bankowners through its design of bank closure policy and capital requirements. However, these regulatory
mechanisms based only on a bank's own risk fail to minimize aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and thus
accentuating systemic risk. See id.
338
339
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externality) spreads to the surviving banks because of an increase in scale or an expansion,

and hence reducing the profitability of banks. More importantly, as long as banks are

levers of monetary policy, ensuing bank panic can have negative macroeconomic effects

resulting in the decrease in the money supply, and an economic downturn. 342 As such,

systemic risk causes a negative externality of banks, since failed banks and their owners

(shareholders) do not have to pay for systemic harms they posed to other banks and other

economies. 343 In the global context, the domestic repercussions of cross-border banking

crises that national bank regulators cannot individually control have brought up concerns

over the danger of contagion stemming from the risk of systemic crisis. Accordingly, most

banking systems around the globe are heavily regulated, because bank regulators are

concerned about the social and economic costs of systemic risk. 344 In this regard, the

342 See McCoy, supra note 331, at 443. Since the losses to both depositors and the economies from a joint
bank failure exceed those from individual bank failures, different banks undertake investments in assets with
lower correlation of returns, and thereby resulting in a greater decrease in aggregate investment. See id. at 3.
343 See id.
344 Nevertheless, there is still no consensus on whether bank regulation is necessary, and if so, how banks
should be regulated. One notes this is partly caused by the lack of consensus on the nature of the market
failure that makes free banking not optimal. See George Benston & George Kaufman, The Appropriate Role
o/Bank Regulation, ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Vol. 106, No.4, at 688-697, cited in Joao A C Santos, BANK
CAPITAL REGULA nON IN CONTEMPORARY BANKING THEORY: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE, BIS Working
Paper No. 90 (Sept. 2000), at 5. For the rationale of banking regulation, see Charles Goodhart et aI.,
FINANCIAL REGULA nON: WHY, How AND WHERE Now? 10-12 (1998) (outlining the traditional rational bank
regulation on the basis of four main considerations: (i) the critical status of banks in the financial system,
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objective of prudential bank regulation is considered to ensure the stability and soundness

of the financial system as a whole. Consequently, systemic risk has been one of the most

powerful forces behind the internationalization of bank regulatory standards as it is one of

the critical justifications for bank regulation. In these circumstances, deep skepticism is

running over the efficiency of the current bank regulatory mechanism to prevent or retard

systemic risk. In this context, it is worth analyzing the concept of systemic risk.

a. Concepts of Systemic Risk

In general, systemic risk is not a phenomenon limited to economics and the financial

system. Historically, the concept has been well illustrated in the field of health and

epidemic diseases. That is, Black Death of the Great Plague in the Middle Age, which

broke out in 1348-50, and beset Europe until the 1730s, was immediately fatal and spread

rapidly from southern to northern Europe resulting in by 1400 a remarkable decrease in the

population to about a half or two-thirds of its total a century before. Most recently, the
particularly in clearing and payments systems; (ii) the potential systemic dangers resulting from bank runs;
(iii) the nature of bank contracts; (iv) moral hazard associated with the lender-of-last-resort role and other
safety net arrangements that apply to banks.
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outbreak ofSARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) in China in November 2002 has

rapidly brought about a devastating infectious disease around the globe. Systemic risk is

arguably a particular characteristic of financial system in the area of economics. Whereas

contamination (contagion) effects may also take place in other sectors of the economy, the

probability and danger is accounted as considerably higher.

345

An entire systemic crisis in

the financial system may have strong adverse impacts on the real economy and general

economic welfare.

346

Systemic risk is defined as "the risk or probability of breakdowns (losses) in an entire

system as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components and is evidenced by

comovements (correlation) among most or all parts.,,347 Systemic risk in banking sector is

proved by a high correlation and ensuing of bank failures in a nation, in a number of

However, some challenges the existence of systemic risk in the fmancial system. See G. Sheldon & M.
Mauer, Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk: An Empirical Analysis offor Switzerland, SWISS JOURNAL OF
ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, Vol. 134, No.2 (1998), at 685 (asserting that "[s]ystemic risks are for financial
market participants what Nessie, the monster of Loch Ness, is for the Scots (and not only for them): Everyone
knows and is aware of the danger. Evereyone can accurately describe the threat Nessie, like systemic risk, is
omnipresent, but nobody knows when and where it might strike. There is no proof that anyone has really
encountered it, but there is no doubt that it exists").
346 See Olivier De Bandt & Philipp Hartman, SYSTEMIC RISK: A SURVEY, European Bank Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 35 (November 2000,) at 10.
347 See George G. Kaufman, Banking and Currency Crises and Systemic Risk: Lessons from Recent Events,
rd
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives (3 Quarter 2000) at 9, 14.

345
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nations, or all over the globe. In this sense, systemic risk may arise either or both in the
domestic dimension andlor in the transnational arena. 348

Meanwhile, systemic risk is meant by different description, especially with respect to its
causation. 349 The first refers to a macro shock that causes near simultaneous adverse effects

on the most or all the domestic economy. In other words, systemic "refers to an event

having effects on the entire banking, financial, or economic system, rather than just one or a

See id. Systemic risk is also evidenced in the other financial sectors. In particular, the size of big securities
firms is now so great as to cause genuine systemic concerns in case of a market failure. Since the dramatic
collapse of Barings pIc in 1995, the understanding to cope with systemic risk has been widely spread to
securities regulators and supervisors because of the negative effect on fmancial systems resulting from the
simultaneous decline in the prices of a number of securities in single or several markets in a nation or across
nations. For an analysis of the Barings Collapse, see generally Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive,
Globalization of Financial Risks and International Supervision of Banks and Securities Firms: Lessons from
the Barings Debacle, 30 INT'L LAW. 301 (1996).
349 For the review of various description of systemic risk, see Kaufman, supra note 347, at 14-15; see also De
Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 10-13. De Bandt and Hartman specified some concepts to define
systemic risk. They refer to "a systemic event in the narrow sense as an event, where the release of "bad
news" about a fmancial institution, or even its future, or the crash of a financial market leads in a sequential
fashion to considerable adverse effects on one or several other fmancial institutions or markets ... Essential is
the "domino effect" from one institution to the other or from one market to the other emanating from a limited
("idiosyncratic") shock." According to them, a systemic risk in the broad sense includes both the event
defmed above and "simultaneous adverse effects on a large number of institutions or markets as a
consequence of severe and widespread ("systematic") shocks." They also describe a systemic crisis in the
narrow and broad sense as a systemic event that produces effects on a considerable number of institutions and
markets in a strong sense, thus "severely impairing the general well-functioning ... of the financial system
relatin[g] to the effectiveness and efficiency with which savings are channeled into the real investments
promising the highest returns. They assert that the distinction between the distinction between the narrow and
the broad concept of systemic events is significant because "crisis management measures, tackling the source
of the problem, might be different in the case of an idiosyncratic shock that risks causing contagion compared
to the case of a systematic shock that might have a broad simultaneous destabilization effect." As for systemic
risk, they describe it as 'the risk of experiencing systemic events in the strong sense ... the spectrum of
systemic risk ranges from the second-round effect on a single institution or market ... to the risk of having a
crisis affecting most of the financial system at the upper extreme ... "
348
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few institutions.,,35o Arguably, this definition does not clarify how the effects transmit

from a macro shock to individual units. 351

Two other definitions emphasize potential spillover from one unit to others. One refers

to systemic risk as the "probability that cumulative losses will accrue from an event that

sets in motion a series of successive losses along a chain of institutions or markets

comprising a system '" That is, systemic risk is the risk of a chain reaction of falling

interconnected dominos.,,352 This definition focuses on "causation as well as correlation

(correlation with causation) and requires strong direct interconnections or linkages among
350 See Philip F. Bartholomew & Gary W. Whalen, Fundamentals of Systemic Risk, in RESEARCH IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES: BANKING, FINANCIAL MARKETS, AND SYSTEMIC RISK, Vol. 7, at 4 (George G. Kaufman
ed., 1995). See also Frederic S. Mishkin, Comment on Systemic Risk, in RESEARCH IN FINANCIAL SERVICES:
BANKING, FINANCIAL MARKETS, AND SYSTEMIC RISK, Vol. 7, at 32 (George G. Kaufman ed., 1995) (defming
systemic risk as "the likelihood of a sudden, usually unexpected, even that disrupts information in financial
markets, making them unable to effectively channel funds to those parties with the most productive
investment opportunities").
351
See Kaufman, supra note 347, at 14.
352 See George G. Kaufman, Comment on Systemic Risk, supra note 350, at 47; see also Bank for
International Settlements, 64th ANNUAL REpORT (June 1994), at 177 (defming systemic risk as "the risk that
the failure of a participant to meet its contractual obligations may in tum cause other participants to default
with a chain reaction leading to broader fmancial difficulties"). This domino phenomenon is remarkable in
banking sector. Since banks have claims on each other through the payment system and the interbank market,
financial difficulties of an individual bank can spread to others as it defaults on its obligation. See Stephen R.
Gallen, Regulating the Modern Financial Firm: Implications of Disintermediation and Conglomeration,
University of St. Gallen Discussion Paper No. 2000-21 (September 2000) at 5. Recently, some study and
research have dealt with this type of financial contagion. See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Interbank
Lending and Systemic Risk, JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Vol. 28, No.4 (1996) at733-762
(developing a model of the interbank market where interbank lending produces a trade-off between increased
peer monitoring and higher systemic risk resulting from larger interbank linkages); see also Franklin Allen &
Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 108, No. 1 (2000) at 1-33
(analyzing the completeness of the interbank deposit market affects the extent to which individual shocks
spread throughout the system). Meanwhile, this perspective emphasizes some type of government
intervention either through guarantees or last resort lending. However, there are still many significant issues
in dealing with contagion left.
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institutions and markets, sectors, or countries involved, ... when the first domino falls, it

falls on others causing them to fall and in tum knock down others in a chain of "knock-on"
·

reac t IOn.

,,353

A third definition of systemic risk also emphasizes spillover from an initial shock.

354

[B]ut, [it] does not involve direct causation, and depends on weaker and more indirect

interconnections. It focuses on similarities in third-party risk exposures among the units

involved. When one unit experiences an adverse shock generating severe losses,

uncertainty is produced about the values of other units potentially subject to same shock.

To minimize additional losses, market participants will examine other units, such as banks,

in which they have economic interests to see whether and to what extent they are at risk.

The more similar the risk exposure profile with that of the initial unit economically,

politically, or otherwise, the greater is the probability ofloss and the participants to

withdraw funds as soon as possible. The response may cause liquidity and even more

fundamental solvency problems. This may be defined as a "common shock" or

353
354

See Kaufman, supra note 352, at 47.
Kaufman, supra note 347, at 14.
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"reassessment shock" effect, and represents correlation without direct causation (indirect

causation).

In the periods of uncertainty due to the asymmetric information problems, market

participants need time and resources to sort out the other units at risk and the magnitudes of

any potential losses, and increasingly tend to make their portfolio adjustments in quantities

(runs) rather than prices (interest rates).355 As a consequence, there seems to be "an

immediate flight or run to quality away from all units that appear potentially at risk,

regardless of whether further analysis would identify them as ex-post as having similar

exposures that actually put them at risk (guilty) or not (innocent).,,356

The runs are likely to put a strong downward pressure on the prices (upward pressure

on interest rates) of the securities of financially affected institutions and markets.

Simultaneously, many of the affected countries are likely to increase their interest rates up

ld. at 15.
See !d. Since runs are concurrent and widespread in this period, where common shock contagion appears
indiscriminate, potentially affecting the entire universe and reflecting a general loss of confidence in all units,
such behavior by investors is referred to as "herding" behavior. This defInition of systemic risk does not
differentiate between innocent parties and guilty parties. !d.
355

356
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to diminish additional capital outflows and encourage inflows. 357 Thus, any resulting

liquidity problems are likely to temporarily spill over to units indirectly affected by the
initial shock. 358 That is, the initial domino falls indirectly on other dominos, however, its

fall forces market participants to examine nearby dominos until they can see if they are
subject to the same destabilizing forces as forced to falL 359

In addition, systemic risk is often distinguished between rational or information-based

systemic risk and irrational, noninformation-based random, or pure contagious systemic

risk.360 According to this distinction, rational contagion assumes that investors
(depositors) can differentiate among market participants based on their fundamentals. 361

Random contagion, on the basis of the actions of uniformed agents, is considered more

dangerous as it does not differentiate among participants, affecting and spilling over to both

See id.
See George Kaufman & Kenneth Scott, Does Bank Regulation Retard or Contribute to Systemic Risk?,
Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 211 (December
2000) at 3-4, available at http:papers.ssm.com!paper.taf?abstact-id=257927 (last visited Jan. 15,2004).
359 ld. at 4.
360 /d. Under common shock contagion systemic risk, innocent parties are likely to be affected immediately
during the sorting out period, however, in time will be sorted out by investors (depositors) from guilty parties.
As a consequence, the empirical borderline between rational and irrational contagion is unclear and depends
partially on the time horizon applied. Likewise, the distinction between "innocent" and "guilty" is not always
clear even though innocent parties may be referred to as units that are widely perceived to be economically
well-behaved, and guilty parties as economically insolvent, near-insolvent, or excessively leveraged units. See
id. at 6.
361 ld. at 5.

357
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guilty and innocent parties, and thus seems to be broader and more difficult to contain. 362

Although random contagious systemic risk is relatively easy to discriminate between the

innocent and the guilty ex-post the crisis, it is practically difficult to distinguish the one

from the other ex-ante a crisis, because ex-ante information is frequently insufficiently

available, timely, or reliable to make the distinction with confidence.

363

h. The Financial Fragility Proposition

It is worthwhile to reexamine why systemic risk poses a special concern to the financial

system. As noted briefly above, in a broad sense there are three interrelated characteristics

of financial system for the driving forces behind the financial fragility proposition. That is,

the features are the structure of banks, the interconnection of financial organizations

through direct exposures and settlement systems, and the information intensity of financial

contracts and related credibility problems.

362
363

364

364

ld.
See id. at 7.
See De Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 13-14.
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First, as financial intennediaries banks engage in deposit-taking and loan-extension at

the same time. 365 Traditionally, banks take fixed-value deposits that can be

unconditionally withdrawn at any time with a very short notice, and lend long tenn to

industrial finns. 366 Since banks provide liquidity services, and act as a delegated monitors

for depositors, a bank collects demand deposits, invests in illiquid long-tenn projects, and

provides liquidity insurance to consumers facing uncertainty about the exact timing of their

consumption. 367 As a consequence, projects are illiquid because they can earn higher

returns only if they remain funded until maturity, whereas premature liquidation reduces

their value substantially. 368 In this way, banks add value since they allow depositors to

pool their resources, and indirectly invest in high yield investment projects. 369 However,

in transfonning short-maturity liabilities to long-maturity assets, banks become susceptible

365 There has always been a need for some mechanism for channeling the savings of households into the
investments of industrial companies. From the viewpoint of financial markets, businesses demand capital, and
will supply assets to the market to get this capital. Households are the final holders of these assets either
directly or via engaging in various types of investments pools, and thus provide ultimate demand. In this way,
a bank as the financial intermediary distributes resources between these two units of businesses and
households. This is the fundamental role of a financial intermediary.
366 See Douglas Diamond & Philip Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity, JOURNAL OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 91, No.3 (June 1983) at 401-419.
367
See id.
368
See Gallen, supra note 352, at 4.
369
Id.
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to runs, during which all depositors lose confidence and withdraw their funds prematurely.

That is to say, only a small fraction of assets are required to be held in liquid reserves to

encounter deposit withdrawals, thereby leading to illiquidity and even default when

exceptionally high withdrawals occur and long term loans cannot be liquidated. 370 In short,

this feature shows that the health and soundness of bank is both subject to the confidence of

depositors in the value of the loan book, and their confidence that other depositors will not

run the banks as well as to its success in picking profitable investment projects for

lending. 371 This special characteristic has brought up a shift from a good equilibrium with

bank intermediation to a bad bank run equilibrium, which has justified banking
regulation. 372

Second feature is a complex network of exposures among banks and other financial

intermediaries through the interbank money market, the large-value (wholesale) payments

370

See De Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 13.
See id.
372 See Gallen, supra note 352, at 4. This special feature of banks is not applicable to other financial
intermediaries, such as insurance companies and securities corporations unless banks and other intermediaries
belong to the same financial conglomerate. See Goodhart et aI., supra note 344, at 1-37.
371
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and security settlement systems. 373 That is, systemic risk arises from inter-locking

exposures among financial institutions, whether through equity, debt or participation in a

common payments system. Since these exposures may be very large to banks at certain

points during the business day, the financial difficulties at one bank may spread to other

banks as they default on their payment obligations. As long as bank deposits are part of

narrow money, banks create money.374 In this context, widespread bank failures have the

potential to affect the money supply if depositors rather withdraw their funds in order to

hold cash than shift their funds from one bank to another.

375

This type of externality

through the money supply emphasizes the specific nature of bank liabilities in serving as a

method of payment. 376 Banks playa key role in wholesale and retail payment, and

373

See De Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 14.
When the bank makes a loan to a customer, the bank can supply the funds by giving the customer cash
from the vault or a check on another bank, or by selling investment securities and giving the customer the
proceeds. Any of these actions simply changes one kind of asset into another kind, cash for example, into a
loan. The totals on the bank's balance sheet (its "footings") remain the same. Much more often, however, a
bank makes a loan by crediting the amount of the loan to the customer's checking account. On the bank's
books, this increases both assets and deposits, and consequently both assets and liabilities. The initial increase
affects only the bank making the loan, but ultimately it affects the banking system as a whole. If we accept the
fact that checkable deposits are money, or money substitutes, it is clear that banks, and banking system create
money.
375
See Kaufman, supra note 352, at 6.
376 See id.
374
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settlement, thereby arising relevant externalities on the rest of economy. 377 No doubt

securities or insurance subsidiaries can playa role in the tight network of financial linkages

among institutions to the extent financial conglomerates encompass banks and other
financial intermediaries as was discovered in the case ofBarings debac1e 378 In short, the

failure of one institution may have "knock-on" effects on the balance sheet of other
institutions. 379

Immediate negative externalities throughout the economy, which bank failures may generate, are one of
the main concerns about the possible effects of the millennium bug or Y2K problem.
378 Since many deposit-taking institutions are major players in the securities market, their soundness can be
affected by securities losses. That is, the failure of big securities fum encompassing banks and other financial
intermediaries may bring about the disruption in the payment system resulting in a chain reaction of liquidity
problems at other institutions. The collapse ofBarings in early 1995 provides an illustration of such
intragroup contagion. The Barings failure due to rapidly accumulated trading losses in exchange-traded
derivatives called attention the need to recast the form of external regulation dealing with risks associated
with derivatives trading. Namely, the greater use of derivatives fro fmancial management and speculation has
attracted considerable attention on their risks and led to several initiatives regarding regulation and
Supervision, fums' internal controls, and reporting and disclosure. See Andrew Cornford, Risks and
Derivatives Markets: Selected Issues, UNCTAD REVIEW 1995, at 189-212; see also Goodhart, et aI., supra
note 344, at 39-43. Various risk management techniques used in securities and derivative markets, such as
margin requirements and portfolio insurance, which are intended to limit ex ante risk, put an emphasis on
large and immediate payments demands by banks and other fmancial intermediaries ex post, that is at times of
big asset price changes, thereby applying usually to limit the potential of contagion in payment and settlement
systems. See De Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 32-36 for the fmancial intermediaries' interconnection
through payment and settlement systems.
379 See David Humphrey, Payments Finality and Risk ofSettlement Failure, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE
REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: SECURITIES, FUTURES AND BANKING 97-120 (Anthony Saunders &
Lawrence White eds., 1986).
377
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The third character is asymmetric information and control intensity of incomplete

financial contracts. 380 According to the information economics, there would be little role

for financial markets and financial market regulation if information were perfect and

markets were complete. 381 The asymmetries of information-the differences in information,

which are pervasive in all economies, between the lender and the borrower, the insurance

company and the insured have shown the foundations for realistic theory of financial

markets, explaining why those most in need of credit often cannot get the credit-

rationing. 382 Generally speaking, financial decisions aiming at the intertemporal allocation

of purchasing power for consumption are derived from expectations on what the value of

380 According to the free market ideology based on the economic theory attributed to Adam Smith, market
forces-the profit motive-arguably drive the economy to efficient outcomes as ifby an invisible hand. However,
recent crucial researches do not agree with Adam Smith's idea that markets by themselves lead to efficient
outcomes asserted in his book, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS written in 1776. That is, whenever information is
perfect or markets are incomplete, the invisible hand works most imperfectly and competitive equilibrium
(constrained Pareto) is not efficient. Here come desirable government interventions, which improve in
principle on the efficiency of the markets so that main activities of government can account for responses to
the market failures. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, supra note 189, at 73-74,254 n. 2.
381 See id at 74.
382 Id at xi. With regard to the evaluation of various systemic events, the information and intensity of
financial contracts highlight the significance of the distribution of information among the agents playing in
the fmancial sector. In short, general uncertainty and agents' awareness of potential asymmetries of
information stress the fact that the occurrence or nonoccurrence of systemic events are based on expectations.
In this context, some distinguish three potential causes of narrow systemic events related to asymmetric
information and expectations: (i) the full revelation of new information about the health offmancial
institutions to the public; (ii) the release of a noisy signal (imperfect information) from outside sources about
the health of financial institutions to the public; (iii) the occurrence of an imperfect signal which coordinates
the expectations of the public without being actually related to the health of financial institutions. See D. Cass
& K. Shell, Do Sunspots Matter?, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 91 (1983) at 193-227; see also De
Bandt & Hartman, supra note 131, at 14-15.
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respective assets will be in the future or whether the future cash flows guaranteed in a

financial contract would be satisfied. As a consequence, the increasing uncertainty or lack

of credibility of financial commitments may cause market expectations, investment and

divestment decisions to shift substantially and individually rationally in short periods of

time. 383 Furthermore, the asymmetric information problems can demonstrate how

financial problems arise over an extended period of time before an efficient or inefficient

cnsls occurs. Namely, the systemic event is just the effect of a more fundamental

underlying problem, which has been unrevealed from policymakers or the general public

for some time.

As noted above, these three characters can be referred to as the major factors behind

higher vulnerability of financial systems to systemic risk than other sectors in the economy.

Furthermore, the increased linkages across markets and volatility in capital flows on the

international platform may create rapid intermarket contagion and systemic events around

383 This may result in large asset price fluctuations, whose sizes and directions cannot sometimes virtually
explain through fundamental analysis alone, which attempts to predict asset price changes driven by the
factors influencing the intrinsic values of assets, such as corporations' earnings influencing shares, and
inflation rates influencing exchange rates. See R. Shiller, MARKET VOLATILITY, (1986), cited in De Bandt &
Hartman, supra note 131, at 14, n.16.
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the globe. In this context, one argues that bank regulators need to address four principal

non-traditional areas of potential systemic risk present in the international financial system

today?84 First, there is the threat of occurrence of a second sovereign debt crisis due to
developing countries default on securitized debt obligations. 385 Second, there is the threat

that the remarkably increased exposure to foreign exchange and settlement risk as shown in

the collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt in 1974. The concerns over this type of systemic risk

arise from the fact that the current multicurrency clearing systems are not subject to

regulatory oversight. 386 Third, the money laundering contagion can pose a systemic risk to

the international financial system when financial institutions or communities are influenced
by laundered funds of international criminal syndicates. 387 Fourth, there is non-sovereign-

384 See Joseph J. Norton, International Financial Law, " An International Important Component of
International Economic Law": A Tribute ofProfessor John H. Jackson, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 133, 142 (1999)
(asserting that "[t]hese risks can only be addressed appropriately by financial institutions and international
regulators working together in quasi-symbiotic "partnerships" ... ).
385 These concerns are arguably aggravated by the widely disseminated holdings of these obligations among
institutional investors and by the fact that the terms and conditions on instruments such as Brady Bonds do
not benefit sovereign debt reschedulings or restructurings. See generally Philip R. Power, Sovereign Debt:
The Rise of the Secondary Market and its Implications, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2701 (1996).
386 See Norton, supra note 384, at 142. The collapse ofBankhaus Herstatt in 1974, known as "Herstatt Risk"
i~ analyzed below.
7 See id.
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related cross-border financial crises contagion risk as evidenced by the East Asian financial

crises in 1997.

388

Along with addressing the threat of systemic risk, there is a need for further research to

identify whether historical bank failures and financial crises reflect systemic risk. In short,

the evidence on systemic risk and historical experience should be addressed prior to

searching for mechanisms dealing with systemic risk in terms of ex ante (preemptive)

measures, such as prudential supervision and regulation to prevent inefficient and negative

systemic events from arising and ex post policies in the form of crisis management as well.

c. The Evidence on Systemic Risk

Historically, there have been concerns that an individual bank run can trigger other

banks' runs through depositors' reassessment of their bank's soundness and withdrawal of

their funds. That is to say, do bank failures reflect systemic risk? In this context, there is

a strong need to make an empirical analysis of systemic risk resulting from the classical

388

Id.
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bank run models and extensions of these models of single banks' fragility to models of

multiple bank systems leading to the modem bank contagion in different countries and on

the international platform.

389

To begin with, classical bank runs are not currently viewed as a major threat to the

financial system in the industrialized country. This accrues from the adoption of deposit

insurance schemes reducing incentive for depositors to withdraw their funds, and the fact

that non-bank financial intermediation and financing through the capital markets give a
reason for an increasing portion of the financial system. 390 As a consequence, the risk of

contagious bank failures may be considered as the classical case of systemic risk. Here is

an introduction of econometric papers attempting to identify contagion effects although the

full analysis of this issue is outside the scope of this study.391 A first approach tries to link

bank failures with subsequent other bank failures directly by autocorrelation in terms of

Some argues that the empirical evidence of contagious systemic risk depends on the definition as used.
When systemic risk is defined as a broad big shock, systemic risk is observed more frequently. However, this
definition is silent on the transmission of contagion. See Kaufman & Scott, supra note 358, at 8.
390 See Kaufman, supra note 138, at 16. Nonetheless, the modern version of bank runs still poses a threat to
the fmancial system since panics resulting from adverse events such as a default or failure are likely to occur
in the wholesale markets and may cause solvency-threatening liquidity crises. See id.
391 For the review of papers, see De Bandt & Hartman, supra note 436, at 36-42.
389
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intertemporal correlation of bank failures. 392 A second group tests whether the survival

time of banks decrease during historically identified episodes of panics or through other

banks' failures with the application of a macroeconomic duration model in which bank

survival is explained by a host of economic fundamentals such as individual bank balance

sheet items, regional and national macroeconomic variables. 393 Third, a most popular

approach appraises the relationship between bank failures or news and other banks' stock

market value in terms of event studies of bank stock price reactions in response to bad news.

394

A fourth group focuses on the link between news or failures and deposit withdrawals at

392 Some provide more evidence of intertemporal failure clustering in free banking markets through applying
an analysis to data from the US Free Banking Era (1837 through 1863). See I. Hassan & G. Dwyer, Bank
Runs in the Free Banking Period, JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING, Vol. 26 (1994), at 271-288.
However, it is argued that this approach has some disadvantages: flrst, the negligence of macroeconomic
factors exhibiting autocorrelation would discredit any evidence of contagion; second, the intertemporal
contagion cannot be detected at shorter time intervals but only at the frequencies of macroeconomic data
through this approach. See de Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 37.
393 Calomiris and Mason estimates the average survival time of thousand Fed member banks between January
1930 and March 1933 during the Great Depression through an application of a macroeconomic duration
model in which bank survival is explained by a host of economic fundamentals and some proxies of contagion,
panics, or liquidity crises. See C. W. Calomiris & lR. Mason, Causes of u.s. Bank Distress During the
Depression, NBER Working Paper, No. 7919 (2000). Although this approach could indicate the presence of
some bank contagion effects in speciflc episodes during the Great Depression, most of these episodes have
been contained remaining limited to a speciflc region of the U.S., and some of the reductions in survival
duration this study observed might still be related to some unobservable regional or national fundamentals.
See de Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 38.
394 According to this approach, contagion effects are identifled by comparing the normal return of a bank
stock, as proclaimed by a standard capital market equilibrium model estimated with historical data, to the
actually observed returns at the announcement date or during a window around this date. Bad news (such as
the announcement of an unexpected increase in loan-loss reserves or the failure of a commercial bank or a
country to serve its debt) for a bank leading to signiflcantly negative abnormal returns of another bank can be
interpreted as evidence of contagious systemic risk. See de Bant & Hartman, supra note 346, at 38.

149

other banks, thereby keeping track of and analyzing deposit flows. 395 A fifth approach

analyzes the effect of news or failures on the probability of other banks' defaults as

perceived by market participants and reflected in risk premiums in interbank lending in the

context of examinations of bank debt risk premiums. 396 A final approach measures the

Aharony and Swary addresses the effects of three largest bank failures in the U.S. before 1980: United
States National Bank of San Diego in 1973, Franklin National bank of New York in 1974, and the Hamilton
National Bank of Chattanooga in 1976. These three failures might arise from an idiosyncratic nature related to
in-house fraud, illegal real-estate loans, or foreign exchange losses after the switch to floating exchange rates.
This study shows that the Franklin National case, the failure of the 12th largest US bank at the time, brought
about substantial negative abnormal returns in money-center, medium-size, and small banks while no external
effects of the smaller two other cases occurred. See J. Aharony & 1. Swary, Contagion Effects of Failures:
Evidence from Capital Markets, JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, Vol. 56, No.3 (1983), at 305-317.
The results of adverse external stock market reactions to bad news have been subject to critical scrutiny.
Some argues that this results can be interpreted as evidence of pure contagion effects, whereas others claim
that they rather reflect rational investor choices in response to the revelation of new information. The general
outcome of this hot debate is that abnormal returns varied in proportion as banks exposed to problem
countries, which is consistent with the hypothesis of rational investor choice. Since most of these results are
obtained through US data, they cannot apply to other financial systems. Moreover, the concept this study
developed indicates weak systemic events, because stock price fluctuations do not imply failures. Although
this approach may be efficient in proportion to actual exposures, it shows systemic repercussions in the broad
sense. See De Bandt & Hartman, supra note 131, at 39-40.
395 According to this approach, there is a contagion of bank run, if depositors withdraw funds from another
bank in response to financial difficulties of a bank or a group of banks. Saunders addresses whether two key
anoouncements regarding the shape of Continental Illinois Bank in A~ril and May 1984 had any noticeable
effect on other banks' US or overseas deposits. Whereas the April 18 announcement of a US$400 million
increase in the Continenetal's problem loans did not affect US depositors noticeably, the May 10th denial of
rumors by the US Office of Comptroller Currency have seemingly triggered flight to quality (such as shifts to
safer banks and more secure deposits) by big banks but not a general run. See A. Saunders, The Inter-bank
Market, Contagion Effects and International Financial Crises, in THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
STABILITY 196-232 (R. Portes et al. eds., 1987). However, this approach can only address the occurrence of
narrow systemic events in the weak sense.
396 Carron shows that the Franklin National failure in New York in mid-1974 caused an increase in the
quarterly average spread between US certificates of deposits (CDs) and three-month Treasury bills by a factor
of at least six, which is consistent with systemic events via risk premiums. See A.S. Carron, Financial Crises:
Recent Experience in u.s. and International Markets, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, No.2
(1982), at 395-418. Jayanti and Whyte estimate statistically significant increase in the average certificate of
deposit (CD) rates for both UK and Canadian banks after the Continental Illinois failure in May 1984. They
show that the result is consistent with the international contagion effect visible in equity returns. See S.V.
Jayanti & A.M. Whyte, Global Contagion Effects of the Continental Illinois Failure, JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND MONEY, Vol. 6, No.1, at 87-99 (1996).According
to Saunders, the Continental Illinois failure did not lead to a decrease in the total of non-sterling deposits at
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physical exposures among operating banks (or between those and banks which have been

bailed out by the government) to assess whether a default would render other banks

. Iven.t 397
mso

According to the empirical studies on banking crises in the United States, there seems

little empirical evidence of contagious systemic risk that renders economically solvent

banks economically or legally insolvent either before or after the presence of federal

government guarantees and deposit insurance schemes?98 The evidence shows that

either American, Japanese or other overseas abnks in London in April or May, but an increase in risk
premiums on the deposits generally. Saunders also concedes that the average spread between 3-month Eurodollar deposits and T -bills doubled during the Continental Illinois failure in April and May 1984, which is
consistent with international systemic risk in the weak sense. See Saunders, supra note 395.
As a test for contagion effects, this approach is similar to the application to equity returns in that it applies
to risk premiums in debt rates. As a consequence, this study cannot usually address the occurrence of systemic
events in the strong sense. Also, it does not occasionally clarify whether the effects measured originate in an
aggregate shock (potentially revealed by a specific event) or are a reflection of a successive transmission. See
De Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 42.
397 This approach measures directly whether exposures to certain (potentially or effectively failing) banks are
larger than capital. Very Large exposures may occur temporarily vis-a-vis core institutions (large clearing
banks), whereas in principle, banks are not permitted to lend more than a small share of their capital to a
single borrower in accordance with prudential rules restricting large exposures. Kaufinan fmds some results
from the US inquiry into the Continental Illinois case, one of the core institutions at the time. Notably, 65
financial institutions had uninsured exposures larger than their capital to the bank shortly before the
Continental Illinois failure. The Congressional study estimated that if the Continental's losses would have
been 60 per cent, then 27 banks would have been legally insolvent, and 56 banks would have suffered to
below 5 per cent, so that none of its correspondents suffered solvency-threatening losses. See George G.
Kaufinan, Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
RESEARCH, Vol. 7 (1994), at 123-150.
This approach is strongly linked to empirical research on the impact of failures in payment and settlement
systems. However, it cannot address the actual occurrence of systemic events, and it can just shows the ex
ante risks as potential events in the future. See de Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 42.
398 See id. Some review a number of non-quantitative studies on the banking crises in US history between
1873 and 1933, as well as quote a number of contemporaneous observers (arguing that "systemwide
contagious bank runs were not a frequent occurrence in US history (probably occurring at most only in 1878,
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financial difficulties at one bank or a group of banks spread to other banks, but they spill

over almost exclusively only to banks with the same or similar portfolio risk exposures and

subject to same shock. 399 That is to say, there seems little empirical evidence on the

insolvency of a bank which directly leads to the insolvency of other economically solvent

banks, or deposit withdrawals at economically insolvent banks resulting in bank runs and

the insolvency ofthe banks. 4oO

Even though the empirical assessment of the systemic risk potential on the international

platform is undoubtedly essential in shaping and evaluating the future supervisory and

regulatory framework, there is the lack of appropriate data, and empirical studies on

systemic risk in other countries and financial systems. Furthermore, even bank equity

1893,1908, and 1931-1933 and doing major damage probably only in 1893 and 1931-1933), and that fear of
widespread ripple effects did not appear to be of major concern to most students of U.S. banking
before1932"). See George J. Benston et aI., PERSPECTNES ON SAFE AND SOUND BANKING: PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE 70 (1986). For fmal comments, they concluded in asserting that "U.S. history suggests that runs
on individual banks or groups of banks only rarely spread to other banks that are not subject to the same
conditions that started the runs, and that most banks runs have been contained by appropriate action, with only
minimal or short-lived effects on national fmancial stability and economic activity. Generally, the instability
of individual banks or groups of banks has not translated into instability in the banking system as a whole.
The major exception was the run on all banks in late 1932 through early 1933, which caused the banking
system to grind to almost a complete halt and substantially reinforced the economic crisis at the time.
Although an exception, this event was so traumatic that it has colored analysis of bank runs and failures ever
since." See id. at 77. With respect to the bank runs in Chicago, in June 1932 during the Great Depression,
Benston et ai. asserted that "these failures occurred primarily because of adverse local business conditions
rather than because of spillover from other failed banks outside their market areas." /d. at 62.
399
See Kaufman, supra note 347 at 8.
400 [d.
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returns, debt risk premiums, deposit flows or physical exposures for European, Japanese or

emerging market countries have not been studied thoroughly. In the circumstances, there

seems little empirical evidence on the potential for systemic risk in Europe. This may

account for the fact that the appropriate data such as interbank lending for Europe is rare or

virtually absent. Recent studies attempt to evaluate the threat of systemic risk in European

banking employing correlations between stock returns of European banks and bank stock

indexes, respectively, as interdependencies between banks.

401

Arguably, the results of

these empirical studies show that the systemic risk potential has increased at the European
arena, and that there exists a threat of systemic risk in European countries. 402 Nonetheless,

to support this argument, further empirical and theoretical studies are needed.

See Martin. Schueler, The Threat ofRisk in Banking-Evidence for Europe, ZEW Discussion Paper, No.
02-21 (2002) (calculating rolling-window correlations between bank stock returns of the 60 largest European
banks, after controlling for national influences in bank stock returns); see also M. Schroeder & M. Schueler,
Systemic Risk in European Banking-Evidencefrom Bivariate GARCH Models ZEW Discussion Paper (2003)
(estimating bivariate GARCH models between excess returns of bank stock indexes of 13 European countries:
ftrst, testing for structural banks in 1994, as a consequence of the second banking directive, and the
introduction of the euro in 1999, second, testing for the signiftcance of a trend variable in the covariance
equation ofthe GARCH model).
402 See Martin Schueler, How do Banking Supervisors Deal with Europe-wide Systemic Risk?, ZEW
Discussion Paper, No. 03-03, at 5 (July 21,2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlabstact id=412460 (last
visited Feb. 1,2004).
401
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As noted above, the results of existing econometric tests for bank contagion effects are

still limited to data for the United States. .Thus, there is a need for more empirical research

on other financial systems to identify the significance and character of bank contagion in

terms of systemic risks, but this agenda may encounter any challenges on account of the

adoption of safety nets in a number of countries. Historical experiences of bank failures in

terms of systemic risk are demonstrated below.

d. Historical Experiences

i.

The Collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt in 1974

In 1974, the world economy experienced a traumatic distress due to a catastrophic

combination of the sharp increase in oil price, a sharp rise in interest rates on the sovereign

loans, a global recession, and exchange rate volatility. In particular, the new regime of

floating exchange rates brought about a new problem: exchange or currency risk.

403

Since

403 See Kapstein, GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND THE STATE, supra note
209, at 38 (noting that "[i]ndeed, it is somewhat ironic that flexible exchange rates increased [the] mutual
sensitivity to bank failures ... "). That is to say, economists and central bankers expected that the new regime
did the opposite when it came to macroeconomic policy: under fixed rates, central bankers had little
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the early 1970s and the collapse of Bretton Woods, banks and all other players in the

international financial market have been exposed to new levels of exchange rate or
currency risk. 404 That is, all the entities participating in the international financial markets

have been necessitated to catch up with the probability of unforeseen changes in exchange

rates such as sharp changes in the value of domestic and foreign money in the foreign

exchange markets. In particular, bank traders sometimes responded to unanticipated

exchange-rate changes by taking further positions in the hope of recouping losses.

Moreover, the creation of innovative financial instruments has driven international financial

markets toward the direction of a tremendous foreign currency movement. In order to

satisfy the worldwide currency needs of their clients facilitating their international trade and

business transactions, banks borrowed needed funds from other banks, both foreign and

autonomy; their policies had to be formulated with respect to those being set abroad, in order to maintain the
value of the currency; By contrast, under floating rates, it appeared that economic policies could be set
independently, as long as the government and central bank were willing to accept the change rate
consequences. In this context, one argues that interdependence has crucial implications for both
macroeconomic and banking policy. See generally Robert M. Dunn Jr., The Many Disappointments of
Flexible Exchange Rates, Princeton Essays in International Finance (1983).
404 Kapstein notes that foreign exchange trading paused two risks to banks: credit risk and currency risk. The
former arises when a purchaser of foreign exchange contract, usually a bank would not pay after receiving
foreign exchange, as shown in the collapse of the Herstatt Bank of Germany in 1974. The latter arises from
unhedged currency movements. That is, a bank suffers tremendous losses when it is in an unhedged position
in a currency with a bad bet as was the Franklin National Franklin Bank in 1974. See Ethan B. Kapstein,
Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma: International Coordination ofBanking Regulations, INT'L ORG. Vol. 43,
No.2 (Spring 1989), at 334.

155

domestic through interbank market because they kept little foreign exchange in their

vaults. 405 In this context, the growth of foreign exchange trading has propelled the

international interdependence of banking industry.

406

Whereas banks recognized the potential profits in the sharp currency movement,

thereby playing a more speculative game with a bad bet, a number of banks and financial

institutions suffered tremendous losses by failing to hedge against foreign exchange

exposures or in direct foreign currency tradings due to their inexperience to manage

currency risk. As a result, bank failures at the domestic level would spread overseas and

led to the financial problems at the regional and international arenas, because bank
supervisors and regulators were not aware of the remedies coping with this type ofrisks. 407

See Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209, at 38.
See id.
407 In dealing with this unprecedented risk, three types of controls were implemented by responsible
management of a bank to restrict the excessive speculation of its foreign exchange department and to ensure
its fulfillment of careful analysis of borrowers. Firstly, establishing definite limits on the bank's position in
various foreign currencies; secondly, internal controls to ensure such limits were honored; finally, a credit
analysis system to ensure borrowers' repayment of their foreign exchange loans. However, these seemingly
simple measures to design in theory were not successfully executed in practice. This was due to the facts that
bank managers could not but respect account officers' efforts to increase their foreign exchange limits to
satisfy the demands of clients, and that during the early 1970s, bank managers could not get real-time data on
the institution's foreign exchange position under the internal accounting and operating systems of banks.
Furthermore, banks could not easily protect themselves from fraudulent attempts by some account officers
and traders to benefit from the bank's foreign exchange book. See Kapstein, supra note 209, at 38-39.
405

406
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It took only one year to draw global attention to focus on the need to deal with a bank

failure driven by this risk after the adoption of floating exchange rate system.

The collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt in Cologne, Germany in June 1974 due to the severe

changes in foreign exchange trading conditions had the most significant impact on the rest
of world, whereas a number of banks suffered the heavy foreign exchange losses. 408

Herstatt, a medium-sized commercial bank in Cologne, West Germany, was founded in

1955, and had over 50,000 customers and assets over DM2 billion after less than 20 years.

As a major player in the foreign exchange market, Herstatt had been notorious for

overtrading, taking foreign exchange trades that were very large relative to its capital. In

particular, Herstatt had been wildly speculating on the direction of a currency movement in

the foreign exchange markets, borrowing in different currencies from banks around the

globe, and it had lost the speculative game. As a consequence, Herstatt had suffered

tremendous losses in foreign exchange tradings, which the bank's foreign exchange

408 See John Cooper, THE MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION OF BANKS 6,23,241 (1984); see also Richard
Dale, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 156-157(1984}.
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department had concealed with its fraudulent bookkeeping. 409 In short, Herstatt's fraud,

and incompetence to deal with the risks it took in the foreign exchange market led to the

huge losses that expedited its collapse.
Upon discovering Herstatt's fraudulent concealing of exchange losses 410 exceeding half

the book value of its assets, and its insolvency, the Gennan Banking authorities abruptly

revoked Herstatt's license, stopped clearing payments for Herstatt's accounts, and closed

the bank on June 26, 1974 at the close of business (4:00 PM). The timing of the closure

left uncompleted a large number of payment commitments in the amount of millions of

dollars of spot foreign exchange transactions, which had been entered into two days
earlier,411 thereby taking several months to unravel the ensuing tangle. 412 By the time the

See id.
410 Herr Daniel Dattel, the Chief Foreign Exchange Dealer at Herstatt was responsible for the exchange losses
that exceeded $200 million at the time of the closure. See Outrageous Consequences of Bundesbank's Overhasty Reaction, International Currency Review, Vol. 6, No.4 (July-August 1974), at 21.
411 Herstatt's capital losses were estimated to be in excess ofDM 1.2 billion as a consequence of excessive
uncovered foreign exchange conditions and bad debts. See H.J. Muller, The Concordat: A Model for
International Cooperation, Paper presented for the International Conference of Banking Supervisors (London,
JUly 5-6, 1979), at 65.
412 Due to the lack of clarity in several legal issues, the number of parties involved, and the complexity of the
transactions, it took approximately 11 months of negotiations among all the pertinent creditors to reach an
agreement and distribute available funds. Notably, all the pertinent parties sought an out-of-court settlement
although legal actions also aimed at the establishment of who owed to what to whom, and thereby disbursing
ofHerstatt funds held in New York. Interestingly, authority to close a bank in West Germany rests with the
Bundesbankaufsichtsampt fuer das Kreditwesen rather than the Bundesbank, the Gernan central bank. Even
though the Bundesbank did not apparently played any role in the Herstatt's debacle, it was the target of
409
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bank was closed in Gennany, it was still during business hours in New York (10:00 AM),

and London (3:00 PM). Herstatt's global correspondents had paid Deutschemarks to

Herstatt to fulfill maturing foreign exchange contracts at the end of Gennan business day in

the expectation that they would receive US dollars later that day at the close of business in

New York. When Chase Manhattan, Herstatt's New York correspondent received a notice

ofthe closure, Herstatt declined to honor $620 million in payment orders and checks drawn

on its account. The Gennan banking authorities' abrupt closure ofthe bank aborted the

settlement of millions of dollars offoreign exchange contracts caused the New York's

counterparties' exposure to the full value ofDM deliveries made, and thereby leading to the

collapse of the United States clearing and international banking systems.

413

As it is known

litigation on charges negligence for clearing for Herstatt during the few hours between the closure of
negotiations between Herstatt and the Bundesbankaufsichtsampt fuer das Kreditwesen and the actual
revocation of the bank's license. The litigation was not successful since the Bundesbank owed no particular
duty to the plaintiffs. All creditors, including depositors with accounts over $7,500 lost money as a result of
the collapse, since the deposit insurance scheme did not exist in Germany at this time. See E. Gerald Corrigan,
The Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (May 3, 1990), at
17-18,20-21.
413 The international financial community experienced payment problems. The problems are dislocations in
the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), which is the most significant large dollar clearing
system had to be shut down while Herstatt's settlemt debts were declined to cover by German authorities.
That is, New York's corresponding banks, for their own or customers' accounts, would decline to make
payments until they received confirmation that countervalues had been received. As a result, large balances
held in New York's correspondents were not covered. Since large international payments are made through
the mechanism of the CHIPS in New York, the incompletion of payments led to in a chain of reaction of
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as "Herstatt Risk"-the time lapse between payment of foreign currencies and the receipt

of US dollars in foreign exchange transactions: cross-border settlement risks for banks-,

the corresponding dollar payments were left unsettled in New York, while the DM portion

of these transactions had been transferred to Herstatt.

Also, the Herstatt failure triggered the crucial tiering of interbank interest rates, with

premiums as high as 200 basis points charged to even the largest banks and less credit-

worthy borrowers excluded from the market effectively. As a consequence, the

international liquidity was reduced sharply due to the mobility of funds from the

Euromarket to domestic markets and lenders discriminated against borrowers. Moreover,

the global economy encountered dislocations in the international interbank sector of the

Eurocurrency market because of the lack of information about the allocation of spot

transaction losses and the expectation of prospective losses on forward transactions with

Herstatt. This credit crisis caused by the absence of reliable information regarding the

exact nature and extent oflosses incurred to Herstatt and the counterparties triggered

nonpayment under a tightly linked system. The daily clearing drop was estimated to be $24 billion from the
usual $60 billion to average $36 billion over the three days after the collapse.
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market participants' withdrawal of credit lines from banks that could sustain counterparty

losses involved whether they had dealt with Herstatt directly or not. A number of banks

had to pay far above the current London Interbank Offer Rate whereas others could not

borrow at all.

414

In the meantime, the German banking authorities faced harsh criticism in the wake of

the Herstatt debacle. 41s The controversies ran over the negligence of the German

regulatory authorities. It is argued that the German central bank, the Deutche Bundesbank

should have honored Herstatt's debts, and intervened in the foreign exchange markets in

order to support less credit-worthy banks, which had been shut out. That is to say, if the

German authorities had waited to the closure of business in New York before closing the

Herstatt, the counterparty losses would have been greatly reduced. Thus, the counterparty

losses arose from the asynchronous exchange in payment systems due to differences in time

zones rather than Herstatt's exchange losses. 416 It deserves noting "much ofthe spillover

form the Herstatt Bank to other banks from these transactions represents more of a
414
415
416

See Herring & Litan, supra note 64, at 96.
See Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209, at 40.
See Kaufman, supra note 347, at 10.
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government risk than a market risk.,,417 In this respect, there was arguably no other bank's
failure as a consequence ofthe Herstatt collapse. 418 In response to the critics, the German

authorities justified their actions by stating their intent to give a lesson to both bank dealing
with speculators and speculators. 419 Ironically, the Germans established subsequently a

new set of regulations coping with foreign exchange trading, which reflected some selfcriticism on the part of the German banking authorities. 42o

The Herstatt failure highlighted the need for bank regulators and supervisors cooperative

efforts toward keeping pace with the expansion of international banking and the growing

interdependence of financial markets. In this regard, the Herstatt collapse compelled

banking supervisors in different countries to regularly correspond with one another, and

share necessary information, which would soon become the formalized process by the
See id. at 11. Notably, in a number of countries, evidence of contagious systemic risk in banking is
frequently confused with crises arising from the freezing, confiscation or devaluation of deposits (either in
domestic or foreign currency) or the defaulting on bank held govermnent securities by govermnents. That is to
say, the bank problems frequently arise from the use of the banks by the govermnents to pursue their
nonbanking policies rather than from the actions of the banks themselves in their banking activities. These
crises may be referred to as govermnent created crises rather than bank created crises. See Kaufman & Scott,
supra note 358, at 14. As shown in the recent Russian crisis, the crises almost always reflect notorious abuses
that were permitted if not endorsed by govermnent, and the govermnent's incompetence to resolve banks'
insolvency in a timely and efficient manner. See Mark Whitehouse, Frustration soars for Russian bank
depositors., Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1999, at A14.
418 See id.
419 See E. P. Davis, Instability in the Euromarkets and the Economic Theory ofFinancial Crisis, Bank of
England Discussion Papers 43 (October 1983), at 3.
420 See Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209, at 40.
417
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Group ofTen central bank govemors. 421 The aftermath of the foreign exchange related

losses suffered by the Herstatt debacle and the closure of Franklin National in New York in

1974

422

triggered the establishment of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 423

That is, it is widely recognized that the establishment of the Basel Committee resulted from

See id. at 41. In spite of banking crises of the Herstatt failure and the Frankilin National's collapse, and the
growing interdependence of financial markets, the Group ofTen central bank governors' meeting in July
1974 at the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) could not answer the troubling question of whether
emergency liquidity assistance would be available to banks active in the international interbank market. The
meeting could not reach an agreement on which central bank would provide lender-oflast-resort assistance to
banks, in what amount, and under what condition. By contrast with the United States, the Germans would not
explicitly state for some reasons: firstly, the Deutsche Bundesbank did not have the formallender-of-Iastresort powers, which were authorized by a Liquidity Consortium Bank established in response to the Herstatt
failure; secondly the Bundesbank declined any commitments to providing emergency liquidity assistance to
failed banks due to illegal or highly risky activities because it considered central bankers' making explicit
commitments as moral hazard. See Joan Spero, THE FAILURE OF THE FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK 154 (1980).
Under the circumstances, the uncertainty over whether the lender of last resort would operate can also
destabilize and precipitate the systemic crisis, whereas it may intensify market discipline over some banks.
Otherwise, market discipline is weakened in proportion with market participants' expectation of the central
banks to come to the rescue. Shortly, the vagueness cannot accomplish the two apparently designed
objectives: ensuring market discipline and reducing systemic risk. See Herring & Litan, supra note 64, at 9798. Despite the disagreement on emergency liquidity assistance for international banks, the central bank
governors recognized the growing interdependence of fmancial markets, the necessity of cooperation among
bank regulators and supervisors around the globe.
422 On May 10, 1974, the twentieth largest bank in the Unites States, the Franklin National suffered a series
of deposit runs following substantial losses in foreign exchange trading entailed by its book-keeping
malpractices. Owing to the bank's aggressive expansion, the bank encountered a number of difficulties
including excessive gearing, aggressive maturity mismatching, and bond trading, speculation on interest rate
movements, poor asset quality, over-dependence on purchase funds and foreign exchange losses. The Federal
Reserve authorities' fear that the failure of the Franklin National could drive a nationwide depositor run, and
an international banking crisis led to support the ailing institution. However, the bank was closed on October
8, 1974 although as lender of last resort the Fed provided the bank with more than $1.7 billion in funds. The
Fed took over the bank's foreign exchange operations under the guarantee that the Franklin National would
not leave its foreign creditors unpaid as did the Herstatt. The Federal Reserve also acted to prop up the bank's
London branch, extending the lender-of-Iast-resort provision overseas. In the meantime, it must be noted that
the bank was already in big trouble as to its domestic and international operations. At the domestic level, the
Franklin National had suffered from weak management, a weak loan portfolio, poor investments and heavy
reliance on short-term funding. At the international level, the bank faced a remarkable decrease in its earnings,
and a massive liquidity problem resulting from the heavy foreign exchange losses. See Kapstein, supra note
209, at 41-42; see also Walker, supra note 203, at 26-28.
423 See Kapstein, supra note 209, at 44-48; Herring & Litan, supra note 64, at 98-101; see also Walker, supra
note 203, at 35-39, 155-156.
421
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the aftereffect ofthe Herstatt and Franklin National's fraud, and incompetence to deal with

foreign exchange risk and the fear of contagious systemic risk leading to a global banking

cnsls. However, as pointed out in the next sub-chapter, the crucial point to note is that the

creation ofthe Basel Committee arguably resulted more from hegemony of the most highly

industrialized countries in terms of hegemonic stability than from their concerns over

systemic risk leading to a global banking crisis.

ii.

The Failure of Continental Illinois Bank in 1984

The collapse ofthe Continental Illinois Bank, the seventh biggest bank in the United

States, with total assets in excess of $40 billion in May 1984 provides a model case of a

bank that had combined high leverage with a risky portfolio in its reckless pursuit of market
share, and also provides some measures ofthe potential for financial knock-on effects. 424

Prior to the failure, 2,299 banks had credit exposures to the Continental Illinois, the largest

correspondent bank in the country. The bank management's failure in its job of asset and

424

See Kapstein, supra note 209, at 108-109.
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liability management brought about rumors about asset quality leading to institutional
investors' withdrawals of their deposits. 425 Despite the emergency infusion of Federal

Reserve cash in response to the bank's request for a $6 billion injection of the Fed funds to

meet its immediate obligations, the bank collapsed, and a federal bailout followed. 426

Since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) fully protected the creditors at

the time, no bank suffered any 10sses.

427

Even though all creditors had not been fully

425 See id. at 109. Public announcements of millions of dollars of losses due to bad domestic oil loans
triggered depositors and creditors into a run on the bank. That is to say, the Continental Illinois' problems
were traceable to large anticipated loan losses in the bank's loan portfolios for energy, agriculture, and heavy
industry. What is worse, a senior loan officer had purchased many bad loan participations from Penn Square
Bank after receiving a large personal loan from that bank. As a consequence, rumors about the bank's
problems started to circulate within the financial community, which caused the bank to lose $4billion in
deposits in three days. See Kidwell et. aI., supra note 313, at 379, 493.
426 See Kapstein, supra note 209, at 109. In the aftermath of the Continental Illinois debacle, the Federal
Reserve wanted the banks to make their every effort to strengthen their balance sheets though the financial
markets before any of them had to ask for the federal government's assistance. One source of the Continental
Illinois problems at this time is that the off-balance-sheet items accumulating in big institutions were not
considered under the fixed capital-to-asset ratio scheme which required banks to hold $5.50 of capital
(defmed as shareholders' equity and the loan-loss reserve) for every 100 of assets regardless of the asset
quality or the type of asset held. As a consequence, U.S. bank regulators and supervisors began to search for a
new capital adequacy standard as illustrated in detail in the next chapter. See id. at 110. Also, the debacle led
to a wide scale reexamination of the management practices of large money-center banks. See Kidwell at. aI.,
supra note 313, at 379.
427
See Kaufman & Scott, supra note 358, at 10. Bank regulators responded promptly to the problems: firstly,
the Federal Reserve provided the bank with discount-window loans. Next, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Cooperation (FDIC) guaranteed all the deposits of the bank's depositors and creditors (not just those with
deposits up to $100.000). Thirdly, $1.5 billion was added to the bank's declining capital base by the FDIC. As
the bank's subsequent bailout, the FDIC provided open bank assistance with a full protection of all the bank's
creditors and depositors, but left the original stockholders with practically nothing. However, deep criticism
has run on these regulatory measures. In short, the FDIC seemingly preferred the arrangement of purchase
and assumption transactions at the time of a large bank's failure to liquidate it for many years. Then, at the
time of the Continental Illinois debacle in 1984, the "too big to fail" policy produced a two-tiered banking
system. Thus, federal regulators guaranteed 100 percent of deposits of all the bank's depositors to be paid
irrespective of how large the deposit size was or how poorly the bank performed. This policy to resolve the
Continental Illinois failure was also implemented in conjunction with other large banks' failures. See Kidwell
et. aI., supra note 313, at 486, 493-494.
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protected, the losses would not have been very much.

428

That is, some 1,325 banks

exposed to less than $100,000, and were thus fully insured by the FDIC. In spite of the

remainder's exposure to some risk, according to a study of the staff of the House Banking

Committee, only 27 banks would have suffered losses in excess of their reported capital

and insolvent, if the Continental Illinois' loss had been as large as 60 cents on the dollar (a

recovery rate on assets of only 40 percent), which was more than ten times either the
estimated loss or the actual loss as of the time of its resolution. 429 These losses would have

been just $137 million. Another 56 banks would have suffered losses equal to between 50 .

and 99 percent of their total capital in an amount totaling $237 million. According to the

study, no bank would have suffered a loss greater than its capital, and only two banks

would have suffered losses in excess of 50 percent of their capital, if the Continental
Illinois' loss had been as large as 10 cents on the dollar, more than twice the actualloss. 43o

This study shows that banks had apparently acted for the protection of themselves through

See id.
See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Supervision,
Regulation, and Insurance, Hearing (1984), Inquiry into the Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois
National Bank (98-11), 98 th Congo 2nd Sess., September 18-19.
430 See id.
428
429
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limiting their uninsured exposures to their capital and monitoring their positions

carefully.431 Moreover, it seemed that no bank with insured deposits at the Continental
Illinois would have collapsed if these deposits had been uninsured. 432 Arguably, with

regard to banks, at least in the United States, there is little evidence of contagious systemic

risk that causes economically solvent banks to become economically or legally insolvent,
either before or after the introduction of federal government guarantees and insurance. 433

See Kaufman & Scott, supra note 358, at 10.
/d. The Continental Illinois case required regulators to note more strict regulations for two reasons: Firstly,
as a result of the bank failures of the 1970s and early 1980s, Congress was losing confidence in their
supervisory capacities, given their recent track record, and would demand new regulations; secondly,
otherwise, an undesirable message might be transmitted throughout the banking community. The regulators
did not want bankers to misunderstand that the Federal Reserve's saving the seventh-largest bank would be
extended to save any large institution irrespective of the quality of its management and the standard qf its loan
portfolio. Moreover, they did not want observers to infer that the United States was now willing to provide
emergency liquidity assistance for the banks out oftheir third world debts without any satisfactory adjustment
on the part of banks because they were apparently concerned about the moral hazard problem. See Kapstein,
supra note 209, at 109.
433 See Kaufman & Scott, supra note 358, at 8. According to Kaufinan and Scott, the evidence strongly
suggests that "in the absence of de-jure deposit insurance, depositors and other bank creditors take sufficient
protective action on their own to greatly reduce the probability both of losses to themselves and of spillover to
other banks. The externality of contagion appears to be price by the market. This conclusion holds even when
there appears to be some positive probability that some or all the effected claimants may be ex-post partially
or totally protected de-facto. It is also likely that the event stronger protective actions would have been taken
by most bank stakeholders in the absence of regulations or other regulatory actions that project a perception of
safety." See id. at 14. In this context, it should be noted that the fmancial safety net usually exists de facto, if
not de jure, even in countries with no formal deposit insurance scheme in place nor an official discount
window facility at the central bank. Under the protection of a government safety net, a number of countries
have adopted deposit insurance schemes to protect depositors from losses resulting from bank failures.
Furthermore, central banks operate as a lender of last resort either by giving liquidity assistance to an
individual bank or by maintaining liquidity to the system as a whole. Some highlight that the safety net has its
reason for being in reducing the likelihood of bank runs. See Douglas Diamond & Philip Dybvig, Bank Runs,
Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 91, No.3 (1994), at 401-419.
However, the scheme has a negative side-effect because of its creation of incentives for excessive risk taking
by bank managers. Meanwhile, it should be note the difference between deposit insurance and bank bailout
policies on a bank's risk-taking incentives. Under the deposit insurance scheme, a bank failure causes loss of
shareholders' entire investment and managers' jobs. By contrast, a bank bailout with taxpayers' funds or
431

432
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The Continental Illinois debacle is a significant case in both the international banking

regulation and bank management practices in that a new regulatory approach with regard to

bank capital was forming within the U.S. Federal Reserve system, whereas the debate over

international banking supervision continued. In that context, some argue that" ... an

international agenda to strengthen the banking system emerged in 1983-84, not as

collective solution to the third world debt crisis on the part of central-bank governors, but

as an outcome of domestic politics in the United States.,,434 At the time, bank capital was

subject to critical scrutiny as a domestic political issue in the United States. In particular,

the issue of bank capital had been an ongoing agenda item for the U.S. Congress as it

through a last-Iender-of-resort facility causes managers and shareholders to lose their stake in the bank only to
the extent that this is required as a part of the rescue package (through management package or
recapitalization). As a consequence, the point to note is that both deposit insurance and bank bailouts protect
depositors, thereby eliminating their incentives to monitor and impose discipline on the bank, whereas
expected rescues may provide bank mangers with incentives for risk-taking. Namely, bank managers will tend
to take more risk than the creditors would accept if they were uninsured, because banks do not encounter the
outcomes of investing in projects with highly expected returns other than high risks. Asa consequence, the
safety net can be a source of moral hazard. See George Berger, Reforming Insurance and the Regulatory
System: the Failure of the Middle Way, THE CATO JOURNAL, Vol. 14, No.2 (Fall 1994). Most governments
are inclined to rescue a troubled bank, because the political pressure for the rescue is usually very strong. In
this respect, the moral hazard tends to exist even without an official safety net scheme. Although limiting the
size and scope of the safety net can reduce moral hazard problem in banking, moral hazard appears almost
inherent to banking unless governments are expected to commit not to bailout failed banks despite the scheme.
Moreover, some note that a positive level of moral hazard resulting from safety net schemes might be
unavoidable or optimal to contain the systemic costs or monetary disturbances associated with financial crises.
See Charles Goodhart & H. Huang, A Model of the Lender ofLast Resort, L.S.E. Financial Markets Group
Discussion Paper, No. 313 (1999), cited in De Bandt & Hartmann, supra note 346, at 25.
434 See Ethan B. Kapstein, Supervising International Banks: Origin and Implications of the Basle Accord,
Princeton Essays in International Finance, No. 185 (December 1991) at 12.
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debated what to do about increasing the International Monetary Fund's quota since the debt
crisis in 1982.435 In the circumstances, the failure of Continental Illinois compelled

American regulators to recognize the inadequacy of existing prudential regulations in the

context of the myriad risks that banks encountered, and brought them the urgent attention
on the need for a more comprehensive capital adequacy framework. 436 As discussed below,

it must be noted that the U.S. Congress' concern over the competitiveness in response to

u.s. commercial banks' argument oftheir loss in a relative competitiveness in relation both
to foreign banks and nonblank financial institutions rather than their concern about the

safety and soundness ofthe international financial system drove the internationalization of

bank regulatory standards, particularly capital adequacy standards.

See id. at 14.
See Glenn Tobin, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL ADEQUACY NEGOTIATION: A CASE STUDY (1989), cited in
Ethan Kapstein, Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics ofRegulatory Convergence,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, Vol. 46, No.1 (Winter 1992) at 277.

435

436
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B. The Movement Toward Global Standards in Banking

As noted above, in the aftennath of financial disruption in international currency and

banking markets suffered by the failure of the Bankhaus Herstatt and the closure of the

Franklin National Bank in 1974, concerns over the need for unifonnity in global banking

standards began to spread among industrialized countries' bank regulators in the mid-1970s.

The rationale for the standardization of unitary global banking standards was that even

though banks were increasingly multinational and deregulated, monitoring and regulating

cross-border banking practices remained the province of national regulatory and

supervisory authorities. That is to say, it is widely recognized that a dramatic expansion

and diversification of global banking activities posed challenges to national authorities in

dealing with systemic risk, and maintaining the stability and soundness of banks

incorporated in their home countries through domestic bank regulation, and thereby drove a

movement toward unifonn global standards in banking.

However, the significant point to note is that hegemony of the Western powers began a
(

drive to move for the internationalization of bank regulatory standards in tenns of
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hegemonic stability more than their concerns about systemic risk leading to a global

banking crisis. That is, the United Kingdom's concern over how to supervise a number of

foreign banks active on her territory in the early 1970s was the most powerful driving force

behind the uniformity of standards in banking. As a matter of fact, by the early 1970s,

London had become a host to a group of multinational banks in search of regulatory refuge,

particularly from the United States, thereby reestablishing itself as a hub of global finance,

partly thanks to the financial deregulation that attracted foreign banks' activities with

branches and subsidiaries in the city.437 The presence of over two hundred foreign banks

with branches in London raised a host of supervisory issue concerning who would become

a lender oflast resort in the event of financial disturbances.

438

Namely, the Bank of

England wanted to make sure that these branches active in London would be rescued by

their home country's central bank when the one of these branches failed. Furthermore,

London confronted the increasing challenges from other financial centers for fresh

See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma, supra note 404, at 329; Kapstein, Supervising
International Banks, supra note 434, at 5; see also Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209,
at 44.
438 See id.
437
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investment from other banks in reestablishing itself as an offshore financial center, and
unilateral regulation would have eroded this effort. 439

In the circumstances, the United Kingdom as one of the international financial market

powers played a key role in initiating a drive to move for the unitary global bank regulatory
standards. 440

1. The Creation of the Basel Committee

The aftereffect of banking crises of 1974 fueled the United Kingdom's drive to search

for the regulatory and supervisory mechanism monitoring and regulating the complex

cross-border lending and borrowing activities of multinational banks. That is, at that time

the Bank of England's first concern was to address problems with the current domestic

See Kapstein, supra note 404 at 329, n.l6.
The Bank of England had already witnessed fmancial disturbances of the fringe banking crisis in Britain
resulting from a number of virtually umegulated regional banks' borrowing hot money (short-term funds with
floating interest rates) and long-term lending at fixed rates to support various real estate projects. See Kapstein,
supra note 209, at 42, 44.
439

440
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bank regulation that could not cope with the regulatory avoidance and evasion by foreign

bank branches and subsidiaries.

441

At the same time, capital-exporting countries were concerned about the potential threat

to international financial systems in the aftermath of financial disturbances in 1974. In this

regard, the central bank Governors of the Group ofTen industrialized countries undertook

two courses of corrective action. The Governors initially issued a support Communique to

attempt to stabilize the markets while a separate standing committee on regulatory and

supervisory practices was formed to report to the Governors on the development of possible

preventive measures against the repercussion of similar crises in the future. The

Governors at their meeting in July 1974 at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in

Basel raised concerns about the stability of foreign exchanges and Euro dollar markets, and
441 With respect to the allocation of supervisory responsibility, the position of the United Kingdom was that
the Bank of England was concerned with its unaccountability for the costs of having to extend support
operations to all foreign banks operating out of London or elsewhere within the United Kingdom, whereas the
Bank of England was prepared to support the UK banks' activities at home and overseas despite limited
resources. By 1974, the Bank of England adopted an express policy of parent undertaking and parent country
responsibility, which applied both to the branches of overseas banks operating within the United Kingdom
and to wholly owned subsidiaries and consortia. With the presence of a number of foreign banks in London,
the Bank was concerned to ensure that the parent undertakings and parent authorities assumed a certain
degree of responsibility in connection with the overseas operations of their banks, and that the Bank did not
have to bear sole responsibility for the financial support of such institutions in the event of difficulties. Due to
the lack of a cost allocation mechanism, the Bank had to attempt to develop this combined parent undertaking
and parent country control argument in that it could not assume an unlimited liability associated with the
foreign banks to which it was host in the event of a number of large foreign operations in the UK. See Walker,
supra note 203, at 33-34, 94-97.
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bank liquidity. However, the disagreement between the United States and West Germany

over central banks' provision oflender-of-last-resort to troubled banks caused smaller

banks and consortia banks to lose access to funds in the interbank market. In response to

the national market operators' pressure on them for a stronger support commitment, the

Governors declared their commitment to maintaining the stability of the markets in order to

recover the market order and prevent further bank failures in the Communique of

September 1974.

442

Although the statement did not expressly mention the establishment of

new international lender of last resort facility, it seemed that the Governors acknowledged
the effect. 443 In that context, one observer highlights the coordinated action among states
for the effective and stable operation of the new financial markets. 444

The content of the Communique is as follows: "At their regular meeting in Basel on September 9th , the
central bank governors from the countries of the Group ofTen and Switzerland discussed the working of the
international banking system. They took stock of the existing mechanisms for supervision and regulation and
noted recent improvements in these fields in a number of major countries. They agreed to intensify the
exchange of information between central banks on the activities of banks operating in the international
markets and, where appropriate, to tighten further the regulations governing exchange positions. The
Governors also had an exchange of views on the problems oflender-of-Iast-resort in the Euro markets. They
recognized that it would not be practical to lay down in advance detailed rules and procedures for the
provision of temporary liquidity. But they were satisfied that means are available for that purpose and will be
used if and when necessary." See Joan Spero, THE FAILURE OF THE FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK 154 (1980); S.
Solomon, THE CONFIDENCE GAME: How UNELCTED CENTRAL BANKERS ARE GOVERNING THE CHANGED
WORLD ECONOMY 117 ( 1995).
443 See E. P. Davis, Instability in the Euromarkets and the Economic Theory ofFinancial Crisis, Bank of
England Discussion Papers 43 (October 1989) at 19 (noting that this move did not guarantee the automatic
lender oflast resort intervention but indicated the central bankers' willingness of intervention in a crisis). See
442
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In addition to the issuance of the September 1974 Communique, the GI0 governors

reached an agreement to form a working group of supervisors to develop appropriate rule

and guidelines for the supervision of international banking markets. 445 As a matter of fact,

the establishment ofthe new working group was initiated by the Governor of the Bank of

England Gordon Richardson who recognized the need for greater cooperation among bank

supervisors and the Bank's requirement for more information from horne country

supervisors as to the activities of foreign banks with branches and subsidiaries in

London.

446

Richardson's idea of establishing the Standing Committee on Banking

Regulation and Supervisory Practices, now known as "the Basel Committee" which was

comprised of representatives from G 10 countries along with Luxembourg and Switzerland
also Kapstein, supra note 209, at 43 (arguing that "[y]et it is by no means clear that all the central bankers
present had agreed to provide what their connnercial bankers saw as a lender-of-Iast-resort facilities").
444 See Walker, supra note 203, at 33 (noting that "[a]s this was a carefully drafted compromise statement of
no specific intent, it could not be regarded as representing the conclusion of any clear agreement between all
of the parties concerned. It did, however, confirm that countries could no longer act in isolation with regard to
such matters and that, in future, more considered and co-ordinated action would be required in such an
important area of national and international concern as the effective and stable operation of the new fmancial
markets which had emerged during the 1960s and 1970s").
445 Understandably, the Governors agreed as follows: "The Governors of the Group ofTen at their December
Meeting at the BIS, discussed the problem of assuring the solvency and liquidity of banks, basing themselves
on a summary report prepared by the BIS ... To carry further the work in this field, and to prepare for future
discussions among themselves, the Governors decided to establish a new Committee to be made up of two
experts from each country, one from the supervisory and one from the foreign exchange side. The Committee
will take as its starting point the BIS Summary Report and will give particular attention to the need for an
early warning system. It was noted that from this point of view the quality of supervision is at least as
important as the regulations themselves." See id. at 35-36 n.82.
446 At that time, bank supervisors in any country had difficulty assessing a bank as a whole because banks did
not provide the consolidated statements of their activities. See Kapstein, supra note 209, at 44.
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was accepted by the GI0 bank central governors at their meeting in December 1974.447

That is, the initiative for the creation ofthe Basel Committee had arisen from the city of

London. As a consequence, the Bank of England took the lead role in arranging the

secretariat for the Committee, and providing senior officials of the Bank for the first two

Chairman of the Committee (George Blunden 1974-76, Peter Cooke 1977_88).448

As noted above, since London's financial system had been dominated by international

banks, particularly the US banks by the early 1970s, British regulatory and supervisory had

good reasons to be concerned about systemic risk in the aftermath of banking crises in 1974.

Moreover, any unilateral regulatory attempt to cope with international banks would plunder
London of its reputation as a good place for banking activities. 449 As one observer notes,

London's two apparently irreconcilable objectives had to be accomplished: first, the

maintenance of London's reputation for regulatory flexibility and the competitive

See id. It deserves noting George Blunden's statement that the Basel Committee "was established in 1974
by the Governors of Group ofTen, shortly after they had agreed that it was the duty of central banks to
provide lender-of-Iast-resort facilities to their national banks to support their euro-currency operations." See
George Blunden, International Co-operation in Banking Supervision, Bank of England Quarterly (Sep. 1977),
at 326.
448 See Kapstein, supra note 404, at 329 (noting the Bank of England's lead role in formation of the Standing
Committee in terms of hegemonic stability).
449 See id.
447

176

advantages arising from that, second, the reduction of systemic risk.

450

As a result, "[t]he

solution lay in a multilaterally coordinated approach that could produce a set of standards

all could live with.'.451 In the circumstances, the bank of England was concerned to ensure

the allocation of responsibility in the market support operations and appropriate division of

supervisory and regulatory liabilities. Without any formal allocation rule, the Bank would

have been responsible for the supervision of all domestic and foreign banks' activities in

the United Kingdom and the costs of any necessary support operations as well. In this

regard, it is noteworthy the efforts toward the agreement on allocation rules for supervisory

responsibility and lender of last resort liability. A basic principle of shared responsibility

based on the principle of parent country control with an enhanced role for the host
authorities was adopted instead ofthe espousal of a pure home or host country control. 452

As reviewed below, the Basel Committee formulated its first major initiative known as the

Basel Cocordat of 1975, concerning guidelines for consolidated supervision by home

See John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULA nON 104 (2000).
See id.
452 See Walker, supra note 203, at 84-136. As pointed out below, under the original 1975 Basel provisions,
the host rather than the parent country was to be responsible for the solvency of a subsidiary although this was
subsequently reversed in 1983. See id. at 86-109.
450
451
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countries and host countries ofthe foreign activities of banks in response to the Herstatt
Collapse. 453

Indeed, by the early 1970s, the G 10 central bank governors developed a highly

sophisticated but essentially personal network of consultation and cooperation. However,

this had been traditionally based on contact related to purely monetary and economic
matters. 454 Furthermore, the Governors meetings did not pay heed to national bank

supervision whereas national regulatory and supervisory authorities considered
developments unfolding in international financial markets to be irrelevant. 455 In this

context, arguably, not until the establishment of the Basel Committee in 1974, would bank

regulatory and supervisory issues be emerging as the issue of national and international
issue. 456

453 See id. at 86-100. Walker stresses the evidence of coordinated activity secured in relation to the
management of the Franklin National failure although the major catalyst for establishing the Basel Committee
was the collapse of the Bankhaus Herstatt and the Committee's supervisory model, the European Community
Contact Group (the Contact Group). At the time of the National Franklin's difficulties, the Western financial
community has already coordinated on an ad hoc basis between particular national agencies and through the
meetings of the Governors of G 10 countries in Basel with regard to the coordination of monetary and
economic matters. See id. at 38.
454 See id.
455 Id.
456 See id.
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2. The Establishment of Bank Supervisory Standards

a. The Basel Concordat

Following the Herstatt collapse in 1974 and the Franklin National failure of 1975, the

Basel Committee issued a paper, subsequently known as the Basel Concordat outlining

some principles in the form of recommended guidelines of best practice regarding the

supervision of banks operating internationally through branches, subsidiaries, and joint

ventures.

457

The Committee's aim was that no international banking establishment should

escape adequate supervision. The Concordat specifieses five basic principles458

457 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel Concordat on Principles for the Supervision of
Bank's Foreign Establishments. The original Basel Concordat was not released to the public until March
1981. It was reproduced by the IMF as an Annex ("Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments") to
William and Johnson's paper, "International capital Markets: Recent developments and Short-term
prospects." See IMF Occasional Paper No.7 (1981); see also R. C. William & G. G. Johnson, International
Capital Markets: Recent Developments and Short-Term Prospects 29-32 (Aug. 1981). The Basel Concordat
was a set of guidelines on bank supervision reached by consensus among the banking regulators of the
Committee's member states. The Basel Committee titled the document a 'concordat' to indicate the
agreement had no legal force of the treaty. See id.
458 The Basel Concordat of 1975 provided five basic principles to bank regulatory authorities for international
banking supervision:
(1) The supervision of foreign banking establishments should be the joint responsibility of host and parent
(home) authorities; (2) No foreign banking establishment should escape supervision, each country should
ensure that foreign banking establishments are supervised, and supervision should be adequate as judged by
both host and parent authorities; (3) The supervision of liquidity should be the primary responsibility of host
authorities since foreign establishments generally have to conform to local practices for their liquidity
management and must comply with local regulations; (4) The supervision of solvency offoreign branches
should be essentially a matter for the parent authority. In the case of subsidiaries, while primary
responsibility lies with the host authority, parent authorities should take account of the exposure of their
domestic banks' moral commitment in this regard; and (5) Practical cooperation would be facilitated by
transfers of information between host and parent authorities and by the granting of permission for inspections
by or on behalf of parent authorities on the territory of the host authority. Every effort should be made to
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delineating the supervisory responsibilities of home and host countries' bank regulators in

overseeing banking institutions that operate on a transnational basis. It emphasized that all

banks operating in host countries should be supervised by both the home country's and host
country's supervisory authorities. 459 The Concordat mainly concerns liquidity, solvency,

and foreign exchange positions. That is, it recommended that the host country's authority

is primarily responsible for the adequacy ofthe foreign bank's liquidity.46o In tum, the

home country's supervisory authority should take primary responsibility for the solvency of

home country's bank operating in a foreign country.461 Under the Concordat foreign

subsidiaries were to be primarily subject to the host authorities whereas foreign braches
were considered as indistinguishable from a parent bank as a whole. 462 Its final principle

emphasizes the need for cooperation between home and host country regulatory authorities

in removing existing legal restrictions on the transfer of confidential information for

remove any legal restraints (particularly in the field of professional secrecy or national sovereignty) which
might hinder these forms of cooperation. See id.
459 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Report to the Governors on the Supervision of Bank's
Foreign Establishments (September 1995).
460 See id.
461 Id.
462 See id.
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effective supervision. 463 Despite its making a positive step toward international

cooperation of banking supervision, the Concordat failed in keeping up with various

international banking activities, thereby being revised in 1983.

b. 1983 Revised Concordat

In response to financial crises arisen from the Latin American sovereign Debt Crisis

and the Banco Ambrosiano failure,464 the Basel Committee issued a revision ofthe 1975

Concordat in 1983 for the purpose of promoting consolidated supervision on a transnational

basis. The 1983 Revised Concordat adopted new principles for the allocation of bank

regulatory responsibilities between home and host authorities provided in the Principles for

Id.
464 In 1983 Italy's largest private bank, Banco Ambrosiano SpA failed. As Ambrosiano was on the verge of a
liquidity crisis, the parent regulatory authority (the Bank ofItaly) initially honored the Ambrosianos's
financial difficulties with the support of the state's largest commercial banks. However, the bank's illegal
activities spurred the authority to move to close the bank due to the authority's inability to control loss of
confidence. The problem arose because the 1975 Concordat applied only to 'banks'. Indeed, Ambrosiano
had a financial holding company called Banco Ambrosiano Holdings SA that was incorporated in
Luxembourg. Even if the holding company conducted the business of banking, it was beyond the reach of
Luxembourg's banking regulations, because it was not considered as banks. To make matters complicated,
Luxembourg's secrecy laws veiled Banco Ambrosiano Holdings' operation from the Bank ofItlaly. For the
detail, see Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209, at 53-57.
463
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the Supervision of Bank's Foreign Establishments. 465 The Revised Concordat focused on

ensuring that no bank operating in a foreign country could escape adequate supervision,

thereby developing the approaches of 'consolidated supervision,466 and 'dual key' 467

supervIsIOn. Consolidated supervision expands the responsibilities of the home country's

regulatory authority by requiring the home country's regulatory authority to monitor the

total risk exposure and capital adequacy of the home country's bank.468 The home country
regulator is able to do so by reviewing the bank's total operations. 469

When a host country sees a home country's supervision inadequate, the revised

Concordat proposes two options. First, the host country could deny entry approval to an
organization from a country that does not adequately supervise its own organizations.47o

Alternatively, it could impose specific conditions governing the conduct of the business of

Basel Committee, Principles for the Supervision of Bank's Foreign Establishments (May 1983), reprinted
in (1993) 22 ILM 900, 901.
466 'Consolidated supervision' represents monitoring the risk exposure (including the concentration of risk,
the quality of assets, and the capital adequacy) of the banking groups for which the home country authority
takes responsibility on the basis of the totality of the business carried on. See id. at 905.
467 'Dual key' supervision represents that the regulatory authority of each country concurrently evaluate the
ability of other national authorities to supervise and carry out their respective responsibilities. See id.
468 See id. at 905.
469 Id.904.
470 Under the Revised Concordat the Basel Committee's key aim is to examine the totality of each bank's
world-wide business on the basis of consolidated supervision. See Revised Concordat, 22 ILM 901.
465
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foreign banks to operate in the host jurisdiction.

471

Where a host country does not have an

adequate supervision, the Revised Concordat urges the home country's regulatory

authorities to discourage the home country's bank from expanding its operations into the

proposed host country.472 The rationale behind the dual key approach is to prevent

countries from lowering supervisory practices in order to attract foreign investment and
foreign capita1. 473 Additionally, the Revised Concordat seeks to prevent structural features

of international banking groups, such as holding companies from facilitating the evasion of

supervision through lenient regulatory arrangements.

474

In response to the Ambrosiano

failure, the Revised Concordat recommended that "where host authority supervision

(Luxembourg) is inadequate, the parent authority (Bank of Italy) should either extend its

supervision ... or it should be prepared to discourage the parent bank (Banco Ambrosiano

SpA) from continuing to operate the establishment (Baco Ambrosiano Holdings SA) in

See id.
Id.
473 See Duncan E. Alford, Basle Connnittee Minimum Standards, International Regulatory Response to the
Failure ofBCCI, 26 Geo. Wash. 1. Int'l L. & Econ. 241, 253 (1992).
474 Id. at 904.
471

472
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question.,,475 In 1990, the Basel Committee issued a supplementary document called

Information Flows between banking Supervisory Authorities (Supplement) dealing with the

practical aspects of implementing the 1975 Concordat, such as its authorization,
information flows, bank secrecy, and external audit. 476

c. The Response to BCeI: Minimum Standards for International
Banking Groups and Their Crossborder Establishments
Although the Revised Concordat and the 1990 Supplement contributed to improving

the bank supervisory standards that were initially set forth in the Basel Concordat of 1975,

the existing significant gaps in the allocation of supervisory responsibilities led to the

collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)477 in July 1991. The

See Basel Committee, Principles for the Supervision of Bank's Foreign Establishments 3 (May 1983). In
this regard, the 1983 revisions to the Basel Concordat of 1975 appeared to be fueled by the Ambrosiano
collapse. See Herring & Litan, supra note 64, at 103.
476 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Information Flows between Banking Supervisory
Authorities 1 (April 1990).
477 In 1972 BCCI was founded with a view to financing trade with the third world. BCCI was incorporated in
Luxembourg, and its headquarters were in London. Through widespread fraud, deception and money
laundering, BCCI was able to conceal its insolvency for decades, thereby evading supervision and eluding
regulatory authorities for a number of years by incorporating a holding company in Luxembourg. As a result,
the BCCI conglomerate held two parent (home) banks: BCCI SA, incorporated in Luxembourg, and BCCI
Overseas, incorporated in Cayman Islands. Each of these banks had subsidiaries in foreign countries, such as
the United Kingdom. This complex corporate structure enabled BCCI to evade consolidated supervision.
Although BCCI had two parent banks for which two countries held overall regulatory responsibilities, neither
of the parent banks carried on its primary operations in those countries. Consequently, the lack of
475
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Bccr collapse resulted, in part, from BCCI's ability to evade supervision by both home

and host countries, and demonstrated the difficulties of adequately supervising banks which

operate in more than one jurisdiction.

478

The BCCr case raised significant issues over the

regulation of financial institutions established across states' territorial borders. The BCCr

story also shows that the smart money had long left BCCr by the time BCCr went under

because the financial elites of the West were well wired into the work and concerns of the
Basel Committee. 479 Those who lost were thousands of poorly informed investors from

developing countries. One ofBCCI's legacies was to wipe out the social security fund of

Gabon.48o While BCCr was a tragedy for Gabon, it never posed any systemic risk to the

financial centers of industrialized countries which under other conditions it might have

done.

comprehensive regulation over much of BCCl's operations and the secrecy laws in Cayman Islands and
Luxembourg prevented earlier diagnosis and led to the insolvency of a $20 billion bank with sustained losses
estimated at $10 billion. See Peter Truell & Larry Gurwin, False Profits: The Inside Story ofBCCI, The
World's Most Corrupt Financial Empire 31-35 (1992).
478 See id. at 67-94.
479 The BCCI story shows that the existence of the Basel Committee serves as a warning system for those
who move in elite fmancial circles. During the early 1980s the Basel Committee noticed BCCl's evasion of
consolidated supervision. See Herring & Litan, supra note 64, at 103.
480 Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability 222 (1993).
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As the BCCr case shows, under the Basel Committee's guidelines no one supervisory

authority was able to put BCCr under the lens of consolidated supervision. The BCCr

crisis urged the Basel Committee to issue the 1992 Report on Minimum Standards for the

Supervision of International Banking Groups and their Crossborder Establishments

(Minimum Standards).481 The Minimum Standards represent no departure from the prior

agreements in terms of consolidated supervision, dual key supervision and communications

between supervisory authorities except the guidelines for the implementation of these

principles. In response to the increased need for consolidated supervision, the Minimum

Standards recommend that the host country regulatory authorities make sure that the home

country receives consolidated financial statements of the bank's global operations.

Furthermore, the Minimum Standards advise that the home country's regulatory authorities

have the means to satisfy themselves concerning the completeness and validity of all
The Basel Committee's 1992 Report on Minimum Standards for the Supervision ofInternational Banking
Groups and their Crossborder Establishment were summarized by the Basel Committee in its own terms:
(1) all international banking groups and international banks should be supervised by a home-country authority
that capably performs consolidated supervision; (2) the creation of a crossborder banking establishment
should receive the prior consent of both the host country supervisory authority and the bank's, and if different,
the banking group's home country supervisor; (3) if a host country authority determines that anyone of the
foregoing minimum standards has not been met to its satisfaction, that authority could impose restrictive
measures necessary to satisfy its prudential concerns with these minimum standards, including the prohibition
of the creation of banking establishment. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Minimum Standards
for the supervision of International banking Groups and Their Crossborder Establishment 3-7 (July 1992).
481
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financial reports. 482 The Minimum Standards also recommend that the host country make

sure that the home country's supervisory authorities have consented to the establishment of
foreign banks. 483 Additionally, the host country's regulatory authorities should assure

themselves that the home country's regulators have the authority to prevent banks under
their jurisdiction from establishing organizational structures that circumvent supervision. 484

d. The Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision

In 1997, the Basel Committee issued the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking

Supervision (Core Principles), which comprises twenty-five key areas of banking
supervision. 485 The Core Principles were designed to present the essential elements of a

regulatory banking structure that will stimulate confidence in the international banking

market. Its purpose is to serve as a basic reference for the world's supervisory authorities

in supervision of all banks within their jurisdictions. The Core Principles cover the

482
483
484

See id.
Id. at 6.
Id.

See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Sept.
1997) at 1.

485
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significant preconditions for effective banking supervision, licensing of banking institutions,

capital standards, and other prudential guidelines for risk management and internal control,

methods of ongoing banking supervision, information requirements, formal powers of
supervision and crossborder banking. 486 In response to the Asian financial crisis, the IMF

and the World Bank have engaged in technical assistance work to improve the quality of

banking regulation in the emerging and transition markets by using the Core Principles as a

guideline. This technical assistance work involves to design incentive compatible deposit

insurance schemes, and to set forth provision for the orderly exit of unsound banking

organizations. Each feature of a regulatory regime is evaluated under the Core Principles.

In this context, one argues that important motivations for encouraging adoption of the Core

Principles benefit both those countries in helping make a serious banking crisis unlikely

and other market economies through preventing the danger of spillover into others.

487

In

486 See id. In order to harmonize international banking supervision, the Basel Committee also worked with
non-Basel representatives from Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Mexico, Russia, and Thailand.
Eight other countries--Brazil, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Poland, and Singapore--were
also closely associated with the work of the Basel Committee. Id.
487 See Michael Taylor, International Financial Standards and the Transition Economies, in Y. B. Int'} Fin.&
Econ. L. 348 (1999) (arguing that increased interlinkages between banks urge bank regulators to make sure
the compliance of all countries' bank regulators and supervisors with a set of common standards under the
Core Principles).
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October 1999, the Basel Committee, in cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank,

produced a follow-up document called the Core Principles Methodology (Methodology).488

This report was initiated to respond to requests from a number of countries for additional
guidance on how to interpret and implement the Core Principles. 489 The Methodology
document covers specific criteria for assessing and implementing each Core Principle. 49o

While one set of criteria focus on issues viewed essential for the minimum implementation

of the Core Principles, the other focuses on those issues deemed to represent best
practice. 491 Currently, the IMF and the World Bank use the methodology to evaluate the

banking sectors in individual countries.

492

Nonetheless, the Core Principles have faced criticisms from various directions for

failing to pay sufficient attention to the varying conditions of emerging markets compared

See The Basel Committee, Core Principles Methodology (Oct. 1999).
See id. Notably, some observer has compared the Core Principles to the United States Constitution, and
argues that the Core Principles can only be applied to the circumstances of individual countries through the
interpretative efforts of numerous experts and advisers. See Bill McDonough, Interview, 3 The Financial
Regulator 3,32 (1998).
490 Id.
491 William J. McDonough, Remaks before the Eleventh International Conference of Banking Supervisors
(Sept. 2000).
492 The methodology can be used in multiple contexts: (1) self-assessment performed by bank supervisors
themselves; (2) peer review conducted for instance within regional groupings of bank supervisors; (3) revies
conducted by private third parties such as consulting ftrms; or (4) reviews performed in the context of the
IMF surveillance or Wodd Bank lending operations. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core
Principles Methodology (Oct. 1999), at 5.
488

489
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with the developed markets. 493 The more important issue is that the Core Principles

presume an infrastructure of regulation that is usually shared in common in the developed
economies but is often lacking from emerging markets and transition economies. 494 Even

though the Basel Committee, in cooperation with a number of emerging market regulators
formulated the Core Principles, it remained a predominantly developed world grouping. 495

Hence, if a set of basic principles needs to be recognized as global standards, the document

is required to balance the desire to set high standards for supervisory practices with the

pragmatic recognition that specific supervisory arrangements, practices and techniques vary

from country to country depending on differences in culture, financial system structure and

internal political realities. In addition, the Basel Committee needs to consult particularly

with supervisors from emerging market states in order to produce a document with the

legitimacy unless the Committee's membership is expected to expand in the near future.

Here, a point to note is the anti-globalization argument that the process of establishment

See Morris Goldstein, Towards an International Banking Standards, 2 The Financial Regulator 2 (1997).
See Taylor, International Financial Standards, supra note 487, at 354.
495 See id. at 354-355. Taylor notes that "[the Basel Committee] has tended to make assumptions which
reflect the conditions in the developed markets, especially concerning the availability of adequate and
accurate accounting information and the existence of a legal system through which regulators can enforce
their decisions." Id. at 355.
493

494
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and implementation of global standards are under the Western industrial states' dominance,

and represents the transgovemmentalism that threaten undeveloped countries' state

sovereignty and takes away their freedom of action as sovereign states.

496

In this context,

it deserves noting the emphasis of a democratization of the legislative process by which

global standards as international soft law are established, a flexibility in implementation of

the standards reflecting local legal tradition and practice, a full incorporation of the

majority of states into the legislative process concerning the development of the standards,

and a priortization of the implementation of global standards on a country-by-country

basis. 497 Undeveloped countries will apparently resist in complying with global standards

unless they have a realistic chance to absorb and accept the standards. In this sense, the

development of new standards needs to be treated as an evolutionary and educational

process. 498

496 For the detail, see Herbert Morais, The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs.
Sovereignty, 50 U. KAN. L. REv. 779,779-780 (2002).
497 See id. at 806-820.
498 Id. at 820.
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3. The Establishment of Capital Adequacy Standards
Following the Latin American sovereign debt crisis499 of the 1980s, bank regulatory

authorities in the major industrialized countries were concerned about the decline in the

capital strength of their banks and the exposure of several large international banks to the

underdeveloped countries. In response to the deterioration in the levels of bank capital,500

particularly the U.S. regulators' efforts to strengthen their capital adequacy framework

encountered a sharp industry resistance on competition grounds, and thus shifted to the

establishment of capital adequacy guidelines by the Basel Committee. In July 1988, the

Basel Committee issued unifonn risk- based capital adequacy standards for internationally
The debt crisis for the developed countries was incurred by too many loans too few high-risk borrowers.
By 1982, Mexico alone owed U.S. banks $23 billion, estimated to be approximately 46 percent of the capital
of America's seventeen largest banks. Once Brazilian and Argentinean loans are added, the nine largest U.S.
banks had lent more than 140 percent of their capital to these three countries, all of which subsequently
became incapable of servicing their loans. See Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Banking, Politics and Global Politics:
American Commercial Banks and Regulatory Change, 1980-1990, 142 (1995). The dozen largest American
banks lent between 83 percent and 263 percent of their capital to five heavily indebted Latin American
countries that later announced they were not able to service their debts. Due to the lack of prudential
oversight by American regulatory authorities, U.S. commercial banks were able to conduct unsound lending
practices, and thus they were in trouble to the extent that the stability of U.S. fmancial system was threatened.
See Thomas Oatley & Robert Nabros, Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the
Basel Accord, 52 Int'l Org. 35,42 (1998).
500 The deterioration of the level of capital in international banks arises because bank capital serves as a
cushion to absorb unexpected losses that cannot be paid with current earnings, and because capital also give
depositors confidence in the safety and soundness of the bank. See Ethan B. Kapstein, Resolving the
Regulator'S Dilemma, supra note 404, at 335. In the United States, the average level of capital in money
center banks in 1980 had dropped to a postwar low of 4.5 percent of assets that was deemed inadequate in
light of the risks encountering domestic and international loan portfolio. See International Monetary Fund,
International Capital Markets (Dec. 1986) at 42; see also Andrew S. Caron, Financial Crises: Recent
Experience in U.S. and International Markets, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No.2 (1982), at 395419.
499
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active banks (Basel Accord).501 Under the Basel Accord all banks that actively engaged in

international transactions are required to hold capital equal to at least 8 percent of their riskweighted assets plus off-balance-sheet commitments. 502

Basel Accord aims two goals: first, to require banks to maintain higher levels of capital

reserves by maintaining capital-to-asset ratios that are risk-based, and thus improve the

safety and soundness ofbanks;503 and second, to establish a level playing field by requiring

uniform regulation so that a bank based in one country would not receive a competitive

advantage by enjoying a lower capital adequacy requirement than a bank based in another

country. 504 Although the Basel Accord has no legal force, the G-l 0 countries have

501 The guidelines are reprinted in Bank for International Settlements: Committee on Banking Regulations
and Supervisory Practices, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards,
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 980-1008 (1991) (with introductory note by Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, 30 I.L.M. 967
(1991».
502 Bank capital (equity) is traditionally referred to as assets (loans) minus liabilities (de~osits). See Peter R.
Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy 659-667 (5 ed.2000). The
Basel Accords divides capital into two tiers: Tier 1, defmed as paid-up share capital/common stock and
published reserves from post-tax retained earnings, must comprise at least 5 percent of a bank's capital base;
Tier 2, defmed as undisclosed reserves, asset revaluation reserves, general provisions/generalloan-Iossreserves, hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments, and subordinated debt, is limited to 10 percent of Tier 1 and
combined with Tier 1 must comprise 8 percent of the risk-weighted assets. See Basel Accord, supra note 501,
Annex 17. On-balance sheet assets are assigned to one of four risk buckets as part of the risk-weighting
procedure.
503 See Hal S. Scott & Shinsaku Iwahara, In Search of a Level Playing Field: The Implementation of the
Basel Capital Accord in Japan and the United States 2 (1994).
504 See id. at 3.
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incorporated it into their national banking regulations.

505

Unlike other studies focusing on

its implementation and compliance with Basel Accord, this study mainly explores the

origins of the Basel Accord. That is, it seeks to examine when and how national regulatory

authorities pursue international regulatory harmonization or convergence as shown by the

case of Basel Accord.

a. International Regulatory Harmonization

The globalization of financial markets has attracted a considerable amount of attention

to the prudential regulation of financial institutions. Under the market volatility and

competitive pressure, regulatory authorities from the industrialized countries initiated their

efforts toward the harmonization of their prudential regulation. 506 In particular, bank

505 A number of non-G 10 countries have implemented the Basel Accord into their national banking laws:
Australia, Austria, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan. See Klaus P. Follak,
International Harmonization of Regulatory and Supervisory Frameworks, in International Monetary Law:
Issues for the New Millennium 307 (Mario Giovanoli ed. 2000). One views the Basel Accord as a
gentleman's agreement among central banks from the Basel Committee member states. See Hal S. Scott, The
Competitive Implications of the Basel Capital Accord, supra note 259, at 885. By contrast, the Basel Accord
is deemed as international soft law. See Mario Giovanoli, A New Architecture for the Global Financial
Market: Legal Aspects ofInternational Financial Standard Setting in International Monetary Law, in
International Monetary Law: Issues for the New Millennium 33-44 (2000).
506 One refers this situation to as the regulator'S dilemma. See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma,
supra note 404.
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regulators from these countries recognized a need for the creation of international standards

for the stability of banking organizations. To that end, the regulators negotiated to

harmonize their prudential regulations, thereby establishing an international agreement on

international banking regulation. In this context, some observers recognize the Basel

Accord as an effective response to international market failure arisen from international

financial integration. 507 That is, arguably global economic integration in the international

financial markets, which caused a market failure as evidenced by the debt crisis508 through

raising systemic risk and impeding regulators to ensure the safety and soundness of national

banking systems has led to international financial regulation. 509 This view argues that the

Basel Accord was established as a result of regulators' consensus knowledge of the

See Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209, Ch. 5.
Some observers note that its shocks lead to a crisis of confidence in a state's regulatory environment. See
David A. Singer, Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics ofIntemational Regulatory Harmonization, 58 Int'l
Org. 531, 531 (2004).
509 See id. Kapstein remarks policy challenges posed by the debt crisis to all the actors involved-the banks,
the creditor states' regulators, and the relevant international institutions, and the debtors themselves. In short,
the crisis threatened the payment system in two ways: (1) it threatened to bring trade, investment, and
financial flows between the developed and developing countries, choking the world economy; (2) it
threatened the solvency of the banks, which did not have sufficient capital to absorb the losses from unpaid
debts. If their depositors became aware of this shortfall, a run on the banks would begin. See Kapstein,
Supervising International Banks, supra note 434, at 9.
507

508
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systemic risks of undercapitalized bankS.51 0 As bank's capital levels deteriorated

throughout the 1970s and 1980s, they became more vulnerable to losses from loan defaults

and exogenous shocks. This argument, which has enjoyed an extraordinarily positive

reception among economists and political scientists, is that the adoption of minimum

capital standards by the G-l 0 countries provided that the global public good of financial
stability to regulators' collective interests. 511 Beyond the application of this perspective to

the Basel Accord, this view implies that harmonization will take place whenever an

international regulatory standard is necessary for addressing systemic risk including

financial instability.512

In response, others charge this functionalist logic by claiming that the Basel Accord is

an example of redistributive cooperation: "the creation of an international instituion that

510 See Kapstein, Resolving the regulator's Dilemmas, supra note 404, at 341-342.(remarking the Basel
Accord from a public goods perspective whereby leadership of the U.K. and u.S. learned from the 1982 debt
crisis).
511 See Frederic S. Mishkin, Prudential Supervision: Why is it Important and What are the Issues?, in
Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't 1-30 (Frederie S. Mishkin ed., 2001); Herring &
Litan, supra note 414; see also Tony Porte, States, Markets, and Regimes in Banking: The Policy Issues
(1983). On the global public good, see Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Global Public Policy: Governing Without
Government, supra note 181. From the lens of this perspective, Kapstein assumes that regulatory authorities
is playing the most significant role in mitigating global systemic risk. See Kapstein, Resolving the
Regulator'S Dilemmas, supra note 404.
512 See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,
supra note 110.
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internationally reduces at least one other government's welfare compared to the status
quo. ,,513 Theyadvocate that the U.S. Congress legislated stricter capital adequacy

requirements domestically in 1983,514 and urged U.S. regulators to impose these regulations

on foreign competitors, especially the Japanese through an international agreement. S1S

In

contrast to functionalists, they assert that legislators lead the international regulatory

harmonization process, that is, electoral incentives drive politicians to shift the costs of

their policies to other states. Thus, international regulatory harmonization represents the

special interests of a state's legislators to satisfy competing interest group and voter

pressures rather than a jointly provided public good. This view implies that regulators are

significant simply in that they carry out the directives ofthe legislature.

5i3 See Oatley & Nabros, Redistributive Cooperation, supra note 499, at 36 (arguing that the u.s. proposals
for capital adequacy regulation emerged from the U.S. congressional efforts to reconcile competing demands
from their commercial banks and voters rather than an optimal response to international market failure).
514 In 1983 the u.s. Congress acted the International Lending Supervision Act (lLSA), which provides the
regulators to "establish examination and supervisory procedures to assure that factors such as foreign
currency exposure and transfer risk are taken into account in evaluating the adequacy of the capital of banking
institutions." 12 U.S.C. 3903 (b). Additionally, the act required the regulators to encourage the regulators
from other major banking countries to cooperate toward maintaining and strengthening the capital bases of
banks involved in international lending. 12 U.S.C. 3903 (b) (3) (c).
515 The U.S. banks argued that relatively high capital requirements in they had been placed at a competitive
disadvantage to the Japanese and French banks and nonbanking financial institutions. See Kapstein,
Supervising International Banks, supra note 434, at 13.
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For a more general model of the politics of international regulatory harmonization, a

study examines the process of regulatory harmonization in four financial areas, but uses a

country's incentives to emulate as an independent variable rather than specifying

systemically what those incentives are and how they vary.516 It deserves noting this

study's explanation that the circumstances under which financial regulatory authorities will

seek to harmonize with their foreign counterparts or, to explain precisely what the
incentives are leading a regulator to press for harmonization. 517

A more recent study proposes an analytical framework that satisfies the competing

domestic pressures on regulatory authorities, and the role of international regulatory
harmonization in addressing these pressures. 518 To that end, this framework assumes a

516 See Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market
Regulation, 55 Int'l Org. 589, 601-615 (2001).
517 See id. Applying Simmon's framework to the transgovemmental theory, Raustiala argues that for the case
of the Basel Accord, transgovemmental "networks become a vehicle for cooperation alongside some weak
forms of liberal internationalism by facilitating information flow and technical assistance among
jurisdictions." See id. at 601-605; see also Raustiala, The Architecture ofInternational Cooperation, supra
note 194, at 74. Raustiala claims that the "incentives to create networks or to negotiate treatise vary across the
spectrum of regulatory power, and in tum appear to interact with liberal internationalism differently. When
regulatory power is highly asymmetric, as in securities law, liberal internationalism tends to be shunned and
networks primarily fill gaps in cooperation. Conversely, when regulatory power is diffuse, and therefore
treaties are an essential cooperative tool, the domestic capacity building that networks promote may increase
compliance with, and the effectiveness of, treaty law. When regulatory power is moderately concentrated,
networks may help smooth the path to a liberal internationlist solution by promoting convergence in
regulatory approach." See id. at 73.
518 See Singer, supra note 508, at 532.
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principal-agent relationship between a legislature and a regulator in order to analyze
regulator behavior. 519 Put simply, the legislature, as the principal, delegates the

responsibility for implementing financial regulations to a regulatory agency, and prescribes
limits on that agency's policymaking by the threat of legislative intervention. 52o In such

circumstances, the framework predicts that regulatory authorities are more likely to seek

international regulatory harmonization as a means of increasing the size of its win-set and

safeguarding its autonomy where confidence in the stability of financial institutions is

deteriorating, and where competitive pressures are increasing from foreign firms
confronting less strict regulations. 521 In short, the regulatory authority's domestic political
environment spurs an international solution. 522 As this view argues, this "confidence-

competitiveness" framework synthesizes elements of both of functionalist and

See id.
As Singer notes, in this process the legislature maximizes a combination of campaign contributions and
aggregate welfare, while the regulatory authority is only concerned with maintaining its decision-making
autonomy. Also, the legislature enjoys a range of policy options at its disposal, but the regulator is limited to
a single policy tool of regulatory stringency. According to Singer, the regulatory authority chooses a degree
of regulatory strictness that falls within its "win-set"-the range of policy choices that do not result in
legislative intervention. Furthermore, exogenous shocks to international competitiveness or voter confidence
in fmancial stability can lead to the decrease in the size of the win-set and make intervention more likely. Id.
at 532-533. For the analysis of the analytical framework, see id. at 535-544.
521 See id. at 533.
522 Id.
519

520
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redistributive logics, but seek to offer an explanation of regulator preferences. 523 In similar

manner to the functionalists, this view incorporates regulators as important actors in

international regulatory harmonization in that they have considerable discretion in
coordinating with their foreign counterparts. 524 Here, a significant note is the functionalist

and confidence-competitiveness frameworks, and transgovemmentalism are in agreement

with on the significance of regulators in the process of international regulatory

harmonization. 525 Similarly to the transgovemmental theory, they highlight regulators as

key actors in all the modes of international regulatory harmonization. In contrast, they

incorporate the focus of redistributive logic on legislatures and domestic politics more

523 See id. at 534. Singer argues that "[u]nderstanding preferences is the fIrst step in a more theoretically
complete analysis of circumstances under which regulators will create international standards. Once one
understands who wants what and why, one is in a much better position to explain harmonization outcomes
using variables such as market power and international institutions." See id. at 544. Kapstein, Oatley and
Nabors are in accord with on the signifIcance of market power in explaining the emergence of a multilateral
agreement for bank capital adequacy. See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma, supra note 404, at
338; Oatley & Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation, supra note 499, at 49-52. On the role of international
institutions in the process of harmonization, see Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization, supra
note 516.
524 Id. at 534-535.
525 Like the transgovemmentalists, they emphasizes that unlike traditional international agreements, such as
treaties, regulatory agreements are usually not ratifIed by legislatures, nor have they legal force on signatories,
and that these agreements are important, and thus under market forces and pressure from international
organizations, which correspond to transgovemmental regulatory networks, help to ensure compliance with
global regulatory standards. See Singer, supra note 508, at 535. On market pressures, see Kapstein,
Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209. On compliance with the Basel Accord, see David Ho,
Compliance and International Soft Law: Why do Countries Implement the Basel Accord?, 5 J. Int'l Econ. L.
647 (2002).

200

generally. 526 In this sense, both theories and liberal internationalism are in accord with on

the importance of legislatures in the process of international harmonization. In this context,

one stresses an integrative approach considering the incentives of both regulators and

legislatures for a complete analysis of international regulatory harmonization.

527

As noted, there is still a need to reevaluate the views introduced above in the context of

the Basel Accord To that end, this study moves on to the examination ofthe perspectives

in pursuit of a more adequate framework responding to the demands for international

regulatory harmonization.

b. The Establishment of the Basel Accord

i.

Capital Regulation

As financial intermediaries, banks take many specific risks. Upon lending money to

customers, banks incur credit risk that a borrower will default on a loan.

528

On a bank's

See Singer, supra note 508, at 535.
Id.
528 "Credit risk is most simply defined as the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet
its obligations in accordance with agreed terms." See The Basel Committee, Principles for the Management of
526
527
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balance sheet, a loan appears as assets because it represents an entitlement of the bank to

receive a certain amount of money (Plus periodic interest payments) on a specified date

from a borrower. The major liabilities on a bank's balance sheet are its deposits, or

obligations to reimburse savers either on demand or at a time agreed. The amount of net

assets (assets minus liabilities) is thus the bank's capital. Capital provides a cushion

against losses resulting from borrower default or changes in asset prices. 529 Banks view

capital reserves as necessary for their prosperity and stability.

530

In the event of severe

trouble, bank regulators' goal is to enable the bank to survive trouble, thereby protecting

depositors' funds and public confidence in banking system. Capital levels are required to

be sufficient to absorb losses and enable the bank to continue as a going concern. It is

important to note that capital requirements are designed to prevent insolvency and default

for banks. In this context, one points to the significance of the capital requirements for

Credit Risk (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.bis.org/publlindex.htm (last visited Jan. 10,2003). When
the bank makes a loan to a customer the bank could supply the funds by giving the customer cash from the
vault or a check on another bank, or by selling investment securities and giving the customer the ;proceeds.
Any of these actions simply changes one kind of asset into another kind, cash for example, into a loan. The
totals on the bank's balance sheet remain the same.
529 See Singer, supra note 508, at 544.
530 See Gray Haberman, Capital Requirements of Commercial and Investment Banks : Constraints in
Regulation, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, Vol. 12 (Autumn 1987) at 1-10.
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three reasons. 53 ! First, capital requirements influence the price and availability of credit,

and thereby affect the efficiency ofthe financial system in all economies. Second, capital

is a key determinant ofthe strength and competitiveness ofthe banking system. "Too little

capital, and crises become uncomfortably frequent. Too much, and the financial

intermediation moves away from banks and into other, less regulated channels." Third,

capital regulation influences the fairness of the international playing field. "Banks is a

global business, one in which some institutions may have an unjustified advantage through

their treatment by national regulators."

ii.

The Backdrop

As some observers note, initially, capital adequacy was an entirely domestic issue. 532

Although bank regulators had expressed the concern over the deterioration of the levels of

capital, this concern did not emerge until the early 1980s. The key event that captured the

attention of bank regulators on levels of bank capital was the outbreak ofthe debt crisis in

531
532

See Andrew Crockett, Banking Needs a New Basel Accord, Financial Times, Jan. 27, 2004, at 19.
See Singer, supra note 508, at 545.
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1982. 533 Since banking institutions in the world's financial centers such as London, New

York, and Tokyo confronted financial difficulties arising from substantial losses on their

lending portfolios, the debt crisis of 1982 served as a wake-up call to regulators about the
dangers of low capitallevels. 534 The Basel Committee initiated to work on a set of

guidelines for capital adequacy, but its progress was delayed. With a general

understanding that levels of capital were too low to support the riskiness of bank portfolios,
central bankers launched their negotiations for improving bank safety and soundness. 535

Nevertheless, the regulators could not decide how to properly define capital nor agree on an

appropriate minimum level that banks are required to hold.

536

Also, Japanese banks were

operating with substantially lower levels of capital than Western banks, which have placed

them at a competitive advantage to especially U.S. banks through offering more favorable
pricing than their competitors. 537 French banks also had relatively low levels of capital and

533 In the early 1980s, the Basel Committee initiated to investigate the wide-scale deterioration of capital
levels in internationally active banks.
534 See Singer, supra note 508, at 546.
535 See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma, supra note 404, at 337.
536 See id.
537 Id. at 339.
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were resistant to any movement toward more stringent regulations. 538 Japanese bank

regulators resisted the creation of an international standard that would incur high cost to
their banking markets. 539

In January 1987, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of England announced a

bilateral agreement on common standards for capital adequacy.54o This Anglo-American

agreement established a risk-weighed standard in which capital requirements would

increase with the degree of risk of a bank's portfolio. 54! From the outset it was clear that

"the agreement was not intended to last in isolation; rather it was a strategy to force the

Basel Committee into multilateral agreement favorable to U.S. and U.K. regulators.,,542

This Anglo-American "zone of cooperation" implies the warning of excluding
noncompliant countries' banks from British and American markets. 543 On December 10,

1987, the Basel Committee issued the Basel Accord as a global standard for minimum

See id. at 341.
Id.
540 Id. at 339.
541 Id. at 339-340.
542 See Singer, supra note 508, at 546.
543 See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator'S Dilemma, supra note 404, at 340. Kapstein argues that "[t]he
tacit threat of preventing foreign banks from expanding operations or establishing new ones within that zone
Was apparently credible enough to move discussions to the multilateral level." See id. at 344.
538

539
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capital levels which superseded the U.S.ID.K. accord after several months of negotiations

to mitigate the discrepancies between the U.S.ID.K. coalition and the nonmembers of the

Committee.

iii.

The Origins of the Basel Accord

Under what conditions did the regulators seek to establish the Basel Accord? This

study attempts to answer this question through reviewing the current literature on the Basel

Accord.

a) Functionalist Theory

Functionalists claim that the creation of the Basel Accord was led by international

"consensual knowledge" of the systemic risks of bank lending, combined with the

leadership of the United States and the u.K. 544 This theory highlights that the Herstatt

collapse and the Franklin failure of 1974 triggered the creation of the Basel Committee

in emphasizing the significance of consensual knowledge. This view asserts that these

544

See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator'S Dilemma, supra note 404, at 341-342.
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prominent banking institution collapses followed by the debt crisis of less developed

countries (LDC debt crisis) in 1982 led to a consensus among regulators of the systemic

risks of global financial markets. 545 In particular, the failure of Continental Illinois

bank in 1984 caused the U.S. regulators to acknowledge the inadequacy of existing

prudential regulations in the context of risks confronted by banks, and attracted an

increasing attention of the urgent need for a more comprehensive capital adequacy

framework. 546 In this regard, this view argues that crisis acted as an impetus for the

introduction of new ideas in policy circle. 547 This claim acknowledges that consensual

knowledge of systemic risk was necessary but insufficient to produce an international

agreement. With respect to the creation of the U.K./U.S. accord leading to the

establishment of the Basel Accord, this view implies that although all the G-10 states

wanted to create a global standard, it took a demonstration of market power to move the

negotiations along.
545 See Kastein, Between Power and Purpose, supra note 436, at 277. In this regard, one argues that the issue
of capital adequacy emerged by the supervisors, but not in a multilateral context. Further, an international
agenda to strengthen the safety and soundness of banking system emerged as a result of domestic politics in
the United States rather than a collective solution to the debt crisis on the part of central bankers. See
Kapstein, Supervising International Banks, supra note 434, at 12.
546 See Kapstein, Between Power and Purpose, supra note 436, at 277.
547 See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma, supra note 404, at 338.
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Some critics charge its inability to explain the dynamics of the Basel negotiations. 548

The point to note is that capital adequacy regulations cost too mush, as they influence
bank's profit margins. 549 Ifregulators are rational, there are a great number of

incentives for countries to free ride, and let other states suppose the costs of global

financial stability.55o Systemic risk is not a helpful variant because it cannot provide an

answer to the question of why U.S. and U.K. regulators made their efforts to produce an

agreement, while Japanese regulators were resistant to an increase in capital standards.

b) Redistributive Cooperation

Some observers charge the functionalist logic by arguing that the Basel Accord was
an instance of redistributive cooperation. 551 With the Mexican announcement of their

inability to meet their upcoming interest payment obligations to foreign banks, the

industrialized countries tried to address the LDC debt crisis through the IMF in order to

548
549
550
551

See Singer, supra note 508, at 550.
See id.
Id.
See Oatley & Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation, supra note 499, at 36.
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bailout large Western banks struggling due to the crisis.

552

In particular, the U.S.

regulators initially sought to cope with the debt crisis through a wealth transfer from

voters to commercial banks and a risk transfer from commercial banks to voters rather

than by enacting stricter regulations governing internationallending.

553

The IMF was

deemed to achieve both objectives. 554 That is, with additional capital the IMF was to

provide Latin American debtor governments with new credits that could then be used to

service their loans. This process led to the transfer of the ownership of a portion of

developing countries' debt to the public sector. 555 As part of this arrangement,

commercial banks were required to restructure their existing commitments and extend

additional loans. 556 Since implementing this strategy required the IMF to boost its

resources by 47 percent, and thus part of this revenue was to come from a $4.7 billion

See Kapstein, Supervising International Banks, supra note 434, at 12.
See Oatley & Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation, supra note 499, at 42. In this sense, the weakness of
commercial banks was not sufficient to bring about a demand for international financial regulation. See id.
554 See id. at 43.
555 Id. ("Through this process, "society as a whole," rather than the commercial banks, would bear the risk of
default by less-developed countries ... ").
556 See Thomas Oatley, The Dilemmas of International Financial Regulation, Regulation, Vol. 23, No.4
(Spring 2001) at 37.
552
553
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outlay from the United States. The U.S. Congress approved the expenditure,557 but

requested tightening of domestic banking regulations and an increase in commercial
banks' levels of capita1. 558 In response, the U.S. banks protested this unilateral measure

in arguing that the proposal could lead to both a decrease in international and domestic

lending, and an exacerbation of their competitive difficulties in relation to foreign,

particularly less-regulated Japanese banks and nonblank financial institutions due to
cross-national differences in existing capital adequacy regulations. 559

In addressing the competing pressures from voters and commercial banks, Congress

synthesized the IMF quota increase, regulatory concerns about capital levels, and the

banks' concerns over unilateral regulation in the International Lending Supervision Act

(ILSA) of 1983. The ILSA required the U.S. regulators to increase domestic capital

adequacy standards, and it encouraged other major banking countries' regulators to

557 With a deepest recession in the 1980s, voters opposed to using of taxpayer dollars to rescue a number of
commercial banks. See Oatley & Nabros, Redistributive Cooperation, supra note 499, at 43. In response to
this analysis, one argues that additional government spending or taxes are not required for an IMF quota
increase. See Singer, supra note 508, at 551.
558 See Oatley, The Dilemmas, supra note 556, at 37. From the perspective of Congress, its advantage to
raise new capital would be a demonstration that taxpayers (voters) would not bear the full costs of the debt
crisis. See id.
559 See Kapstein, Supervising International Banks, supra note 434, at 13; see also Oatley & Nabors,
Redistributive Cooperation, supra note 499, at 44.
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work toward strengthening the capital bases of banks involved in international

lending. 560 The redistributive theory contends that the ILSA met voter demands by

forcing banks to raise new capital and take at least part of the responsibility for their

unsound lending practices. 56l Concurrently, it claims that an international agreement

mitigated the banks' concerns over the loss of market share due to their potential

placement at a competitive disadvantage to other competitors. 562 In other words, an

international agreement on capital adequacy provided American legislators a means to

satisfy both demands: the voters would get regulations to prevent their responsibility for

unsound bank lending practices; the commercial banks would be compensated by

mitigating the regulatory advantage enjoyed by foreign banks. 563 In this way, Congress

linked stricter capital standards in the U.S. to the successful competition of an

international agreement. 564 More importantly, this theory argues that there was no

evidence of international market failure once capital adequacy reached the G-l 0
560

12 U.S.C. 1280, 128l.
See Oatley & Nabors, supra note 499, at 45.
562 See id.
563 Id. at 45-46.
564 See Oatley, The Dilemmas, supra note 556, at 37. To the contrary, one argues that "[I]fthe banks were
going to be forced to raise, at least it would be done on a multilateral rather than a unilateral basis." See
Kapstein, Supervising International Banks, supra note 434, at 14.
561
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agenda. 565 Moreover, widespread commercial bank weakness was not evident, nor did

all G-10 regulators believe that harmonized capital adequacy regulations would create
benefits relative to the regulatory status quO. 566 Finally, this view asserts that the

exercise of U.S. financial market power led to a multilateral agreement of the Basel

Accord. 567 The Basel Accord is arguably a case of redistributive cooperation.

568

In response to the redistributive theory, some observers acknowledge the significance

of the U.S. market power in the creation of the Basel Accord, but point to the

inconsistency of congressional view on the Basel Accord. Thus, this perspective

emphasizes that a principal-agent framework is necessary for a full explanation of the

preferences of U.S. regulators during the Basel negotiations.

569

See Oatley & Nabors, supra note 499, at 48. Oatley and Nabors argue that "even if we accept the premise
that the debt crisis revealed an international financial market failure, this was not sufficient to generate a
demand for international regulation." See id. at 45.
566 Id.
567 See id. at 49.
568 Id. at 52.
569 See Singer, supra note 508, at 552.

565
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c) The Confidence-Competitiveness Framework570

During the 1980s both the United States and the UK. confronted an increased threat

from Japanese banks.571 Moreover, US. markets were home to a rising proportion of
Japanese bank assets. 572 By 1988, more than 38 percent of the assets ofthe Japanese
banks were held in overseas branches, mostly in the United States and the UK. 573 In
1985, Japanese intemationallending surpassed US. lending for the first time. 574

As a

result, both the United States and the UK. experienced an exogenous shock to
competitiveness in the mid-1980s. 575 Some observers argue that if Japanese banks were

to hold the same capital level as their competitors in the United States and the UK.,
their competitive advantage would be severely lowered. 576 Exogenous shocks to

570 The assumption of the confidence-competitiveness framework is that regulators choose policies that
defend their decision-making from direct political intervention. See id. at 553. As a result, regulators can
strike a balance between the competitiveness of regulated finns and voter confidence in the stability of
financial institutions. Id. Accordingly, regulators are more likely to seek international regulatory
hannonization when confidence is declining, or when less-regulated foreign finns impinge on the market
share of domestic finns. Id.
571 See id. at 554. The data for the total assets of the ten largest banks in the world for 1974, 1984, and 1994
shows the remarkable growth of Japanese banks at the expense of U.S. and U.K. banks. See id. at 555.
572 See id. at 554.
573 See Henry S. Terrell, The Activities of Japanese Banks in the United Kingdom and in the United States,
1980-88, Federal Reserve Bulletin (Feb. 1990).
574 See Financial Times, January 31, 1986, at 24.
575 See Singer, supra note 508, at 554.
576 See Devesh Kapur, Reforming the International Financial International System: Key Issues, in Global
Financial Refonn: How, Why and When? (2000). In 1986, Citicorp and Barclays (U.K.) had capital-to-asset
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confidence were also remarkable in the Basel Accord case. As witnessed by the debt

crisis of 1982, despite an IMF quota increase to deal with the crisis in the short term,

market confidence was badly shaken by the imprudent lending practices of a number of

u.s. commercial banks.

577

The failures of Continental Illinois and John Matthey

Bankers (U.K.) in 1984 were distressing to regulatory authorities, and called into
question the stability of their countries' banking system. 578 Due to a tremendous

number of bank failures in both countries during the 1980s, voter confidence was badly
shaken in both countries. 579

While the United States and the u.K. were experiencing simultaneous shocks to

competitiveness and confidence, regulators in each country were in agreement on the

ratios of 4.73 and 4.71, respectively, whereas Japan's Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Sumitomo, and Fuji had ratios of2.38,
2.89 and 2.95. See Herve De Carmoy, Global Banking Strategy: Financial Markets and Industrial Decay
(1996).
577 See Singer, supra note 508, at 554. Exposure among the dozen largest American banks in the five most
indebted Latin American countries ranged from a low of 82.7 percent to a high of262.8 percent, with most
banks falling between 140 and 180 percent. See Oatley & Nabors, supra note 499, at 42.
578 See Arturo Estella, Dealing with Financial Instability: The Central Bank's Toolkit, New York Federal
Reserve Bank Discussion Paper (Jan. 23, 2001).
579 See Singer, supra note 508, at556. By contrast, Japanese banks were not much exposed to LDCs during
the debt crisis, and there were no high-profile bank insolvencies throughout the 1980s. Because of a close
linkage between banking industry and government in Japan, and implicit guarantees of government support to
business in difficult times, exogenous shocks to confidence are rare. Id. at 557.
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urgent need for international regulatory hannonization. 580 These regulators recognized

that sufficient levels of confidence and competition could not be obtained without a

change to Japanese regulations. 58l This view argues that regulators from the United
States and the u.K. made their sustained efforts to establish international capital

adequacy standards, thereby creating a variable win-set for regulatory policy, as

evidenced by the Anglo-American Accord in 1987.

582

d) Concluding Remarks

The dynamics underlying the creation of the Basel Accord imply that a more general

negotiating process lies at the heart of international financial regulation. Regulatory

authorities shift regulation from the domestic arena to international arena in order to

avoid domestic battle with their banking institutions. As a consequence, international

financial regulation has little with rectifying market failures resulting from international

See id.
581 See id. ("More stringent regulations were necessary to bolster stability, but the resulting loss of
competitiveness was too great to bear.").
582 Id.
580
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financial integration. Rather, regulators adopt international regulations to minimize the

distributional outcomes ofregu1atory reform in an increasingly integrated international

financial system. 583

The principal-agent relationship between legislatures and regulators is significant to

understanding when and why states seek global financial standards. As such, regulators

as well as legislatures are deemed crucial players in the negotiating process. Thus, the

regulator's incentives derive from the possibility oflegis1ative intervention. In tum, the

legislature's incentives arise from the need to choose an optimal trade-off between

confidence and competitiveness. In particular, regulators are required to use regulatory

policy as the only tool at their disposal to strike a balance between confidence and

competitiveness. In the event of an exogenous shock to competitiveness, or confidence

regulatory policy may be ineffective in maintaining this balance unilaterally, in which

case regulators have incentives to seek an international regulatory agreement to maintain

their autonomy.

583

See Oatley, supra note 556, at 37.
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Here the issue of the Basel Accord needs to be addressed by focusing on the varying

preferences of national regulators in the context of legislative constraints rather than on

systemic concepts such as international market failures and global public goods. In

addition, it is significant to note the trade-off between voter confidence and financial

sector competitiveness.

c. Evaluating the Basel Accord

i. The Basel Accord of 1988

The Basel Accord of 1988 (Basel I) set forth minimum standards for internationally

active banks pegged at eight percent of risk-weighted assets.

584

Since its inception, Basel I

is still the basis for the requirements of the size and the structure of the capital banking

institutions in more than 100 countries all over the world. 585 Basel I goes further on the

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards, Publications (July 1988), available at http://www.bis.org/pubVindex.htm (last visited January 10,
2003).
585 See Patricia Jackson et aI., Capital Requirements and Bank Behavior, supra note 224, at 1; see also
Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, Regional Financial Institutionalization and the Creation of a Zone of Law: The Context
of Financial StabilitylRegulation in East Asia, 35 Int'l Law. 1627,1647 (2001) ("While many countries have
adopted the Basel principles, they are not necessarily rigorously enforced due to the high threshold for an
emerging economy and the low compliance rate ofthe regulations. This reflects an acceptance of principles
584
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premise that a single capital structure, based on minimum capital ratio of eight percent, was

universally optimal for banks both in terms of return on equity and adequate protection for
depositors and their insurers. 586 As such, a determinist notion of economic efficiency is

embedded in Basel I as in the Core Principles. As the unintended outcomes led by

regulations often get regulators away from their goals, the Basel 8 percent standard, based

on a single, lockstep model of economic efficiency, has inevitably brought about its adverse

consequences. In short, due to its simplicity of the "one-size-fits-all" standard, the Basel I

framework could not catch up with the ongoing evolution of banking fueled by the

emergence of new complex financial instruments and techniques in banking. Accordingly,

banking institutions have learned to exploit its loopholes, that is, they can evade higher

standards through regulatory capital arbitrage,587 which is not strictly cheating but lawful

because otherwise they would not be able to attract foreign investment or fmance in the international financial
market.").
586
See McCoy, supra note 331, at 439.
587 Regulatory capital arbitrage refers to the gaming of the capital standards, that is, the exploitation of
loopholes that allows banking institutions to lower the amount of capital for a given level of risk. It is not
necessarily undesirable, because in many cases, regulatory capital arbitrage acts as a safety valve, preventing
the capital rules from distorting bank behavior in noneconomic ways. Put differently, regulatory capital
arbitrage serves to reduce the adverse effects that are in excess of the levels warranted by a specific activity's
underlying economic risk. In this way, arbitrage may appropriately lower the effective capital requirements
against safe activities that banks would otherwise be forced to drop by the effects of regulations. See Alan
Greenspan, The Role of Capital in Optimal Banking Supervision and Regulation, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York Economic Policy Review (Oct. 1998) at 164-165.
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exploitation of intentional and unintentional regulatory loopholes in contravention of the

objectives of the standards.

Despite its desirable effects, arbitrage may undermine the effectiveness of the capital

rules and cause some economic distortions in that it is not costless and thus not without

implications for resource allocation.

588

Because regulators did not interestingly want to

influence banks' resource allocation decision, the formal capital standards do not

include very many risk buckets.

589

As a consequence, the "one-size-fits-all" standard

does that by forcing the bank to strive to negate the capital standard, or exploit it in case

of a significant disparity between the arbitrary standard and internal, economic capital

requirement. 590 The disparities between internally required economic capital and the

regulatory capital standard create another problem of the possibility that normally high

regulatory capital ratios may mask the true level of insolvency probability.591 This

possibility becomes more acute as banks arbitrage away inappropriately high capital

588
589
590
59)

See id. at 166.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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requirements on their safest assets by removing these high quality assets from the
balance sheet via securitization. 592 Through securitizing assets, banks can unbundle and

repackage risks to transform on-balance sheet assets into off-balance sheet assets that
fall into lower risk weight categories. 593

The issue is not only the appropriateness of

the capital requirements on the bank's residual risk in the securitized assets, but the
sufficiency of regulatory capital requirements on the assets remaining on the book. 594

Such "cherry picking" goes further to leave on the balance sheet only low quality assets

for which economic capital allocations are greater than the 8 percent regulatory
standard. 595 In other words, against this lower quality balance sheet, the Basel Accord's

eight percent capital requirement may be insufficient, and thus the bank's capital ratios
may not offer an appropriate measure of the bank's true financial condition. 596 Thus,

592
593
594
595
596

Id.
See Oatley, supra note 556, at 38.
See Greenspan, The Role of Capital, supra note 587, at 166.
See id.
See Oatley, supra note 556, at 38.
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banks can sell off loans to avoid higher capital requirements that otherwise would apply
if those loans would remain on the books. 597

Moreover, the Basel Accord's simple risk classification scheme has called into

question. Under the Basel Accord's relatively crude system of weighting risk,

according to its supposed level of risk, assets are divided into four broad categories,

referred to as buckets: a zero risk weight to governments of states in the OECD, a 20

percent risk weight to OECD banks and non-OECD governments, a 50 percent risk for
mortgage lending, and a 100 percent risk to all other loans. 598 Under this system, nearly

all private sector loans are dealt with as equivalent from a risk standpoint, with identical

capital holding requirements. Banks have taken advantage ofthis simple risk-weighted

capital system, thereby altering their lending practice in ways that they evade regulatory

oversight. For example, the risk classification offers incentive to bank to hold riskier

loan portfolios than they would have otherwise. Moreover, banks have incentives to

shift: toward higher-risk, higher-interest assets within each category, because the

597
598

See id.
See id. at 38.
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regulations assign the same risk weighting and capital costs to all loans within a given

category. For example, a loan to a AAA-rated company receives the same risk

weighting as a loan to a junk-rated company, even though the loan to the junk has a

much higher probability of default. Because the banks charge higher interest to the

junk, they are more likely to make that loan than to lend money at a lower interest rate

to the secure company. In classifying sovereign debt, the four-bucket system assumes

that assets with higher weights have higher risks than lower-weighted assets, but that is

not always the case. For example, relatively risky loans to Mexican banks require four-

fifths less capital than loans to secure corporations with AAA credit, simply because
Mexico is a member of the OECD. 599 This problem of simplification has created

increasing distortions over the years.

Given these difficulties with one-size-fits-all nature of the capital regulations, it is

understandable that calls have arisen for the reform ofthe Basel Accord of 1988. The

It is widely acknowledged that assigning a 20 percent weight to short-term bank lending, as opposed to the
100 percent that lending to most private nonblank institutions carries caused an increase in lending to Asian
banks, which in tum contributed to the Asian crisis of 1997. Sixty percent of the $380 billion in international
bank lending to Asia at the end of 1997 had a maturity of one year or less. See Z. Minton-Beddoes, A Survey
of Global Finance: Time for a Redesign?, The Economist, Jan. 30, 1999.
599
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last decade have witnessed considerable economic turbulence and the increased new

complex financial instruments and techniques in banking sector. Under the

circumstances, banking institutions have made significant improvements in risk

management, and thus there has been a need for the reform of the Basel Accord to keep

pace with market developments. In response, The Basel Accord has been modified

twice.

As the 1988 Basel Accord's focus on credit risk was too narrow, it could not

adequately address the complexities and risks inherent in the growth of international
bank participation in swaps and aTe derivative activities. 6oo That is, understandably

the Basel Accord ignored market risk as well as many new complex financial

instruments. Indeed, this gap in risk treatment arose largely because new scope and

degree of financial innovation did not exist at the time when it was originally drafted.

See Joseph J. Norton & Chridtopher D. Olive, The Ongoing Process ofIntemational Bank Regulatory and
Supervisory Convergence: A New Regulatory-Market "Partnership", 16 Ann. Rev. Banking 227, 298 (1997).

600

223

Additionally, Internally active banks conducted more heavily traditional banking and

intermediary functions where credit risk was the most significant factor. 601

The 1996 Amendment

602

mainly coped with the ways banking institutions should

adjust their capital based on market risk that arises from broad factors in contrast to risk

of loss from specific loss from specific loans and investments. Its significance is the

addition to the Basel Accord of qualitative standards for banks basing their capital

requirements on the consequences of internal models, a relatively new approach to the

measurement of capital proposed to the banking community in 1995. Tentatively

accepted in the 1996 amendment was the use of the bank's own internal model as an

evaluation of specific risk. The 1996 amendment allowed banks to choose between a

standardized approach developed by the Basel Committee for measuring market risk, or

to use their own internal value-at-risk (V AR). The purpose of this choice was to

recognize that many international banks develop and use risk management systems that

601 In April 1993, the Base Committee formally addressed guidelines concerning capital adequacy
requirements for market risk. See Basel Committee, The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risks (Apr. 1993).
602 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Overview of the Amendment to the Capital Accord to
Incorporate Market Risks (1996), available at http://www.bis.org/publlbcbsc23,pdf(lastvisited Oct. 1,2004).
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are far more sophisticated and tailored to the international institutions than could ever be

developed by a regulatory authority. However, recognizing the shortcoming in its

policy, the Basel Committee amended its market rules so that banks can use internal risk

measurement systems if they can demonstrate that the systems adequately capture
risk. 603

Here it is significant to note that the 1996 amendment adopted self-regulation
concept in its market risk guidelines. 604 Also, the guidelines require close working

relationships between banks and their supervisors in a pUblic-private partnership.605
The 1998 Amendment is the second modification. 606 Under the 1998 Amendment,

the Basel Committee resolved certain speculations contained in the 1996 Amendment.

Its chief purpose in the 1998 Amendment was to confirm the bank's ability to use its

own internal model to estimate both market risk and specific risk. Although it is not
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Explanatory Note: Modification of the Basel Capital Accord of
july 1988 (Sept. 19,1997), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p970918a.htm (last visited Oct.!, 2004).
604 See Norton & Olive, The Ongoing Process of International Bank Regulatory and Supervisory
Convergence, supra note 600, at 309.
605 This partnership, among regulators, and large and complex banking organizations (LCBOs), so called elite
banks, shows at least greater reliance by public sector on private sector involvement. See Joseph J . Norton,
A Perceived Trend in Modem International Financial Regulation: Increasing Reliance on A Public-Private
Partnership, 37 Int'l L. 43, 43 (2003).
606 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks
(1996, updated 1998), available at http://www.bis.org/publlbcbsc222,pdf(last visited Oct. 1,2004).
603
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provided in the 1998 Amendment, the bank's internally created model is deemed as the

device of the future in the establishment of bank capital. The use of the model was

contingent upon the bank's establishing supervisory approval of the model from both

home and host countries. 607 The approval is on the basis of four principles: (1) the

bank's risk management system must be conceptually sound and implemented with

integrity; (2) the bank has a sufficient number of trained staff; (3) the model must have a

record of reasonable accuracy; and (4) bank conducts stress tests of its model. On its

face, the amendment seemed to be another example of the Basel Committee's

responsiveness to industry trends. However, its attempt to keep up with market

developments has fallen short of the mark. Consequently, a widespread recognition

that the Basel Accord needs to be revised to match capital to risk has created Basel II.

607

See id. at 38.
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ii. Basel II

On June 26, 2004, the Basel Committee released Basel II, a new capital adequacy

framework for banks, with the endorsement of G-l 0 central bank governors and heads of

supervision. 608 Following the publication of the Committee's first round of proposals for

revising the capital adequacy framework in June 1999, an extensive consultative process

was set in train in all member countries and the proposal were also circulated to supervisory

authorities worldwide. The Basel Committee subsequently released additional proposals

for consultation in January 2001 and April 2003, and furthermore carried on three

quantitative impact studies related to its proposals. As a consequence of these efforts,
many valuable improvements have been made to the original proposals. 60 9 While the

Basel Accord focused on the bank's capital level, Basel II emphasizes the measurement and

management of significant \>anking risks, such as credit risk, market risk, and operation

608 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement
and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework, Basel Committee Publications No. 107 (June 2004), available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs103.pdf(lastvisitedJuly 3,2004). Basel II will be implemented in two
phases. The so-called standardized and foundation levels of capital adequacy-which will still be set by
regulators-are due to come into force at the end of 2006. The advantage system, which will see more
sophisticated banks use their own systems to calculate the required amount, will follow a year later. See
Elizabeth Rigby, G 10 nations put Basel II on the map-Bank Capital, Financial Times, June 28, 2004, at 24.
609 See id.
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risk.

610

Basel II framework seeks to compare the maximum losses that the bank may suffer

over the year ahead with the available buffer for the losses. 611 Its purpose is to provide a

methodology for the bank to prepare a statement that compares risk and buffer.

Basel II framework builds on two significant trends to incorporate a new philosophy for

banking supervision. 612 It combines a risk-focused approach to supervision with incentives

for prudent risk-taking into coherent policy objective that seeks to promote adequate

capitalization. Basel II reinforces the focus of management on control structures through

incorporating in all three of its pillars clear incentives for banks to improve their

management ofrisk. 613

•

First, in Pillar 1(Minimum Capital Requirements) regulatory capital charges are

aligned more closely to the bank's own measures of risk. This creates immediate

incentives for banks to improve those measures.

•

Likewise, Pillar 2 (Supervisory Review) emphasizes that responsibility for

See Ryozo Rimino, Basel II-towards a new common language, BIS Quarterly Review (Sept, 2004) at 4l.
See id.
th
612 See Jaime Caruana: Making diligent preparations for Basel II, Opening Remarks at the 13 International
Conference of Banking Supervisors (Sept. 22-23, 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r040928h .. pdf
(last visited Dec. 5, 2004)., supra nopte .
613 The Basel Committee, Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards: a Revised Framework (June 2004), supra note 608.
610
611
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assessing capital adequacy lies with the bank's management. Supervisors wi111

review and respond to those internal assessments, thereby creating incentives

for banks to evaluate their exposures thoroughly and to plan their capital strategies

carefully.

•

Finally, Pillar III (Market Discipline) seeks to make the bank's risk profile more

transparent to outside investors and market participants. This should better enable the

market to reward banks that takes a responsible approach to risk management and penalize

those that do not. Market disciple can serve as a powerful incentive for prudent behavior in

that markets are sometimes stricter than supervisors.

Basel II's combination of a process-oriented focus with incentives for banks to improve

their risk management intends to provide benefits both for individual banks and for the
banking system as a whole. 614 For an individual bank, Basel II attempts to encourage

management to adopt approaches that are related to the risks the bank confronts and that are

appropriate for its level of sophistication so that it can ensures that the bank takes prudent

614

See id.
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steps to protect itself against losses, including making appropriate use of its capital

resources.

Since a consultative paper for a new capital adequacy framewok was put forward in

1999, the Basel Committee's proposals have attracted critiques from financial practitioners,

academics, and politicians. One of the main concerns over Basel II is its complexity.

Basel II comprised of 251 pages is filled with high technical language and arcane

mathematical formulations, while the Basel Accord of 1988 comprised 30 pages. The

complexity is an obstacle to enforcement and makes it easier for vested interests to find
ways around new rules. 615 Its enormous complexity will impose a heavy cost burden on

bankers who are required to design systems and educate staff to deal with the complex new
rules. 616 Moreover, it is very difficult to implement even-handedly across numerous

regulatory regimes. Accordingly, Basel II framework needs to be relatively simplified.

615
616

See Avinash Persaud, The Basel plan must get back to market basics, Financial Times, Sept. 3, 2003, at 21.
Basel II Bombshell, The Banker (April 1, 2003) (quoting Comptroller of the Currency John J. Hawke).
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Another concern about Basel II is that its sophisticated prescriptions place emerging
countries and companies at disadvantage. 617 Banking regulation should not be too

prescriptive. Good banking involves the ability to use different information in a different

way, to lend safely to borrowers to whom others do not lend. In this sense, the special

situation and concern of emerging countries should be taken into account. Additional

mounting criticism is that Basel II penalizes small and medium sized enterprises. In this

regard, American unilateralism over Basel II has upset Europeans. Because of the

criticism that Basel II will give larger banks an advantage, the U.S. regulators plan to apply

the new risk-based capital standards only to the largest banks, whereas Basel II is to be

incorporated into EU law and applied to all banks and investment firms, not just
internationally active bankS. 618 As noted above, Basel II is decidedly controversial. Thus

the adoption of Basel II should not be the end ofthe story. As we have learned from

considerable financial turmoil and policy responses over the past decades, a mechanism for

continued review of the capital regulation should be included in financial regulation.

617
618

See Persaud, supra note 615, at 21.
Basel II Bohmshell, supra note 616.
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C. Lessons to be Drawn from Basel

As witnessed in the Basel Committee's creation of the bank supervisory standards, the

Committee's attempts to keep pace with the improvements of risk management in banking

organizations have fallen short of the mark.

Since the 1996 Amendment, the Basel

Committee has incorporated the concept of the pUblic-private partnership between bank

authorities and leading large and complex banking organizations (LCBOs), called as elite

banks, approach into bank supervision. Notably, this partnership approach vests elite

banks with greater independence and discretion to identify, measure, monitor, and manage

the material risks arising from trading book and banking book activities, subject to
compliance with qualitative and quantitative parameters. 619 As a result, banking

supervision paradigm increasingly guides the commercial banks to develop and implement

comprehensive risk management and internal control frameworks that are suitable for their

See Joseph J. Norton, Selective Bank Regulatory and Supervisory Trends Upon Entering the 21 st Century,
Essays in International Financial & Economic Law, No. 34 (2001) at 30.
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particular institutional risk profiles-a fonn of qualified self-regulation--subject to

prudential standards. 62o

Nonetheless, elite banks and their banking authorities have recently been caught in

significant risk management and internal control failures including the OTC derivatives and

counterpart credit episodes underscoring the Asian financial crises over 1997-1998, and

more significantly the LTCM episode of 1998. These cases imply that the risk

management and internal control standards created by the Basel Committee may not be

successfully implemented or self-enforced by the elite banks. Indeed, the collective

motivation and incentives for elite banks to successfully implement and enforce these

standards seem to be absent or compromised by profitability concerns. 621 Accordingly, the

framework for risk management and internal control systems needs to establish a careful

and transparent rebalancing of power such that elite banking interests do not unduly affect

or overcome the safety and soundness interests of banking authorities. 622 In this regard, it

is noteworthy the Basel Committee's adoption of three pillars in Basel II despite
620
621
622

See id. at 31.
See Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modem International Financial Regulation, supra note 605, at 57.
See id.
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considerable criticisms against the Basel II. In particular, the pillar 2-a higher priority on

bank supervision: an increased supervisory review of a bank's internal assessment of its

own capital adequacy- is a new approach relying more than before on the internal

measures and management practices of banks, and giving them more incentives to invest in

better information systems and controls. Likewise, the pillar 3-an increased emphasis on

market discipline: additional disclosure of bank risk profiles- may be a dramatic change

from many practices. Although market judgments would never be perfect, market

feedback can playa larger role as banks develop and disclose better information. For their

part, bank supervisors can certainly use the market's help as they deal with ever-more-

complex rules and banking practices. These developments could herald a fundamental

transformation of the regulation as a pure public function to a joint pUblic/private

undertaking.

The premise ofthese two pillars is that well-functioning markets can go a long way to

induce firms to make socially optimal decisions. There is a role for government, but the

best way to carry out that role is to encourage the banking market to do as much of the
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work as possible. However, it seems idealistic for bank regulatory authorities to direct

market incentives to attain the regulatory goals of safe and stable banking markets, which

enhance maximum sustainable growth. In this sense, it can be said that market discipline

is not a panacea, because financial disclosures do not always provide the market with

sufficient information to fully assess a bank's risk position and overall capital adequacy.

At the same time, there are limits to how much informed and timely discipline the banking

market can assert, because of the inherent difficulty of measuring and understanding

banking risks. Furthermore, Basel II's vagueness that gives national bank regulators a lot

of discretion with regard to the validation of banks ' internal systems and the disclosure

necessary to use those systems for the determination of capital charges creates uncertainty

among market participants and regulators alike, which most certainly does not contribute to

providing financial stability. As a consequence, bank regulatory authorities will easily be

able to engage in regulatory forbearance and be subject to corruption. In these

circumstances, it is not easy to predict how Basel II will work well although it is premature

to do so.
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As noted, vigorous efforts have been made by the Basel Committee to establish

international bank regulatory and supervisory standards that build on and offer the potential

to globalize the standards that exist within the most advanced countries. Similarly, other

international financial institutions urge developing countries to adopt global financial

standards through the harmonization of regulatory frameworks. If the harmonization

conflicts with domestic economic imperatives, legitimate forms of global financial

governance may be called into question. In this context, international policy makers

should fully consider local conditions, such as national legal, business, and political

practices and institutions when they design and formulate global standards. Most

importantly, developing countries active on global financial markets should be allowed to

comply with international standards by different routes and through divergent institutional

arrangements. Consequently, the establishment of the new Basel capital adequacy accord

(Basel II) should not be the end of the story.
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v.

The Search for a New International Financial Order

A. The Dilemmas of International Financial Regulation

Arguably, there are probabilities for regulatory arbitrage to occur where countries adopt

identical capital adequacy policies but totally different rescue policies for failed banks

among countries. 623 The bank rescue policies adopted by central banks are highly

divergent in ranging from strict market discipline denying recovery to shareholders of

failed banks to full bailouts for bank shareholders prevalent in emerging economy markets.

The bank rescue policies have feedback effects that change the future risk propensity of

banks. 624 No variance of capital adequacy rules in different countries has provided

internationally active banks incentives to charter in countries with lenient bank rescue

policies since they are not required to reserve additional capital to offset the heightened

incentives for risk created by lenient bank rescue policies. Furthermore, international

banks in less-regulated countries that operate abroad through branches rather than
In the United States, approximately three quarters of failed banks are resolved through assisted mergers
with other banks, whereas Japan, Finland, Sweden, and Norway rely principally or exclusively on open bank
assistance (government bailouts). See Acharya, Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy
Regulation Desirable? 16 (Nov. 2, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/abstracUd=223768 (last
visited Jan. 10, 2003).
624 If a state bails out the bank's shareholders, the bailout encourages other banks' shareholders to increase
risk-taking with impunity. See id. at 24-26.
623

237

separately incorporated subsidiaries have higher incentives to increase their risk-taking

abroad and at home. This is because if the bank becomes insolvent, the generous rescue

policies of the lenient country will apply to the entire banking group including its overseas

branches. As one argues, global convergence of capital regulation is desirable only if it is

accompanied by a standardization of other aspects of banking regulation, such as monetary
policies and bank rescue packages as well. 625 Thus, an appropriate divergence in capital

requirements may be necessary where such accompanying convergence is infeasible.

"Differences in economic conditions and organizational structures across countries may

also accentuate the need for such divergence.,,626

These circumstances take this study to another significant issue: ifbanks should be

regulated by governments, is there a need for international financial regulation to manage

international financial integration? In other words, has governments' ability to look to

national regulation to maintain stability of banks incorporated in their jurisdictions been

eroded by increasingly changing financial activity, and thereby necessitates a shift to

625
626

See id. at 16.
See id.
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international regulation? Arguably, governments need not shift regulation away from

independent national regulatory authorities, because international financial integration
creates no new market failures. 627 Here international coordination of regulatory

responsibility is necessary, but states can arrange this coordination through agreement

rather than internationally harmonizing prudential regulation.

There is another question to be answered. If domestic regulation and international

agreements can cope with banks' exposure to risk, then why does international financial

regulation coexist with domestic regulation? As witnessed by the U.S. proposals for

hannonized capital adequacy regulations, states created this regulation primarily as a

political response to banks' fears about international competition. That is, disparities

between domestic regulations brought about cost differentials that place banks at a

competitive advantage or disadvantage. As a result, the banks in less-regulated states can

provide banking services to customers at a lower price. Accordingly, international

627

See Oatley, supra note 556, at 37.
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regulation that requires all governments to adopt a set of common standards removes these

disparities by creating a level playing field in international finance.

However, harmonizing international regulation may harm banks' safety through

creating a level playing field. As regulation always creates unintended outcomes, there is a

potential for harm arising from the interaction between the unintended consequences of
financial regulation and the hostile nature of international decision-making. 628 This

interaction leads to a less safe banking system.

Given the unintended outcomes, the Basel Accord may have made banks less secure.

As noted, these problems have driven the revision of the Basel Accord. As evidenced in

Basel II, the negotiations have produced, efforts to attain a better national banking

regulation has not been in progress until the conclusion of a better international agreement

on banking. 629 A better international banking agreement has been in no progress by

distributive struggles between banks incorporated in distinct jurisdictions, between banks of

628
629

See id.
See id. at 38.

240

different sizes, and between banks and other non-banking institutions. 63o Due to these

attempts to use international regulation to create a level playing field have caused harmful

delays in the introduction of necessary regulatory reforms.

As national banking regulations are quickly outmoded, regulators struggle to catch up

with the market development and unexpected negative effects. In these circumstances,

governments need to retain the ability to regularly adjust and revise the regulatory
framework. By contrast, international negotiations are not well suited to the task. 631

The ongoing international financial integration causes governments to continuously

encounter a difficult regulatory dilemma. National financial regulation appears to create a

safer financial system, but it can also cause financial institutions to shift their business to

less regulated states. 632 To the contrary, international financial regulation can remove the

unwanted competitive outcomes of unilateral national regulation, but it may create a
weaker financial system. 633 Hence, a domestic approach to regulation creates safer

630
631
632
633

rd. at 38-39.
See id. at 39.
See id.
rd.
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financial institutions but less domestic financial business, whereas an international

approach protects domestic financial business at the price of potentially weaker financial

institutions.

As discussed, the better solution may lie in domestic regulation supported by an

international agreement on broad principles rather than opting for either domestic or

international regulation. 634 Governments can move further away from one-size-fits-all

international regulations in favor of establishing broad regulatory goals that each state can

then pursue through domestic regulation. To ensure that each state adopts regulations

consistent with international objectives, the international community can implement a

review process. 635 Such an approach would not only eliminate the competitive

consequences of purely national regulation but also maintain the flexibility of national

regulation.

636

However, this perspective emphasizes exclusively the significance of governments, that

is national regulators' role in regulating banking and other financial institutions.
634
635
636

See id.
rd.
rd.
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Accordingly, this view does not reflect the increasing importance of role of private sectors

at both national and international financial markets, which will be addressed later.

B. The Role of Private Regulation

As noted, the world's bank regulatory authorities have been struggling to catch up with

the market innovation over the past decades. This situation pertains in both developed and

developing countries. Moreover, government central banks have been obsolete,637 whereas

advances in information technology have increased the advantages of private interest

regulation in several respects. Even though central banks currently enforce a variety of

legal constraints on commercial banks, many of these restrictions have been undermined by

financial innovations fueled by the information revolution. In particular, depositors too

easily avoid any inefficient restrictions on domestic banks, as the price of remote access to

offshore banking services is falling toward zero. In this regard, private clearinghouse

637 Today central banks play five major roles: monopoly issuer of currency, banker's bank, regulator of
commercial banks, lender of last resort, and conductor of monetary policy. See Lawrence H. White, In What
Respects Will the Information Age Make Central Banks Obsolete?, Cato Journal, Vol. 21, No.2 (Fall 2001) at
219.
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association have always found it useful to improve and to enforce solvency and liquidity

standards for their members, to ensure that their clearing partners would not default at the
next clearing session. 638 In this way, private clearinghouses are fully able to assess and

internalize settlement risks and have a great track record even if central banks recall

doomsday scenarios and fear about systemic risk in private delayed-settlement systems. 639

To prevent shrinkage of domestic banking industry, regulators are required to put an end to

inefficient public regulations. The traditional public regulations that will survive will be

those that provide advantages both to banking organizations and their customers.

638 See id. at 223. The membership of clearinghouse that is a members-only club, with high standards for
membership, has provided a credible seal of approval for depositors seeking a safe ballie Id. In the United
States, private clearinghouses were never completely suppressed, they rather continue to process some checks,
automated payments, ATM transfers, and large-volume transactions. The clearing volume on the private
Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS) of the New York Clearing House Association (NYCHA)
continues to rival the volume on the Federal Reserve's Fedwire system. See id. at 221-222. The CHIPS
which is owned and operated by the NYCHA, an organization of the major New York City banks is a
communication and net settlement system for payments by and two classes of participant banks located in
New York city: settling and non-settling participants. For the detail, see Scott & Wellons, supra note 5, at
600-615. As another type of the U.S. large value transfer system, the Fedwire is a communication and
settlement owned by the twelve U.S. Federal Reserve Banks. For its operation, see id. at 599-600. A crucial
point to note is that clearinghouses and organized exchanges are the classic examples of the private strategic
responses to concerns about the stability and integrity. See Randall S. Kroszner, The Role of Private
Regulation in Maintaining Global Financial Stability, Cato Journal, Vol. 18, No.3 (Winter 1999) at 356.
639 See White, supra note 637, at 222 ("If commercial banks are freed from the constraint of holding account
balances at the central bank, more of the clearing business may return to the private sector. This is
particularly likely if central banks continue their current fixation with imposing real-time gross settlement in
place of the more efficient netting and delayed-settlement systems, but not for any reason that withstands
serious scrutiny.").
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In fact, numerous international financial transactions take place in a realm that is close

to anarchy. The offshore markets harbor safe from financial regulation and international

agreements. When contractual disputes arise in international financial transactions, it is

not easy to determine where they would be litigated and what laws would apply. The past

several decades have witnessed the rapid expansion of global financial markets, and the

remarkable growth of internationally active banking and financial institutions. The point

to note is that the growth of many of the largest and most active global financial markets

have actually been driven by the avoidance of traditional government regulations.

Whereas frauds, mismanagement, and bankruptcies take place, market forces have been

effective regulators that have created order, rule and norm out of the apparent catastrophe
of the international banking and financial markets. 64o As the collapse ofBCCI and the

debacle ofBarings have shown, regulatory structures set forth and operated by national

governments and designed to supervise domestic financial activities have been outmoded if

not obsolete. Even though the overall stability and integrity of these markets is due

See E. Kane, How Market Forces Influence the Structure of Financial Regulation, in Restructuring
Banking and Financial Services (R.M. Kushrneider ed., 1988).
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primarily to the role of private regulators rather than public regulatory authorities, many

committees and institutions have attempted to coordinate domestic regulatory policies and

negotiate international standards without projecting regulatory oversight into a global

economy to avoid the complexity of multiple, overlapping regulatory structures that have

been an important problem in financial market regulation.

In that regard, it deserves noting one observer's application ofthree approaches to the

allocation of regulatory authority: centralization, competition, and privatization.

641

According to these approaches, the Basel Accord is the best example of centralization of

regulation of banking and financial institutions. As is always the case with centralization

of regulatory standards, the critical question in the area of financial institutions regulation is

whether wide-scale compliance or even compliance within the narrow range ofthe Basel

Committee member countries or the OECD countries is a realistic aspiration. As shown in

the Asian financial crisis, countries have found it difficult to coordinate domestic regulatory

641 See Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 649, 664 (2001).
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structures with international standards. 642 Domestic interest groups and political

consideration, which created different and typically lax regulatory structures in the past,

remains resistant to reforms, despite the existence of international standards. 643

Centralization of regulatory functions is difficult to implement in the context that lacks a

coordinating public authority, a characteristic that is often absent in the transnational arena

and may even be only marginally effective in regional alliance such as the Europe Union. 644

On most of these dimensions, allocation of regulatory authority among member states

represents an intermediate solution. It can create competitive pressures on regulatory

officials if regulated firms have mobility to select among a range of legal regimes and that

other conditions of competition are present. If centralization of regulatory standards

cannot always deal with issues of regulation of financial institutions in international

markets, models of competition or privatization could provide alternative solutions.

See Raudi Bonte et aI., Supervisory Lessons to be Drawn from the Asian Crisis, Basel Committee
Working Paper No.2 (June 1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publlhcbs_wp2.htm (last visited Jan. 10,
2003).
643 See Scott, supra note 259.
644 See Jackson, supra note 641, at 670.
642
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The elements of regulatory competition that already exist under the Basel Concordat of
the 1970s have been redefined in the aftermath of the BCCI failure of the early 1990s. 645

To allow private firms to choose among the regulatory systems of member states raises the

probability of sub-optimal outcomes in contexts where the mechanisms of competition are

incomplete or where substantial agency costs and negative externalities may be present. 646

An instructive demonstration of the privatization solution is the international swaps

market. 647 The swaps market is an example of the kind of complex contractual networks in

the global economy. It is primarily regulated by privately developed legal rule, most

notably the standard agreements of the International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA).648

However, even in the swaps market, where privatization is the dominant regulatory

paradigm, a debate has been increasing over whether national or supranational, that is
Under the Basel Concordat, domestic regulators were assigned to supervisory responsibility over certain
foreign branches of domestic banking organizations so that for some time, national fmancial supervisors have
had to taken an interest in the offshore activities of domestic banks. See Mandanis Schooner & Michael
Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The Case of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States, 20
Mich. J. Int'l L. 595, 599-605 (1999); see also Basel Committee, supra note 465. The collapse of the BCCI
called upon domestic supervisory agents to look upstream where domestic banking organizations are
controlled by foreign financial conglomerates to evaluate the efficacy of the entity's consolidated supervision.
See Daniel M. Leifer, Note, Putting the Super Back in the Supervision oflntemational Banking, Post-BCCI,
60 Fordham L. Rev. S467 (1992). In this way, the world's bank regulators have increasingly been projecting
their oversight internationally and offering the rudimentary structure of global supervision rather than
concerning themselves exclusively with financial activities occurring within their own national boundaries.
646
See Jackson, supra note 641, at 670.
647 See id. at 665.
648 See the ISDA homepage at http://www.isda.orgJindex.html.
645
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centralized regulatory constraint should supplement existing safeguards. 649 In particular,

the failure of Long-Term Credit Management Limited in 1999 has drawn calla for reform in

this area of financial supervision. Privatization of regulatory functions provides the

greatest degree of flexibility and space for experimentation. 650 More importantly, private

firms often have elaborate internal procedures for controlling risks, and those procedures

may be likely to provide an efficient substitute for more traditional forms of mandatory
governmentaloversight. 651 Accordingly, innovations in strategic organizational design and

governance for financial institutions can handle international regulatory challenges more

effectively than traditional public regulation.

See Jackson, supra note 641, at 666.
See id. at 670.
651 In this regard, one observer argues that "[w]hile there are ample reasons to doubt whether private
incentives for risk-regulation are, in fact, appropriately aligned with the public interest, one can appreciate
how private fIrms and their representatives could perceive private regulatory solutions as a cost-effective
alternative to more familiar systems of supervision." See id. Further, it is asserted that "while representatives
of private entities are not unmindful of issues of systemic risk and negative externalities, they may be less
attuned to the possibility that the optimal level of risk-taking from a public perspective may well be lower
than the optimal level from the perspective of the individual fIrm. As the costs of systemic risk and negative
externalities are borne in large part by parties not in contractual privity with private fIrms, the market is not
likely to force fIrms to internalize these costs. In addition, moral hazard problems, collective action problems,
and the incentive-suppressing effects of public regulation may deaden cost internalization on the part of some
parties, like depositors, who are in contractual privity with regulated fIrms. Finally, industry representatives
involved in policy debates are likely to be drawn from better-managed and more successful fIrms. They may
be less cognitive of the problems of incompetent managers and the perverse incentives facing fIrms in
fInancial distress than are governmental offIcials, who deal with bad apples on a regular basis." See id. at 671
n.58.
649
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The private strategic responses to concerns about stability and integrity take many

forms. 652 A traditional solution had been to create a members-only club, with high

standards for membership, such as clearinghouses and organized exchanges. However,

most recent growth in the global financial markets has been occurring outside of traditional

members-only institutions. Over-the-counter derivatives trading has grown sharply during

the past decades. It is noteworthy that much of the movement toward OTe markets is

spurred by the desire to avoid the domestic regulation that has been imposed over time on

organized exchanges. 653 National financial regulatory authorities have struggled with

claiming that such financial activities fall within their jurisdictions. In these effectively

unregulated OTe markets, the strategic responses to the challenges of stability and integrity

have taken a variety of forms. Independent credit-rating agencies playa key role in

certifying the quality of potential counterparties to a transaction.

654

Thus, private

regulators have carried out the auditing, screening, and monitoring functions of the public

regulators and have been quite effective even if they do not have the same legal powers to
652
653
654

See Kroszner, supra note 638, at 356.
See id.
Id.
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obtain information that public regulators do. By contrast, public regulators cannot be

insulated from political and interest group pressures. 655 The political pressures offer a

background incentive different from that for the private regulators. Moreover, the public

regulators have much greater difficulty than do the private regulators. Giving public

regulators wide discretion is an invitation to political and interest group pressure. One

argues that whereas the market is not a perfect regulator, the public regulatory alternative

should not interfere with the creative experimentation and innovation. 656 Further, a unified

international regulator seems to slow the engine that generates the innovations that have

driven the growth of the global financial markets without any clear stability advantages. 657

C. The Market as a Regulator

Over the past decades, debates over the proper allocation of regulatory authority in

banking and financial sectors have increasingly been common. This trend mainly

attributes to the globalization of finance. In earlier times, technical constraints have not

655
656
657

Id. at 359.
See id. at 360.
Id.
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enabled issuers and intermediaries to engage in substantial volumes of financial

transactions across national boundaries. As a consequence, regulatory jurisdiction could

be allocated on a territorial basis. However, the evolution of technologies and financial

markets has eroded national boundaries, and forced regulatory authorities to choose

between the imposition of overlapping, potentially inconsistent supervision on a territorial

basis and the creation of new paradigms for allocating or coordinating regulatory

jurisdiction. In these circumstances, there is a need for the creation of a new regulatory

paradigm.658

This new regulatory paradigm necessitates a radical rethinking the scope of regulation

and regulatory techniques. One possible option would be to use the market as the primary

regulator, and insofar as traditional public regulation would continue to exist, it would seek
to work with market mechanisms. 659 This view highlights that the supervisory function

might be limited to monitoring compliance with a few simple principles leaving the more

difficult issues to be evaluated by the marketplace, such as other financial intermediaries, or

658
659

See Michael Taylor, The Search for a New Regulatory Paradigm, 49 Mercer L. Rev. 793, 793 (1998).
See id. at 802.

252

credit rating agencies on the basis oflegislatively mandated full disclosure of a bank's risk

exposures. In this regard, the obligation to disclose may be backed up by stringent

punishment of directors to make sure that they bear full responsibility both for the activities

of their institutions and for the information released into the public domain. However,

there are still some problems with reliance on greater disclosure.

66o

Most of banks active

in foreign country are subsidiaries of major international banking organizations, and thus

subject to the consolidated supervision of their home country supervisors. Additionally,

there remain serious obstacles to the reliance on enhanced public disclosures as a way of

dealing with the problem of supervising of institutions with active trading options. As

noted above, the use of derivative instruments has increased the complexity and opacity of

the risk profiles of financial institutions in ways that traditional accounting techniques

cannot cope with. Moreover, the new financial instruments are off-balance-sheet in the

context that entering into a derivatives contract does not give rise to immediate cash flows

to the extent of the contract's face value, which is different from traditional loans. Since a

660

Id. at 803.
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derivative contract concerns future rights and obligations, how to value this is of

significance.

Although an exclusively disclosure-based regime might have its difficulties, it could be
supplemented by enhanced reliance on the forces of self-regulation. 661 However, there are

still two fundamental problems with relying on greater public disclosure or self-regulation
as a substitute for supervision. 662 The first is the residual contagion risk that may result

from the bank's failure, either through a loss of confidence in the banking sector as a whole

or through banks' complex interplay in the payments system. As discussed above, the loss

of confidence argument has been exaggerated in the integrated global economy, because

there is little evidence that the bank's failure drive a widespread systemic crisis as the result
of panic withdrawals by depositors. 663 The payments systems aspects of contagion risk are

also being lessened by remarkable improvements to the payment and settlements system

661 See Group.ofThirty, Global Institutions, National Supervision and Systemic Risk 12 (1997) ("the
fundamental responsibility for ensuring the stability of financial institutions, and thereby limiting systemic
risk, rests with the board and management of global institutions themselves."). The standing committee
notion is in effect a proposal for the leading international financial institutions to adopt a system of selfregulation. See id.
662 See Taylor, supra note 658, at 804.
663 In fact, the evidence of recent banking crises in the East Asia is that bank collapses were entailed by a
flight to quality in which depositors tend to move their funds to well-capitalized institutions authorized by
jurisdictions with a high regulatory reputation. See id.
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themselves. As risks within the payment systems become legal risks-the ability to take a

charge over the collateral- rather than the credit risk of large intra-day exposures, the

character of risks changes even if they are not abolished entirely. Although a large

banking organization may theoretically fail without being the cause of widespread

disruption to the whole banking system, there remain residual risks which it may be
difficult to abolish. 664

The second reason that exclusive market-driven regulation may not be the solution is

that it is politically impossible if the taxpayer continues to underwrite banks' deposit

liabilities in the form of deposit protection schemes and access to lender of last resort

facilities in most of countries although there are some differences in deposit guarantee
arrangements. 665 The movement toward relying on greater use of market forces and self-

regulation can only be fulfilled provided that there remains an explicit or implicit taxpayer

guarantee against the outcomes of bank failure. Since the continued existence of deposit

guarantee arrangements is a legacy of the old regulatory paradigm that provided a publicly-

664
665

See id. at 804.
Id. at 804-805.
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funded indemnity to consumers against the risk of loss, the potential risk to taxpayers was

supposedly limited by a regulatory system that emphasized stability. Accordingly, deposit

insurance schemes could exist precisely because an excess of regulations ensured that bank

failures would be rare even if the price ofthis was steadily accumulating inefficiency in the
financial system. 666

The point to note is that the techniques or regulation applied under the old paradigm

cannot be transplanted to the new environment of financial services. Market forces may

not be the exclusive substitute for the need for regulation. As such a new regulatory

paradigm needs to involve much less of a role for traditional public regulation, that is

external governmental regulation than was case before. There is a growing consensus that

the partnership between regulatory authorities and market actors (private interests) is

essential for the good governance and prudential regulation of global financial markets.

666 See id. at 805 ("[A] key component of the new regulatory paradigm must be to rethink the role of deposit
insurance schemes now that their symbiotic relationship with restrictive regulation has vanished.").
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D. Public-Private Partnership

Global financial integration has considerably challenged the policy autonomy of the

state to supervise and regulate international transactions. National regulatory authorities'

efforts to cooperate with their foreign counterparts in order to design and formulate

effective regulatory standards have often become problematic. This is partly because of

the difficulties of cooperation in an international system, and partly because of variations in

domestic market structures, financial institutions and legal systems. Attempts by national

and international supervisory and regulatory authorities are often proved insufficient for the

effective formulation and implementation of global financial standards in emerging market

economIes.

While the private sector activities have increasingly dominated global financial

transactions, the wider public sector policy and regulatory objectives of financial

governance have become more difficult. As such, powerful private interests have

increased their dominance of national economic policy making, and have played an

important role in formulating financial market rules and structures, whereby state policies
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tend to promote market-led adjustment policies. 667 The process of global financial

integration has strengthened the position of private market actors in governance of financial

system at national, regional and international levels. Given that private sector activities

have increasingly dominated global financial transactions, and private interests are crucial

to the governance of financial systems, private market actors need to be incorporated into

the rule-making process. An important issue examines how to design private sector

involvement in formulating and implementing financial standards and regulations.

The private sector must be involved in the standard-setting process in two ways: (1) the

private sector's integration of the use of standards into their risk management techniques,
(2) the private sector's development of best practice standards in the financial sector. 668

These goals may be accomplished either through private-public collaboration or by the

private sector themselves. Given that private market actors have played an important role

667 Geoffrey R. D. Underhill & Xiaoke Zhang, Global Structures and Political Imperatives: In Search of
Nonnative Underpinnings for International Financial Order, in International Financial Governance Under
Stress: Global Structures versus National Imperatives 82 (Geoffrey R. D. Underhill et al. eds., 2003) (arguing
that the process of global fmancial integration has altered the notions of the public interest that underpin the
operation offmancial order, changed regulatory parameters and objectives in public sector responsibility, and
posed a problem of democratic accountability).
668 George Vojta & Marc Uzan, The Private Sector, International Standards and the Architecture of Global
Finance, in International Financial Governance Under Stress: Global Structures versus National Imperatives,
supra note 667, at 284.
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in developing financial structures, and identifying and refining international standards for

acceptable practices, they can help enhance the limited expertise and capacity of regulatory
authorities. 669 In this sense, the private sector should be fully incorporated into the process

of standard formulation and implementation. If the task of standard setting and

enforcement would be exclusively left to the public sector, market disciplines may fail to

play their role in financial governance and regulation.

While a consensus that the private sector is crucial to the governance of financial

system at national, regional and global levels has been reached, how to fashion the

appropriate balance between the public authority and private interests is a crucial issue.

That is, to what extent and under what conditions should the regulatory authority's rule-

making power be ceded to private market forces? Since the recent global financial crises

have revealed that the private dominance of financial sector and regulatory process would

lead to the legitimacy deficit, economic instability and turbulence, the changing balance

between public authority and private market power in the financial regulatory process

See id. All this demonstrates the significance of private sector involvement in the formulation and
implementation of global financial standards.

669
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affects both the stability of the financial system and the nature of the democratic order. 67o

In this sense, the impact of private domination of regulatory processes on financial stability,

democratic accountability and legitimacy should be addressed.

A proper balance of public and private interests is essential to the legitimate functioning

of a market economy. Although financial transactions in the market-based economies are
I~II! 11111 iII

mainly private, the way in which the financial system operates makes it part of the essential

infrastructure in any economy, of the value to the operation of markets, to the needs of

states and to the well-being of civil society that it should be placed at the center of the
public domain. 671 Over time, regulatory authorities need to have more close relationship

with private market actors to respond promptly to their demands, and work in communion

with private interests to monitor and supervise properly financial transactions. Symbiotic

relations and shared-world views developed in public-private interactions provide private

market actors with the opportunity to be incorporated into regulatory processes in the
670 See id (noting that the private dominance of regulatory process has altered the notions of the public
interest that underpin the operation of fmancial order, changed parameters and obj ectives in public
responsibility, and generated a fundamental problem of democratic accountability).
671 See Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, The Public Good versus Private Interests in the Global Financial and
Monetary System, International Comparative and Corporate Law Journal, Vol. 2, No.3 (2000) at 335-359
(discussing the notion of the public domain and corresponding interpretations of the public interest in relation
to the financial order).
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financial system and to affect the nature of financial governance. 672 As a result, it is

getting difficult to distinguish the public interest from the claims of private market actors in
relation to the financial system673

Although private interests need to be incorporated into the process of regulatory

reforms, the private sector itself is diverse and far from being monolithic and
homogeneous. 674 This diversity implies the complexity of interactions between regulators

['!II!lili

and market actors who have conflicting interests and are marked by different relationships
illl'

to national regulatory authorities. This difficulty has called into question how regulators

can effectively coordinate diverse private market actors to design and formulate standards

that are to be applied to financial sectors. In this sense, regulatory authorities at national,

See supra note 667, at 84.
See id.
674 See supra note 668, at 298. The banking sector, particularly in emerging market economies, is usually
composed of commercial, specialized and development institutions. Diverse types of banking organizations
tend to have dissimilar business activities, varying degrees of international exposure and divergent
preferences for the design of standards for sound managerial practices. As a result, it is difficult to coordinate
different private institutions and their respective interests in standard formulation and implementation within a
international context. See id. at 285.
672

673
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regional and global levels should consider these constraints in their attempts at designing

new market disciplines. 675

The private domination of the financial sector and regulatory process can change the

notions of public good which underpin the formulation of regulatory standards designed to

ensure market stability, compromise the policy autonomy of states to maintain their

legitimacy, and pose a fundamental problem of democratic accountability.676 In this regard,

the clear definition of public interests distinct from the claims of private market actors is

the key to ensuring the predominance of such interests in the financial system. The

problems of democratic accountability and legitimacy become more acute in the

international domain as witnessed in the recent episodes of economic turmoil resulting from

the undue dominance. of financial regulatory processes by powerful profit-seeking private

market forces. In the absence of strong public authority over private market forces,

international regulatory standards may not only conflict with economic and financial

imperatives in developing and emerging market countries but also pose serious problems of

675
676

Id.
See id. 298.
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policy management. 677 In these circumstances, existing institutional arrangements in the

global financial system are more likely to facilitate the interests of powerful private actors

and institutions from the leading industrial countries than to address the major concerns of

the developing world and further financial market stability.678 Unless this issue is

addressed, deep skepticism will run over ongoing efforts to reform the international

financial architecture.

E. The Need for Regional Cooperation

Despite strong pressures for the convergence of one-size-fits-all standards throughout

the global system, the current global governance agenda has given little attention to the

tension between harmonizing pressures of financial globalization led by advanced financial

centers and prevailing diversity of financial systems and to their economic consequences.

677 Maintaining strong public authority over private market power requires the strengthening of democratic
institutions of accountability in the national, regional and global levels of governance. See Geoffrey R. D.
Underhill & Xiaoke Zhang, Conclusion: Towards the Good Governance of the International Financial System,
in International Financial Governance Under Stress: Global Structures versus National Imperatives, supra
note 667, at 367.
678 See supra note 668, at 299 (arguing that "[t]he real issue about private involvement in standard
formulation is thus a normative one about who can and ought to benefit from new regulatory standards and
about whose interests these standards are to serve.").
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Prevailing variations in national financial practices continue to complicate policy and

regulatory cooperation through international institutions. Given that the failure of national

governments to collaborate effectively at the international level, prospects for the

successful restructuring of the global financial regime through international cooperation

based on harmonization have been attenuated. Hence, persistent national differences in

financial market structures and institutions have significant implications for international

cooperative efforts at global financial governance. In order to enhance global financial

governance toward a new world order in the international finance, it needs to explore

specific policy and regulatory options to national and international policy makers in

devising patterns of regional and international cooperation.

Since international cooperation has demonstrated little aptitude for effective

cooperation in the past, regional cooperation has an important alternative that could operate
alongside global monetary and financial governance. 679 The process of regional economic

and monetary integration experiences of European countries provide valuable lessons. In

679

It can be argued that regional cooperation is not immune to the difficulties of institutional collaboration.
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these circumstances, many countries, particularly developing countries have shown

increasing interest in regional institutional cooperation to manage the global monetary and

financial system. At the regional level, emerging market governments have increasingly

realized that they tend to encounter similar problems with market integration and have

similar interests in financial regulatory framework, and would be better able to prevent

financial market instability and to insulate vulnerable economies from negative spill-over

effects from crises. The effects of financial contagion and the growing pressures for global

financial integration have emphasized collaborative ties among Asian governments. Due

to the tough conditions ofIMF rescue packages, regional central bankers and financial

regulators strived to seek the chance for the establishment of regional facilities. In

particular, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 proved that the region did not have a regional

financial mechanism to prevent and manage such crises. Since the crisis, the plan of a

regional stability fund as a regional supplement system for the IMF has been put

forward. 680 In general, the proposal targets to create a fund that is exclusive to Asia, while

680

The Asian Monetary Fund would have been capitalized to the tune ofUSD 100 billion from the reserves

265

i!11

maintaining the decision-making within Asia. This attributes to a deep suspicion toward

the decision-making ofthe major international financial institutions dominated by the
United States. 681 The U.S. was opposed to the idea, claiming that funds were likely to be

loaned on lenient terms that could be damaging in the long-term. 682

As a matter of fact, the greatest obstacles to regional cooperation in East Asia have
1111'1:,

corne from outside the region itself. Even if a regional monetary fund can provide

countries with contingent credits during crisis periods under much more favorable

conditions than those mandated by the IMF, and make Asian governments more

independent and less subject to the policy demands of international institutions, greater

regionalization faces a strong opposition from the institutions dominated by the U.S.

Nevertheless, various proposals ranging from modest plans on more effective coordination

of Japan, China and Taiwan. See generally Walden Bello, Inviting Another Catastrophe, 162 Far E. Econ.
Rev. 42 (Aug. 1999).
681 See HK bank chief argues for Asian Monetary Fund, Fin. Times, Jan. 6,1999. Both the U.S. Treasury and
the IMF were opposed to the proposal for a regional stability fund because it would weaken the IMF. See
Bello, supra note 680.
682 See Japan seeks Asian Monetary Fund, Fin. Times, Dec. 16, 1998. Interestingly, the U.S. Treasury has
been critical of economic cooperation in areas where it cannot exert influence and produce practical outcomes
to its liking. See Yokoi-Arai, supra note 585, at 1654.
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among financial regulators and joint efforts to create more extensive Asian monetary union
or common currency have been set forth. 683

Although the Asian Development Bank (ADB)684 has the potential to support policy

dialogue on regional financial regulation, its diversity of membership may attenuate the

development of financial regulatory aspects within. Other institutions such as Asia-Pacific
III ~'

Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN),

Executives' Meeting of East Asian and Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP), and Soth East

Asia, New Zealand, Australia Forum of Banking Supervision (SEANZA) are not
appropriate because of the informality of these institutions. 685 Hence, it needs to explore

the benefits of a regional financial regulatory institution, because there is a strong desire to

establish the institution within East Asia.

A regional financial regulatory institution would benefit East Asia since it would be

possible to take advantage of geographic proximity and cultural understanding of the

See East Asian nations reach accords on further co-operation, Fin. Times, Nov. 29, 1999.
The ADB is the only fonnal institution with a large number of Member States and legal entities. In 1966,
the ADB was founded to promote social and economic progress of the Asian and Pacific region. See 8 Basic
Documents of Asian Regional Organization 8 (M. Haas ed., 1980).
685 For the analysis of regional institutions in Asia, see Yokoi-Arai, supra note 585, at 1648-1654.
683

684
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region. 686 As for the advantages of a regional institution, it deserves noting one observer's
analysis of the institutional approach. 687 First, a regional institution could have the

advantage of being a "midway" between national regulatory authorities and international

bodies. Such an institutional approach could play an important role in local specifics, and

could design an appropriate regulatory framework for international standards to be applied

in order to produce the identified effect within the region. Second, an appropriate regional

institution could help attenuate the tension of applying regulations that are politically

difficult to adopt. In a regional institution, negotiators could use regional peer pressure for

the change of domestic policy on the basis that the regional institution is more aware of

financial regulation. Third, cooperative formulation of financial regulation is likely to

prevent the race to the bottom in financial regulation and to encourage the application of

new international standard. Moreover, a regional institution could also be used to

686 See Yokoi-Arai, supra note 585 at 1659 ("National regulators do not always have the objectivity or
political will to conduct adequate supervision and to penalize non-compliant parties. International bodies may
not have sufficient access to local particulars necessary to conduct adequate supervision.").
687 See id. at 1660
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encourage the enforcement of international regulatory standards by more effective

involvement in the process of its formulation.

However, there are many arguments against the establishment of a regional institution
for the supervision of financial activities and the formulation of financial regulation. 688

One counterargument is redundancy of international institutions, and another is opposition

to an international organization constraining financial regulation based on sovereignty.

The redundancy of international institutions lies in their inefficiency, not necessarily in the

number of organizations. Over time, many international institutions and agencies become

obsolete due to their bureaucratic inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption. This is

because ofthe difficulty in measuring their achievements relative to their objectives. In

this sense, all public institutions at national, regional and international levels need to be

structured to be more accountable. In response to the argument with traditional

sovereignty of states, it should be noted that sovereignty is not preserved within the

national domain.

688

See Yokoi-Arai, supra note 585, at 1666.
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As noted, a regional institution can coordinate the implementation of financial

regulation in order to obtain the identified effect, and can provide safety and soundness to

the financial system. Given the benefits of a regional financial regulatory institution, the

establishment of such an institution in East Asia would arguably require the existence of a

regional community within the region to facilitate and support its operation. 689

East Asia has a successful model of a regional community in the EU. It is important to

note that European countries could move faster toward a community, because they have

shared similar culture with languages based on the same Latin roots. In contrast, lack of

linguistic, ethnic, religious, political homogeneity hinders cooperation within East Asia.

Compared to other regions, East Asia has no converging sense of regional interests and the

accompanying drive for regional integration. 690 Due to the experience of colonialism and

imperialism, East Asian countries do not enthusiastically seek strong ties with advanced

states, in particular Japan. Skepticism is still running over Japan, because the Japanese has

justified past aggression and colonization of neighboring countries, and distortion of history

689
690

See id. at 1664.
Id. at 1665.
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textbooks that whitewashed atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers against neighboring

countries during W orId War II. In order for East Asian countries to forge a future-oriented

relationship of cooperation, Japan needs to apologize for the country's past militarism in

Asia. Since East Asia is the region, where ethics and feelings may be considered more

important than economic benefits, a feeling of togetherness, self-confidence and mutual

understanding of each other are essential to regional cooperation. There is still a glimmer

on regional cooperation within Asia in that Asian countries are enthusiastic of creating

Asian Monetary Fund based on Asian values. 691 These moves may strengthen the kind of

collaborative ties that will support more ambitious programmes of regional and monetary

cooperation in the near future

Since the rule of consensus has been a norm for most East Asian community, the initial

stage ofthis community will depend on its consensus-making more than legal orientation.

691 Their attempts at the establishment of a regional stability fund are displayed in the participation of central
bank governors and fmance ministers from Japan, Korea and China in the swap agreement of ASEAN. See
Asian Currencies: Swapping Notes, Economist, May 13, 2000. Korea agreed to swap arrangements with
Japan (USD 7 billion), China (USD 2 billion), Thailand (USD 1 billion). See Ministry of Finance and
Economy, Republic of Korea, at http://www.mofe.go.kr/mofe2lhtml/mainindex.php3 (last visited March 15,
2004). This fund would be based on the core function ofinter-govemmental forum, member surveillance, and
technical assistance. The fund should be supported by the creation of a zone of law in the region to enhance
the law-based nature of the framework. See Yokoi-Arai, supra note 585, at 1668.
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To attain and sustain economic development, East Asian countries should adopt new

principles to further integrate. In any event, this objective can be accomplished only if

there is legitimacy and procedural fairness in its decisions, and there is support from the

legal orientation of the institution. 692 Needless to say, regional cooperation involves not

only regulators but also private sector actors and their interactions with regulatory

authorities at national and international levels.

692

See Yokoi-Arai, supra note 585, at 1666.
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VI.

Conclusion: Toward a Just World Order in the Global Finance

A. International Standards and Global Governance

The past decades have witnessed a significant evolution of the international financial

system. The globalization of finance has led to a remarkable increase in the economic

integration in the world economy, and greater cross-border capital flows around the globe.

Moreover, the emergence of new and complex financial instruments over the preceding

decades has posed formidable challenges to financial regulatory authorities. The impact of

financial globalization has raised considerable concerns in the wake of economic

turbulence around the world. As such, the globalization of finance has attracted increasing

attention to the integrated international regulation of financial institutions.

At the same time, the question of global governance has become an agenda for

rethinking about the rules and norms that underpin the world order as a result of the Asian

crisis of 1997. The financial crisis has shifted the focus in global and domestic policy

debates back to the notion of market failure. Liberalization, deregulation and privatization

are not likely to be simply considered as sound economic theory. They are viewed to have

273

negative redistributive consequences that the invisible hand cannot address rather than

welfare enhancing outcomes. The consequence is a need for a new paradigm for

governing globalization, because the global governance agenda that emphasizes the

universalization of understanding of global governance based on efficiency and

effectiveness through one-size-fits-all formulas, in which democratic accountability and

participation is a secondary viable even though a diverse world cannot have rigid rules and

regulations uniformly. Continued national differences in financial market structures and

institutions have the important implications for international cooperative efforts at global

financial governance. Since international cooperation based on harmonization will

continue to be difficult, the regional solution can be a more effective alternative for

governing and regulating the global financial markets. As a consequence, many countries,

particularly deVeloping countries have shown increasing interest in regional cooperation

through regional institutional coordination. Regional solutions may help attenuate the

tension between harmonizing pressures of financial globalization led by the advanced
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financial centers and persistent national variations in financial systems and regulatory

frameworks.

Furthermore, the ongoing standard-setting process has a crucial shortcoming in that

most developing countries have had little participation in the standard-setting process, and

thereby do not have the incentives to embrace and implement international financial

standards. That is, the current global governance agenda is dominated by the powerful

states, alliance constructions and interest representations that feature in the structures of

international institutions and groupings. If less developed countries are excluded from the

standard-setting process, the process may come to little consequence. In these

circumstances, calls for the expansion of the membership in nontraditional international

organizations recognize that institutional constructions of key global policy fora are not

adequate in the context of global collaboration on a range ofpolicy issues. Without the

global collaboration through the extended participation, the global governance agenda

aiming to construct a new world order is in need of reevaluation due to the inequitable

nature of the negotiating processes themselves. Further, there is a need to devise effective
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and legitimate international institutions for the global era in a world infused by democratic

norms.

B. Democracy, Legitimacy and Accountability in the International
Financial Order
Transgovernmentalists arguably look to the evolving practice of formal and informal

governmental networks as the most realistic hope for asserting democratic principles, not

to the empowerment of traditional international organizations as the way forward for

democracy.693 Yet the transgovernmentalism is undoubtedly controversial. The

sharpest charge against networks is their lack of accountability in that they are networks

of the world's technocrats. As there is no formal recognition of the role of government

networks, accountability remains a concern. In response to the critiques on the lack of

accountability in the networks, some highlights the difference between the creation of the

Basel Accord and other global public policy initiatives.

694

According to the observer,

one significant difference to note between the Basel case and the other cases, such as
693
694

See Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order, supra note 298, at 199.
See Reinicke, Global Public Policy, supra note 181, at 113.
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international trade is the participation of nongovernmental actors in the various

policymaking stages is limited in the Basel case to one set of interests. Thus, the absence

of conflict among domestic interests in the Basel case expedited the agreement reached

by central bankers from member states. This loss of accountability at the domestic level

was not compensated for at the international level in that the postwar international

institutional structure was built to accommodate international economic interdependence,

which, from a public policy perspective, is best accommodated by facilitating

intergovernmental relations, and thus did not concern its democratic deficit. This view

emphasizes that a democratic deficit facilitated the conclusion of a compromise. Further,

the absence of accountability and transparency is arguably welcome for the timely
conclusion of an agreement, and the prevention of a global financial crisis. 695 In this way,

trans governmental networks can arguably operate more quickly and effectively than

formal bodies. This efficiency-oriented perspective is problematic in that trade-off

See id. at 114. Here it deserves noting a charge against the Basel Committee in light of its slow response
to the Asian economic crisis in 1997. Until the fall of 1997-more than a month after the Thai fmancial
crisis exploded-that the Basel Committee did not start moving, apparently realizing the severity of the crisis
facing developing countries. See Jaret Steiberg, The American Banker, Dec. 8, 1998, at 1.
695
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between democratic accountability and efficiency in global public policymaking may not

be based on a full consideration of equity and justice. 696

In fact, trans governmental networks do not provide mechanisms for either delegated

or participatory accountability. 697 It is often unclear which organizations have delegated

powers to them because the networks are informal. Moreover, participatory

accountability is minimal in that the general public is not involved and transparency is

typically lacking. Although abuses of power may in some instances be controlled by the

fragmentation of power and conflicts of interests between the participants, cooperation

among the members of the networks can easily become collusion of outsiders. It can be

said that there is some peer accountability within trans governmental networks, because

the entities involved may request information from one another and sanction other entities

Nevertheless, it is argued that "the informality, flexibility, and democratization of networks mean that it is
very difficult to establish precisely who is acting and when. See Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy,
supra note 193, at 193-194. In response to the critiques of democratic accountability, Slaughter claims that
the critics often miss several key points: legitimacy may derive from performance as well as process;
government networks typically operate through persuasion rather than authoritative decision; and these
networks may actually empower democratic politicians and their governments by promoting cooperation
among them when the alternative could be leaving decisions to markets. See id.
697 See Grant & Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power, supra note 275, at 11.
696
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for perceived misbehavior. 698 However, there are no clear mechanisms of accountability

since accountability requires a public standard of legitimacy to which political actors are

held. Nonetheless, there is the potential for negotiation constraints. The power of an

entity in the network may be checked only where abuses are against the interests of

principles of the other entities within the networks. 699 In this regard, diversity among

parties is a precondition for negotiation constraint. Otherwise, collusion is likely to

follow. 700 However, serious issues of democratic accountability still remain because

trans governmental regulatory organizations operate like clubs. In short, the

organizations look like closed and secretive clubs to functional outsiders, even in the

same government.

By pointing to democratic deficit, globalization protesters call into question the

legitimacy of international institutions and trans governmental organizations in that they are

undemocratic, but their rules have powerful effects despite the weakness of the institutions

698
699
700

See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 108
Id.
Id.
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and organizations. 70t As such, consistency with democratic procedures has become

increasingly important in today's world. In this context, there is a need to develop the

legitimacy of global governance. To that end, three key things are required: (1) greater

clarity about democracy, (2) a comprehensive understanding of accountability, and (3) a

willingness to experiment. 702 In short, the club model requires modification. As one
argues, it is significant not to put more weight on the organizations than they can bear. 703

Rather than pursue strong institutions to strengthen deep integration at the international

level, it is more appropriate to pursue "networked minimalism.,,704 Putting too much

weight on the organizations before they are sufficiently legitimate to bear leads to deadlock.

701 It deserves noting the protesters' interesting points: long lines of delegation from multiple governments
and lack of transparency often weaken accountability; although the organizations may be agents of states,
they often represent only parts of states. See id.
702 See id. at 109. It is argued that "[ d]emocracy is government by officials who are accountable to the
majority of the people in a jurisdiction ... For democracy to work well, "the people" have to regard
themselves as a political community.... Democratic governments are judged both on the procedures they
follow (inputs) and on the results they obtain (outputs)." See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, The Club
Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in Efficiency, Equity, and
Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium 281-282 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001).
Further, both inputs and outputs influence legitimacy at the international level. Thus, for international
institutions to be legitimate, their practices and the result of their activities need to meet broadly democratic
standards. See id.
703 See id. at 290.
704 Id. According to some observers, "[n]etworked minimalism is a broad principle of governance--more a
matter of what not to try (hierarchy and intrusiveness in domestic policies) than what to do." See Josph S. Nye
& Robert o. Keohane, Introduction, in Governance in a Globalizing World 37 (Joseph S. Nye et al. eds.,
2000) Further, "[n]etworked minimalism seeks to preserve national democratic processes and embedded
liberal compromises while allowing the benefits of economic integration." See id.
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In short, government networks may reinforce the traditional undemocratic features of

international law by consolidating the position ofthe state over the individual unless

transparency and certainty over the impact of such processes are present. In this

prescriptive process, the benefits of greater plurality will be lost. Hence, developing

appropriate measures to judge the transparency and democratic accountability in the
institutions is crucial to deal with global problems. 705

Similarly, national governments need to achieve a balance between expertise and

representativeness, and accountability to ensure democratic governance at the domestic

level. While globalization has played a major role in convincing many countries to free

their central banks from political control, what has been overlooked in the rush to make

central banks independent is the fact that such political insulation does not come at a price.

Indeed, the insulation of central banks from popular control has become one ofthe

signifiers whereas achieving a balance between representativeness and independence is a

tough task. Supporters of central-bank independence defend it in two related ways. The
705 Through their participation in decision-making, global civil society, in particular, epistemic communities,
and markets playa role in enhancing the legitimacy of global governance. See Keohane & Nye, The Club
Model of Multilateral Cooperation, supra note 702, at 291.
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first is theoretical and justifies treating monetary policy differently from other kinds of

policy due to its supposed special characteristics. The second is practical and justifies

treating monetary policy differently because so doing supposedly creates significant

economic benefits. 706 In response, some observers note that monetary policy is simply not

that distinctive and need not be treated differently while they admit that monetary policy is

actually complicated and confusing; politicians and public do often view with a short term

perspective. 707 The second rationale for central-bank independence is also strictly practical

and unconvincing. 708 As far as developing countries as opposed to industrial ones are

concerned, the positive impact of independent central banks on inflation do not simply

continue to exist, both because politics in developing countries is often misguided by

informal rules rather than coercive laws and formal procedures, and because such countries

706 According to advocates of central-bank independence, monetary policy cannot be entrusted to normal
policymaking process because it is complicated and requires a disciplined, long-term perspective to succeed.
Further, ordinary people and politicians cannot also think far into the future or accept pain now for gain later
in the context of time inconsistency problem. See Sheri Berman & Kathleen R. McNamara, Bank on
Democracy: Why Central Banks Need Public Oversight, Foreign Affairs, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 3.
707 See id.
708 It is argued that central-bank independence has no measurable effect on real economic performance. That
is, insulating a country's central bank from popular control from politicians and publics, and giving it to
technocrats seems neither to span economic growth nor to reduce unemployment. See id. at 4. The one area
where a possible boon from central-bank independence has been detected may be in fighting inflation.
However, some note that independent central banks have little positive long-term impact on inflation unless
backed by a societal consensus on the need for stable prices. Id. at 5.
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lack the range and depth of institutions required to carry out full policy implementation and

coordination.

By turning over monetary policy to unelected and often unaccountable technocrats,
countries concede much control over their economic fates. 709 Since surrendering such

authority would be a critical decision, it is worth taking only after full national debate.

Since economic benefits are questionable, fully taking control of monetary policy away

from government regardless ofthe particular national or economic context could have dire

outcomes. Moreover, one argues that even though "transparency--openness-is now

recognized as a critical aspect of democratic process[, and t]here cannot be effective

democratic governance without information[, y]et central banks continue to operate in

secrecy.,,710 In short, transparency and democratic control on balance create moderation,

In this regard, it is enough to ask whether national policy should not be delegated to independent delegates.
See id. at 4 ("Anyone unwilling to go so far should be prepared to let monetary policy be just as subject to
democratic control as everything else.). On the opposed perspective, see Keohane & Nye, supra note 702, at
277 ("U.S. institutions that are deliberately insulated from elections--in particular, the Supreme court and the
Federal Reserve Board---routinely publish their deliberations or opinions, so that not only the results, but the
reasoning and disagreements involve, can be publicly known. These institutions are held accountable through
criticisms by professional networks, such as legal scholars writing in law journals and economists writing
scholarly articles and offering opinions in the public media. Without transparency, these means of
accountability would be eviscerated.").
710 See Berman & McNamara, supra note 706, at 7 ("If the [central] bank's decision-making processes were
reasonably transparent and open to democratic oversight, the pain could perhaps be explained and justified.").
709
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success, and most importantly legitimacy whereas they may produce mistakes and

embarrassment. These are exactly the qualities that the world economy needs in the global

era. Consequently, the rhetoric of democracy has an important role in the absence of

systemic democracy at the national and international levels in a globalizing world.

c.

The State-Market Condominium of Global Finance

While the global financial community is still in a state of transition, much more

understanding of the relationship of the state to the market is required to govern and

regulate properly an increasingly integrated world economy in the global era. Indeed, the

relation between states and markets has varied by place and by time. Over time markets

have become more extensive, more integrated, and more intricately interwoven into the

fabric of life. Evolving and integrated markets pose different challenges for governance

and regulation than those it was sought to master when markets were simpler, more

In this context, Keohane and Nye assert that"[t]ransparency does not imply governance through elections, as
the examples of the Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve Board show. Transparency does mean that the
arguments and reasoning on trade rules, and the adjudication of those rules, are made public. Democratic
societies demand this of institutions that allocate values profoundly affecting people's lives." See Keohane &
Nye, supra note 702, at 277.
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segmented, less audacious in their reach. The growing scale, reach, and complexity of

market institutions and market players are reopening everlasting questions about the role of

the public and private sectors, and redefining what it means to govern and regulate properly.

In this regard, from the more state-centric perspective one argues that the state is still very

much in control ofthe process of global financial integration, working through the
cooperative regulatory and supervisory process of the Basel Committee among others. 711

By contrast, the other claims that the market was winning in the contemporary period of

transnational integration, which yielded a retreat of the state in the face of market

ascendancy,712 largely self-induced, with serious dangers for the legitimacy and functioning

ofthe global financial system. These two viewpoints recognize the continuous interaction

or interdependence of states and markets in the process of governance and regulation, but

they imply that states and markets are antagonists competing blueprints for social

organization. As a result, it is argued that when one advances, the other gives away.

See Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209, at 103-128.
See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy 121 (1996)
(arguing that the balance between the state and the market shifted after 1970s in a way that made the state just
one source of authority among several and left "a yawning hole of non-authority or non-governance").
711

712
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Although the state-market dichotomy approach viewing states and markets as separate

(if interacting) entities is often a useful abstraction, it is critical to note that states and

markets are part of the same integrated ensemble of governance and regulation, a statemarket condominium, and should be thought of as SUCh. 713 The regulatory and policy-

making institutions of the state are one constituent of the market, one set of institutions,

through which the overall process of governance and regulation operates.714 At the same

time, the state is and should be involved in the market, because the market cannot function

as a system without political and regulatory processes that national regulatory authorities
represent. 715 Likewise financial regulation and supervision has always involved private

sectors. Recent financial regulatory and supervisory trend is toward more market-oriented

in a global context, and a corresponding adjustment of national practices. Furthermore, the

state has progressively delegated a number oftasks either to private bodies or international

organizations. In this sense, there is not so much a retreat of the state in the face of market
713 See Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, States, Markets and Governance for Emerging Market Economies: Private
Interests, the Public Good and the Legitimacy of the Development Process, International Affairs, Vol. 79,
No.4 (2003) at 765.
714 See id.
715 Id. at 779. Democratic accountability is required to build the state-market condominium where
functioning democracy is absent or poorly embedded because the condominium is not immune from rentseeking, powerful and predatory private interests. See id. at 777.
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forces as transformation of the state in symbiosis with transformation ofmarkets. 716 The

form and functions ofthe state will rather continue to evolve, as they did in the past. As

such, the private sector plays a crucial role in regulating global financial markets, even as it

seems to operate in private ways.

However, the significant to note is that the market will become discredited as an

instrument of policy and regulation when the private market processes reveal only greed

and privilege for the very few, and the extent to which private agent cannot fulfill their
responsibility to society as shown in the Enron debacle. 717 As a matter of fact, the private

sector can playa crucial role in the financial system at national, regional and international

levels as long as there is an appropriate balance between public authority and private

interests in the domain of global financial governance and regulation. To that end, there is

a need to maintain strong public authority over private market power in the financial system

716
717

See id. at775
Id. at 779.
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because ofthreats posed to democratic accountability by the undue private dominance of
public purpose become more severe in the international domain. 718

As noted, the global era is a time of unprecedented opportunities and unique challenges

to market participants, and regulatory authorities alike in that the increasing complexity of

globalization brings with it in a global system of governance and regulation. Needless to

say, both the public and private sectors are required to playa key role in dealing with

challenges posed by technological advancements and the rapid innovations, and pursuing

the objective of a modem, flexible yet stable economic system. Although the perspectives

of the public and private sectors may differ from time to time, the objective of both parties

is the same-to maintain a strong and vibrant economic system. It is evident that each

satisfying one's responsibilities and reinforcing the other through the sustained cooperation

will be able to properly govern a rapidly evolving, ever-more integrated world economy in

the global era.

718 Democratic accountability is required to build the state-market condominium where functioning
democracy is absent or poorly embedded.
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